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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is the investigation of the history of
violent activity in colonial Virginia, paying particular attention to
the use of violence as a factor in shaping Virginia's orderly society.
Research materials consulted indicate a major pattern of social
violence consisting of an early component of Indian-white hostility, a
middle component of white social violence derived from severe social
stresses, and a later component of violence between white masters and
black slaves. A minor pattern of official violence, in which the
colonial government used force and punishment to control crime and
social deviance, occurred. The government helped shape Virginia society
through that official violence.
The major pattern of violent activity occurred between 1607 and
1735, with the Indian-white component lasting from 1607 to 1646, when
whites succeeded in crushing the power of Virginia Tidewater Indians
to resist white expansion. Between 1646 and 1705, a number of stresses
within white society helped breed extensive unrest which found fullest
expression in Bacon's Rebellion.
Imperial relations such as commercial
policy, royal land grants, centralization of the Empire, and religious
and political upheaval of the 1680s in England encouraged disorder in
Virginia. In the colony itself extensive exploitation of land and
labor by the elite and a decline of opportunity for political recog
nition helped produce major discontent. By 1705, however, that unrest
had largely dissipated and slavery had replaced white servitude as the
principal labor system. The introduction of large numbers of slaves
in the first quarter of the eighteenth century exacerbated race rela
tions and was reflected in violence between blacks and whites. By
1735, threats of major violence between slaves and masters had ended.
From 1735 until 1755, violence consisted of criminal activity and a
low level of political unrest expressed in election riots and assaults
on the families or servants of burgesses.
The minor pattern of official violence suggests that, despite the
harsh requirements of penal law, by 1755 colonial Virginia courts had
found ways to ameliorate criminal punishment. Fines, jail sentences,
and pardons or reprieves were often substituted for the whippings or
hangings which had been used in the seventeenth century.
This study suggests, thus, that early Virginians "used" violence
in a number of ways which aided the creation and development of an
orderly colonial society.
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TURMOIL IN AN ORDERLY SOCIETY:
COLONIAL VIRGINIA,

1607-1754;

A HISTORY AND ANALYSIS

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

In 1950 Henry Steele Commager published The American Mind, a book
in which he depicted American characteristics as essentially benevolent.
Gregarious, optimistic, confident--these he identified then as typifying
the American individual.

American society was "the most favored of all

countries, the happiest and most virtuous of all societies,"

Commager

claimed.'*' Exactly twenty years later Commager delivered an address at
the Milton S. Eisenhower Symposium, The Johns Hopkins University, a
symposium whose topic was violence.
had altered significantly.

His opinion of American character

In his address Commager called attention to

the pervasiveness of violence throughout American history, arguing that
violence was a major characteristic

of America.

In his analysis of

American violence he commented thatthe vast bulk of violent activity
in this country was not only official, but cloaked with respectability
by the very nature of its officialness.
In America violence is clad in the vestments of respectability
and armored with the authority of the law.
It customarily took
and takes the form of assaults on the weak and helpless, on the
whole of society, on future generations. It is violence against
native peoples, Negroes, immigrants, women and children, perishing
and dangerous classes; it is violence against nature herself.
Commager defined violence very broadly, charging that historians study
ing the topic had used too narrow an angle of vision to encompass the
vast extent of violence during America's rise.

Not only were actual,

physical acts of violence against person and property (the usual

definition of violence and the one used in this work) included in his
interpretation, but non-physical acts using power and force against
those unprotected from groups representing authority were included in
his overview of violence in American history.

The impression left

the reader is that American history is pervaded with violence, with
little break in that violent thread since the earliest settlements.
Commager's insights suggest that a major element of violence in
the history of the United States has been that of the dominant white
males against many minority racial groups.

To resolve the apparent

paradox that so little political violence appeared in the pages of
American history, although the nation had been denominated a violent
society, many scholars have pointed to racial and social group violence
as the key to explanation.^

They suggest that American whites have

used violence repeatedly to subject or to repress racial minorities
in the country.

Group or racial violence has served as a "safety

valve"; that is, it has reduced tensions within the dominant white
culture, thus, relieving pressures which might have manifested them
selves in political violence or in other forms of violence more
visible to American historians prior to 1965.

American historians

preceding that date have focused upon the political history of this
nation, a concern generally confined to national politics, an area
largely free of the violence so prevalent in other areas of the
nation's history.
Earliest investigations of the violent history of the nation
have examined the Revolution, the Civil War, or the Indian Wars of
the late nineteenth century.

As Commager noted, American whites think

of King Philip's War, the Deerfield Massacre, slave uprisings, attacks

against management mounted by labor, or destruction by alleged anarch
ists or socialists when they consider violence.**

They seldom per

ceive that white intrusions on Indian lands and culture prompted
Indian retaliation.

They do not understand the deprivations and de

humanization of slavery.

They have suffered an inability to see that

management has probably been more guilty of beginning so-called labor
violence than workers.

Socialists or anarchists in this country have

been subjected to violence more often than they have practiced it
against an otherwise peaceful American people.^
Thus the fact that America's great violence has been confined
within the social structure and fabric rather than the political arena
Q

has obscured the intellectual focus for much scholarly work.

With

the great violence of the 1960s--ghetto riots, campus and student
turbulence and disorder, and the Vietnam War— American social scien
tists awakened to the general problem of the role of violence in
shaping American society.

By 1970 many historians had marked out lines

of investigation and had begun to point to some conclusions about the
nature and origins of violence in the United States' history.

One of

the most important general points made was that violence was generated
by the dominant white group in American society and that violence or
force were used against those classes or groups in America possessing
Q

little or no authority or power to resist.
At the same time a reexamination of the history of relations
between colonial whites and Indians as well as the origins of slavery
began.

In both lines of investigation violence was shown to play an

important role.

Not only were Indian wars responsible for clearing a

great deal of the eastern seaboard for colonial purposes, but less

visible intrusions into Indian lands and culture likewise forced
Indians to evacuate their ancestral homelands.

Although Indians

generally were a semi-nomadic peoples, many tribes and nations such
as the Iroquois Confederation or the Powhatan Confederation of Virginia
had long resided in their respective homesites before English or other
European settlers arrived.^-0

The many ways in which Europeans pres

sured Indians along the east coast resulted in a century of almost
continuous warfare and hostility with whites eventually the victors.
The course of hostile relations between Indians and English
developed and refined notions of English ethnocentrism and racism.
The English had arrived with an already-established sense of ethno
centrism, one perhaps more keenly developed than their fellow Euro
peans.

Ethnocentrism, the notion that one's national group is in

herently superior to any other, encouraged English aggressiveness,
for it stimulated ideas of Englishmen's natural abilities to lead
other peoples.^

Once that notion was firmly engrained in English

minds in the New World, racism and its associated violence virtually
became inevitable.

There was a fine line of distinction between

English ethnocentrism and racism by 1600, when permanent English col
onization of North America became a possibility; and some surviving
evidence from pre-1600 English colonizing experiments suggests that
those engaged in the experiment had come close to crossing the line.
Historically, then, Englishmen arrived in the New World with
some already-established ethnocentric notions conditioning their per
ceptions of Indian receptions of them.

However, full-blown racism

was a product both of the Indian-English confrontations and the
process of Negro enslavement in North America.

The use of white labor,

so prevalent in the seventeenth century, yielded often to Negro
slavery in those colonies engaged in commercial crop agriculture.

The

"unthinking decision" brought to English mainland America large num
bers of "seasoned" and fresh black Africans to work plantation
fields.

12

The conjunction of labor, English conceptions of blacks,

and Africans as slaves helped to establish powerful racist notions in
eighteenth-century white Americans.

1^

Associated with the process of

enslavement came severe and harsh abuses of Negroes, violence itself
written into slave codes to be used as threats to repress rebellious
ness and resistance.

Brutal reprisals on blacks even suspected of

insurrectionary plotting reminded other blacks of the penalties for
resistance to slavery.

Thus, by the end of the colonial era, violence,

repression, and exploitation of racial minorities were tied together.
Racial violence remained prominent in the general scope of
violent activity within the United States.

The nation grew with an

increasingly diverse population as Europeans of many nations flooded
into the country during the nineteenth century.

Those who considered

themselves "true natives" did not receive the new immigrants' benev
olently.

Whether discussing the Irish and German immigration of the

mid-nineteenth or the Eastern, Southeastern, and Southern European
immigration of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
scholars have found a high level of intolerance, frequently resulting
in violence, on the part of the older Anglo-Saxon g r o u p s . ^
Although "native" Americans resisted the influx of immigrants,
they also exploited slave labor and Indian lands during most of the
nineteenth century.

Slavery became a central political issue of the

mid-century, with many anti-abolition riots occurring in the 1830s to

repress Americans protesting continuation of the institution.

The

issues in which slavery came to play a part reflected most of the
major political difficulties of the era.

It required a civil war

lasting four years and costing six hundred thousand lives before
slavery legally ended in the nation.

1s

But the racial issue, of which

slavery was so much a part, did not die with the institution.

It con

tinued a part of the violent activity of the nation from the end of
the Civil War until the present.

Lynchings, race riots, and other

forms of violent exploitation of blacks by whites extended to the
post-World War II era.

Whether the racism which is so ingrained in

white society will ever disappear is questionable; however, some of
the worst racial violence has quieted as lynchings have ended and
major race riots have been replaced by ghetto riots.

Race riots of

the pre-1960s meant major outbreaks of violence between whites and
blacks, but ghetto riots were confined to black areas of residence.
Blacks aimed their violence at the property of whites rather than at
the whites themselves, a reversal of earlier race tensions, when
whites deliberately sought out blacks in order to kill them, to de
prive them of their property, or to humiliate them in some other way."^
One of the oldest and most continuous threads of violence in
American history was that of the nearly three hundred years1 war
between whites and Indians for control of the continent.

Begun in the

early seventeenth century, whites pushed and coerced Indians until the
1890s.

Seldom were Indians able to resist successfully white attempts

to clear them from their native lands.

This is not to say that Indians

were entirely blameless in the long, cruel wars.

They taught Euro

peans new means of inflicting barbaric tortures on their enemies and

they often initiated warfare with their raids, skirmishes, and out
right massacres.

However, whites retaliated with a much higher level

of violence than their red counterparts.

Whites also exerted full

authority over Indians when they surrendered their independence.
Whether in the seventeenth or the nineteenth centuries, Indians be
came wards of the victorious governments conquering them.

Their inde

pendence was severely curtailedr-another example of whites in America
expanding their freedom at the expense of a minority people.

The

extensive use of violence by both peoples may have conditioned a
callous reaction to the use of violence, thus contributing to a rise
in the visible level of violence within white society.

In regions

where whites and Indians fought most bitterly, whites may have been
conditioned to resort to violence more readily than their European
cousins.

The Indians remained a people to exploit, especially in

terms of their lands.
free or inexpensive.

The white desired above all access to land,
Whites came to regard it as their birthright

that they should have such land, but Indians possessed i t . ^
Although slavery and Indian wars represent two major violent
stresses in American history, there did exist significant, major
violence within white society itself.

White violence often occurred

during an absence of racial strife or turbulence and it was more
social than political; that is, upper- and middle-class whites strug
gled to repress and to control lower-class whites.

Vigilante move

ments represent the classic example of the use of violence by upperand middle-class whites against their lower-class counterparts.
Violence within white society assumed characteristics different from
vigilantism, also.

But those other elements of violence remained

directed at groups within white society.

Seldom did that violence

spill over \ato^the political arena, for absorption of violence within
the many, diverse social groups of the United States relieved political
pressure. 19
7
The late nineteenth century was one of the most violent eras of
American history, but there occurred little major political violence
in the thirty-five years following the Civil War.

Not only did

vigilante movements appear throughout the trans-Mississippi West, but
family feuds, labor-raanagement violence, and farmer protest characterized violence of that era.

20

In addition, racial strife had not dis

appeared, for Indian wars moved toward their inexorable conclusion and
high levels of violence directed at blacks continued.

21

These types

of violence represent social stresses and strains not reflected in the
political arena until the 1890s.
In that decade a third-party political movement, the Populists,
redirected into politics much discontent represented by the social
violence.

The channeling of that discontent reduced levels of violence.

Along with the politicization of that social violence came increased
attention beyond the United States' borders as American imperialism
struggled to fashion a "place in the sun" for the young nation.

The

imperialistic forces released by such events as the Spanish-American
War or annexation of the Hawaiian Islands also involved American
racism.

Whites in the nation reasoned that if Cubans or Filippinos

were unfit to govern themselves, then so were non-white elements of
the domestic population.

Dominant groups in the nation sanctioned

withdrawal of political rights from blacks and other minorities previ
ously accorded participation.

Moreover, the racism associated with

10
the rise of American imperialism spread into domestic relations, and
blacks found themselves even more the victims of violence as lynchings
rose and race riots grew.

22

An interesting pattern of violence suggests itself from the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

As racist impulses erupted

in the late 1890s and as social discontent was siphoned into political
action, violence within white society itself declined.

Moreover,

when the threat of a Populist political association of the white and
black lower classes transcending race developed in southern society,
southern upper-class whites, trying to regain control of political
affairs, made race an issue in that early 1890s Populist movement.
The conscious appeal to racism broke the incipient connection between
lower-class whites and blacks and released the worst racial impulses
of those w h i t e s . ^

How much effect that conscious appeal to race had

in redirecting violence generally in the society is difficult to
measure, but an unconscious result of the rise of Jim Crowism was the
reduction of tensions within white society.

White violent proclivities

were redirected at blacks and other minority peoples in the United
States, and major violence within white society itself was reduced.
Certainly other factors helped alleviate the violence within white
classes.

Reduction of bitterness and hatred following the Civil War

was marked by northern Republican willingness to abandon the Negro in
an effort to win substantial economic favors from southern w h i t e s . ^
The election of 1896 also helped lessen white tensions, because the
Republican Party succeeded in forging a new political coalition trans
forming that party into a majority party for the next several decades.
Republican willingness to sponsor reform of abuses by privileged

11
classes, while making concessions to those very same privileged groups,
relieved many social pressures within white society in the early
twentieth century.

A number of other factors also reduced those ten

sions which had bred violence earlier, factors independent of race but
not necessarily divorced from the group nature of that earlier
OK

violence.
Patterns of the type briefly sketched above may not be unique to
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In earlier times,

dominant groups of white society may have used many of the same tech
niques to reduce tensions within the white society and to redirect
white violent proclivities in other directions.

Whether these choices

were conscious or unconscious is usually impossible to tell, but there
may be similar patterns earlier, perhaps as early as the colonial era.
An excellent colony to begin such a study is Virginia.

Her

colonial society possessed all elements playing roles in the violent
pattern suggested above.

Indians, whites, and blacks lived and

mingled in colonial Virginia.

There existed a long period of skirm

ishing, hostility, and warfare between Indians and whites, a period
inaugurating a racism transferred to blacks when they appeared in
large n umbers in the colony in the eighteenth century.

There was a

period of high-level white violence and a sudden diminution of that
violence.

Blacks became the target of a virulent racism in the

eighteenth century, and a high level of violence and threatened in
surrection between the two peoples marked several decades.

Finally,

a social structure constructed from wealth and acquisitiveness, but
using for its principles a more medieval vision, characterized Vir
ginia society by 1720.

The post-1720 structure has been cited as an

12
example of an orderly society, one exemplifying the principles of def
erence.

The image suggested by the deferential nature of eighteenth-

century Virginia is one of a slow-changing rural, peaceful society,
disturbed only by the onslaught of the Revolution.
colony remained minimal in this image.

Violence in the

What few violent events were

observed appeared patternless, isolated incidents, generally committed
by lower-class convict servants.

26

But Virginia's leadership had risen largely from the classes it
was seeking to control.

It did not possess until the early eighteenth

century the traditional privileges of deference, birth, property, and
education, which English social and political leadership did.
qualities Virginia's leadership had to secure over time.

Those

Not until the

second or third decade of the eighteenth century had sufficient property,
labor to work that property, and educational opportunities passed into
the hands of the elite so that traditional principles of deference
could be asserted.

Until then, the elite relied on power derived from

its acquisitiveness to control the society.

Abuses of that power may

have encouraged severe stresses within the white society, stresses
causing major violent upheavals in the late seventeenth century. ^
But the redirection of violence to blacks in the early eighteenth
century, and the threat to white control of the Virginia wilderness
posed by "blacks, aroused harsh racial antagonisms during the first
three decades of that century.

A number of other factors encouraged

reduction of tensions within the society, but the racial threat per
ceived by whites may have added one more factor to the alleviation of
those tensions.

28

Virginia's colonial society spanned the whole of the colonial

13
American evolutionary era.

The colony, some one-hundred and forty-

seven years old by the beginning of the Great War for Empire in 1754,
was b o m as a business enterprise and developed into a full-fledged
society replete with its own institutions of government, religion,
labor, and courts before 1 7 0 0 . By 1754 Virginia had reached maturity
and was in the process of integrating with the rest of colonial Amer
ica. ^

Virginia had reached a level of stability matched only by South

Carolina by 1754, but the process had been neither easy nor violencefree, for a distinct pattern of violence emerges from study of surviving
colonial records.

31

This pattern, based primarily on race, appears in three distinct
epochs.

First, a struggle between Indians and whites from 1607 until

1646 left whites access to land and physical control of the Tidewater
region.

Second, between 1646 and 1705 whites in the colony struggled

violently among themselves over a number of major difficulties.

Third,

with the arrival of a great number of blacks in Virginia a new racial
threat was perceived by whites by 1705.

Between 1705 and 1735 whites

struggled to suppress blacks into slavery and blacks fought to ameli
orate the institution.

Following 1735, some minor patterns of violence

within white society appeared as outlaw gangs and political turmoil
added new elements to the history of violence in the colony.
Between 1607 and 1646, whites and Indians fought each other, with
whites achieving physical supremacy over Indians by the latter year.
During that almost forty-year period, English attitudes toward Indians
deteriorated from ambivalence and ambiguity to outright hostility
bordering on racism.

By 1646 most whites in the colony dismissed

Indians as barriers to expansion and mastery of the wilderness, more

14
like obstacles to be cleared than fellow-forest residents with some
share in the development of the society.

Yet this had not been the

case when the first whites arrived in 1607.

Several years passed in

which whites and Indians treated each other warily, but with respect
and, on occasion, affection and humanity.

By 1625, however, all such

feelings between the two peoples were disappearing and a separation
based on race and violence was ensuing.

32

Between 1607 and 1614 Indians and whites felt each other out,
skirmishing and raiding.

In some years outright war occurred.

With

the kidnapping of Pocahontas in 1613 and her subsequent marriage to
John Rolfe in 1614, the hostilities temporarily ended.

During those

seven years English suspicions of Powhatan Confederation Indians con
vinced many whites that the Indians intended to exterminate them.

Be

tween 1614 and 1622 some skirmishes and raids occurred, but by-andlarge conditions remained stable.

In 1622, however, the Confederation

Indians launched an attack on the colony, now grown to some fifteen
hundred, which cost the lives of three hundred and fifty whites.

The

subsequent Indian war lasted into the 1630s, drove Indians from the
peninsula between the James and York Rivers, and aroused white hatred
of the natives.

Peace in the 1630s continued into the 1640s only to

be broken by another Indian attack in 1644.

This attack brought a

response from colonists now determined to destroy the Confederation
and to throw open its lands to white settlement.

By 1646 Indian re

sistance had crumbled and the Confederation had disappeared.
During the long hostilities between whites and Indians, basic
institutions within the colony were initiated.
but later modified, from English precedents.

Most were borrowed,
Labor remained the dearest

15
necessity, after foodstuffs, throughout the colony's history, but never
more so than during the 1620s when tobacco prices in England and other
European markets were at their highest.

Although Virginians could not

produce crops sufficient to fill those markets, the competition for
labor and land was so great in the 1620s that considerable violence was
generated between masters and servants, violence which helped create a
OO

need for local courts.
of an ordered society
and disorder.^

The lack of adherence to the English concept
in that era contributed further to the disruption

There existed few "orders" in Virginia after the

Company's dissolution in 1624, because so many of those to whom leader
ship was entrusted by virtue of their birth, education, and social
position had either died or left the colony by that date.

35

The idea of the ordered society, comparable in its construction
to the concept

of the ordered universe, governed English social models

in the seventeenth century.

The attempt to duplicate that model in

Virginia took several decades to complete.

But the early years of

English existence in the Chesapeake Bay region were largely artificial
in that the Virginia Company of London ruled the colony and tried to
fashion it more into a business factory than into a colony.

Thus,

proportionately large numbers of educated, well-born Englishmen came
to the colony, for the Company was composed of numbers of wealthy,
upper-middle-class merchants and many gentlemen, both landed gentry
and nobles.

Those who came to Virginia, however, helped little and

harmed much, for they became idle and disorderly.

Soldiers returned

from wars in support of Dutch independence were frequently among those
arriving in Virginia to aid in protection of the colony.

The mixture

of Indian hostilities, constant friction between master and servant,

and substantial numbers of idle gentlemen, whether soldiers or scions
of well-born families in England, was an explosive one, difficult to
govern .^
Indian hostilities, infrequent between 1614 and 1622 but by-andlarge constant until 1646, created a need for internal unity among
whites.

One method by which that unity could be achieved was through

governmental coercion and force.

The use of official violence, that

is, governmental punishment to control criminal or immoral behavior,
served as one means by which order and stability could be effected in
the colony.

With the high level of Indian-white hostility in the 1620s,

the constant need for labor, and the competitive struggle for profits
from the tobacco trade the infant society was beset by violence or
threats of violence.

A need for order existed, but those who might

have provided such were busily engaged pursuing their own interests.
During that decade and the next one, Virginia's government succeeded
in fashioning means, using violence, to control the disorder and in
stability in the society.

Official violence and the erection of local

militia units gave security and strength to the society.

At the same

time, the creation of county governments permitted those struggling for
recognition and power in the society the opportunity to acquire status
through elevation to county courts.
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By 1625 cultural hatreds was another method used by white leader
ship to forge a more unified society, for appeals to hatred of Indians
brought together disparate class elements for security purposes.

More

over, to ensure that respect for authority and for status was effected
in the colony, the government used high levels of official violence.
Samplings from county courts suggest that they also were prepared to
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uphold their positions of power and dignity through the use of severe
punishments for offenses.®®

The most important component of violence

during those first four decades of Virginia's existence, however, was
Indian-white.
Indian-white violence suffused the entire early history of the
colony.

Although Englishmen arrived in Virginia suspicious of Indians,

they did not intend to eradicate Indian culture nor to deprive Indians
of their lands.

But the history of Indian-white relations in Virginia

during the seventeenth century is a history of constant encroachments
on Indian lands and removal of Indians either to reservations within
the colony or to lands beyond the colony's frontiers.

The violence

associated with this history may have encouraged Virginia whites to use
violence whenever it seemed appropriate.
By 1646 the English had successfully crushed resistance from local
Indians wishing to retain their lands.

The whites asserted full con

trol over affairs of those tribes comprising the Powhatan Confederation,
and for the rest of the seventeenth century, the colonists had only to
confront Indians from beyond Virginia's tidewater districts.

As the

colony expanded into the eastern portions of the Piedmont, colonists
pressured Indians both in the Northern Neck (and in those areas of
Maryland adjacent to that region) and to the west of the settlements.
Yet those Indians, taken collectively, posed no threat to the existence
of the colony.

The Powhatan Confederation had posed such a threat, and

that threat is the basic distinction between the two groups of Indians.
During the last half of the seventeenth century, Virginia's existence
was not confronted by an internal, racial life-or-death situation.
Whites living on the fringes of the colony were, of course, exposed to
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constant threats from the red men with whom they came in alraost-daily
contact.

Moreover, pressures on Indians resident near Virginia from

whites and Indians dwelling far beyond the colony mounted until in the
late seventeenth century frequent raids and skirmishes occurred.

Those

raids remained a frontier phenomenon, however one no longer posing a
threat to the security and safety of the colony itself.

But Virginians

exaggerated the fears of the Indians raiding the fringes of the colony,
often raising a specter of Indian massacre far out of proportion to the
real threat.^®
The release from the dangerous, internal threat posed by the Pow
hatan Confederation left whites to confront themselves in Virginia.
There existed many grievances between Virginians and England as well as
among Virginians after 1650.

As the seventeenth century advanced whites

grew increasingly restive for a variety of reasons.

Disorder and

violence erupted on several occasions in the colony, turbulence arising
out of a multiplicity of grievances.

Coupled with the grievances came

social changes such as rapid population growth and expansion of wealth.
Labor supply continued to be a problem for it had been exploited re
peatedly during the early decades of the colony's settlement.

However,

the internal threat of Indian annihilation may have prevented resort to
mass violence by those being exploited.

Even when Indian-white hostil

ities were reduced, as in the 1630s, whites did not react to major
grievances with mass violence as they would in later decades.

The

revolt against Governor Harvey was engineered and carried out by a
handful of men, most of whom had acquired positions of power by ex
ploiting opportunities for obtaining labor presented in the 1620s and
1 6 3 0 s . I t is possible that the populace followed their lead because
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they were Identified as Virginians, but their exploitation of every
opportunity and advantage in those years makes them sound much like
those against whom whites of many classes rebelled in 1676.
During the years following 1646 grievances and exploitation be
came common in Virginia.

The economy, tied closely to tobacco by 1650,

was subject to shifts and changes of English mercantile policy which
might not have occurred in a more diversified economy.^

English

Navigation Laws enacted following 1651, royal grants of huge pieces of
Virginia to the Crown's favorites, and creation of new colonies ad
jacent to Virginia's lands aroused antagonisms between Virginians and
the royal government.^

By the 1660s Virginia and her sister colony

Maryland were producing more tobacco than the English domestic market
could absorb.

The price had plummeted and hundreds of Virginians found

themselves impoverished.

The continued exploitation of white inden

tured servants, the most common form of labor in the colony, and the
engrossment of enormous chunks of land by those possessing power and
position in the colony aggravated relations between the leaders and the
led.

Protests and remonstrances were presented, both by Virginia to

England and by Virginians to Virginians, but, at least in the percep
tions of ordinary, seventeenth-century white settlers, to little avail.
Moreover, beginning in the late 1640s and continuing until 1675,
large numbers of new colonists arrived in Virginia to enter the labor
force or to take up new lands.

The population swelled from fifteen

thousand to forty thousand in the twenty-year period from 1649 to
1670.

/Q

Many of those coming to the colony were young men, ranging in

ages from sixteen to twenty-five.

Moreover, there existed an increas

ing supply of guns in the colony, guns many young men were able to
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obtain for one reason or a n other.^

Also, the existence of a large

class of white indentured servants meant that every year many of those
servants would be freed.

But opportunity for them had largely been

curtailed by those who had engrossed the lands and labor.

Upon freedom,

then, the young, often-armed men had little else to do but wander or
become the seventeenth-century equivalent of a tenant farmer.

He might

return to his service or enter the service of another master, but that
usually meant loss of personal freedom for another four-to-seven years
Thus, a class of discontented, rootless young men arose in Virginia with
a set of grievances against the colony's rulers, grievances arising
from excessive taxation, continued low prices for tobacco, and engross
ment of lands.

How aware the men were of the causes of their impover

ishment is murky, but they were a fertile group for demagoguery.
From 1650 until 1675 threats of mass violence and occasional riots
and revolts erupted within Virginia.

Virginia1s leaders became in

creasingly alarmed over the potentially-explosive situation.

Birken

head's Revolt in 1663, a servants' uprising, and a taxpayers' revolt
in Surry County in 1674 suggest the growing tension in the colony, but
the leadership could or would do little to eradicate the problems.
Yet it required an Indian uprising, one not of the order of the
1622 or 1644 massacres to be sure, to launch the major upheaval in
1676.

Most of the fighting of Bacon's Rebellion was directed at

Indians, but for the first time in the colony's history open class
divisions appeared.

Although the leadership of the rebels originated

in the colony's elite, the bulk of the followers came from newly-freed
servants, servants, and slaves.^

The uprising against Governor Wil

liam Berkeley led by Nathaniel Bacon, Jr., from whom the rebellion

21
takes its name, temporarily siphoned some discontent and lowered the
level of tension, thus lessening the threat of resort to more violence.
However, the uprising did not remove many grievances and problems af
flicting the colony.

Bacon's Rebellion was more a major link in a

chain of violent events occurring in the late seventeenth century than
it was an end to the threat of violence.
Although no violence up to the level of Bacon's Rebellion occurred
in Virginia after 1676, two other uprisings happened and threats of
riots and mutinies appeared from time to time until the early eight
eenth century.

These violent events reflected continued hard times

and exploitation of the labor resources in the c o l ony.^

White inden

tured servitude remained the preeminent form of labor in the colony
until the first decade of the eighteenth century.

But slavery, a form

of labor which would effectively allay the discontents of the white
lower classes, was rising in Virginia.
During the last four decades of the seventeenth century Virginia's
Assembly created the institution of slavery in a piece-meal, unplanned
fashion.

Although Virginia's courts had used life-time servitude as a

punishment for blacks convicted of misdemeanors before 1660, blacks in
the colony had not been intended as a permanent labor force.

But in

the 1660s a process of enslavement making the status of children de
pendent upon the status of their mother was initiated, thus making
slavery a labor system rather than a punishment.

The Assembly provided

in this fashion permanent servitude not only for individuals but for
generations.

During the last decades of the seventeenth century, then,

the Virginia Assembly refined the definition of slavery in order to
remove rights and privileges from enslaved b l a c k s . ^

The culmination
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of the enslavement process came in 1705 when the Assembly codified the
slave laws it had enacted over the last four decades.

In so doing, the

colony had institutionalized the use of violence in the treatment of
black slaves.

The fact that white masters could use violence on their

slaves was a carry-over from the abuses of white servants permitted
masters but may also have been the result of perceptions of colored
people generated by the constant violence between Indians and whites.
By 1705 not only had a new labor force been introduced into Virginia,
but methods of violent treatment of those slaves written into Virginia
law.

Slaves did not respond docilely to that treatment, however,

using many forms of violence to resist the institution.
During the initiation of slavery, however, blacks posed no dis
tinct threat to the security or safety of the colony, for there were
no more than a few thousand blacks in Virginia at the time of the 1705
codification.

Thus, the colony's productive elements continued to

rely on white servitude for their labor.

The continued low prices for

tobacco in the last two decades of the seventeenth century combined
with the growing integration of the English Empire through centralizing
changes in the administration of it served to produce unrest and discontent not only in Virginia but in other colonies as well.
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The violence generated by the exploited groups of Virginia's
society combined with fears of religious changes and suspicion of
English governmental intent in the decades between 1680 and 1700 to
produce unrest and discontent.

The Tobacco-Cutters' Riots of 1682 and

Parson Waugh's Tumult of 1689 mark the extent of the open, violent
uprisings, but colonial leaders repeatedly warned England that unless
action was taken to relieve the suffering in the colony, mass uprisings
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were inevitable.
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By 1700, however, some tension had been alleviated;

tobacco prices had risen from their lowest levels, slavery was replacing
indentured servitude as the primary form of labor, and new lands were
being opened to settlement.

Moreover, the beginning of warfare be

tween France and England over colonial possessions provided an oppor
tunity to integrate colonial undertakings and to lessen fears of in
ternal unrest.

The colonies, including Virginia, responded half-heart

edly to the war requirements unless they were directly threatened.

But

the rise of extensive piracy added more violence within colonies, for
many privateers converted to pirates upon the completion of the wars
after 1689.
Piracy remained a problem to Virginia's government throughout the
next thirty years.

Although criminality existed within the colony,

there had been little of the organized crime represented by pirates
and their depredations on colonial merchandise.

As pirates began raid

ing Virginia and other colonies, they provided a signal of the growing
wealth of the provinces.

The extensive pirate activity between 1690

and 1720 in Virginia waters suggests that Virginia's economy had b e 
come attractive and her population sufficiently large that pirates felt
they could hide themselves adequately among the colonists.

Although

the colony's government maintained an intransigent position respecting
pirates, not until the second decade of the eighteenth century was it
able to destroy local nests and to remove much of the local menace.
The government had kept a vigilant stance all during the years after
1690, but not until the advent of cooperation from the English home
government and other provincial governments was Virginia able to overcome the infestation of the Chesapeake Bay.
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Along with the piracy, between 1700 and 1720 the colony's govern
ment experienced its first opportunity at self-government, convincing
the Council that it could function effectively without a governor if
necessary.^

Slaves, however, suddenly seemed to threaten the security

of the colony.

Between 1687 and 1730 whites discovered five insurrec

tionary plots, plots which awakened in the masters a dread of slave
revolt prompting harsher reprisals not only on the alleged plotters but
on blacks in general.

Yet slaves devised many other means, some

violent, of resisting slavery during these decades, also.

Running off

and committing suicide if threatened with capture was one way of es
caping slavery.

Flight in small groups to the mountains and violently

resisting recapture was another means.

Attacking overseers or masters'

families was still another expression of resistance.

Whites regarded

slaves as property, and could seek compensation for those blacks who
lost their lives through one of those means of resistance.
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The institution of slavery had important effects on both whites
and blacks in Virginia.

Its importance for the history of violence in

the colony, however, lay in the fact that the growth of an extensive
slave population provided a new, alternative labor force alleviating
the need for indentured servants.

The drop of indentured servants

reduced the numbers coming out of servitude and brought a decline in
pressure on the society for new lands and opportunity.

Those young

men who had been freed from servitude in the late seventeenth century
had had little opportunity to carve out even a small place for them
selves in Virginia.

After 1700, however, young white males could more

easily acquire land from their fathers or by purchase, thus reducing
their propensities to violent solutions for economic problems.

Their
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resentments against those in power lessened considerably and fear of
black slaves prompted a common bond among whites which helped to unify
the society.
Thus slavery not only replaced servitude as the principal labor
system in the colony but eased tensions within white society by intro
ducing a new racial threat into Virginia.

The rise of slavery also

provided whites the opportunity to degrade blacks through a degradation
of labor.

Hard, manual labor acquired a stigma in Virginia it previous

ly had not had, for labor and slavery were closely associated by the
1730s.

The impact of slavery in all its ramifications eased tensions

within white society and, by 1720, made white Virginia a model of
colonial stability, both political and s o c i a l . H o w e v e r slavery did
not transfer all violence from within the white society to black-white
relations.
During the early eighteenth century some new forms of political
violence emerged in the colony.

Although not up to the level of Bacon's

Rebellion nor of a similar nature to that uprising, the new forms of
political violence heralded an approaching political maturity.

During

the eighteenth-century's second decade a wave of tobacco warehouse
burnings occurred, prompting the Assembly to pass legislation designed
to make such arsons an act of criminal behavior for which the convicted
could receive no benefit of c l e r g y . T h e

instances of such burnings

did not recur until the early 1730s, when at least four warehouses and
two churches were burned in the northern parts of the colony.

The

arsons occurred as protests against the enactment of special tobacco
legislation late in the 1720s, legislation requiring deposit of all
export tobacco in warehouses.^

The arsonists, never caught, kept up

their depredations into late 1732, and yet another warehouse was set
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afire in 1744, thus continuing that form of protest. ^
There also existed other forms of political protest during those
decades, protest reaching its climax in the years after 1735.

Assaults

on families or servants of members of the House of Burgesses, several
election riots, and some assaults on appointed officers of the House of
Burgesses characterized that political turbulence.

This political

violence indicated the growing power of the House of Burgesses and also
suggests that some class discontent still existed in the colony.

By

1755, then, there existed an undercurrent of political turbulence in
Virginia.'’®
Along with the political violence came the growth of what appears
to be an outlaw-gang tradition.

By 1750 there existed a gang of horse-

thieves and a counterfeit ring operating side-by-side in the colony.
Perhaps they represent two parts of the same gang.

Their operations

and organization, just as piracy in the earlier decades, indicate in
creasing wealth in the colony.

Their ability to operate successfully

suggests that they .worked across colonial boundaries and may have had
aid from some member or members of Virginia’s ruling elite.

By 1755

attempts had been made by the government to eliminate the outlaws but
with no success."’^
The Virginia government had, however, succeeded in forging a
slightly different method of punishing criminals by 1750.

No longer

were hanging or whipping the only alternatives for convicted criminals.
For between the inauguration of the colony and 1750 the provincial
courts added fines and jail sentences to the range of punishments, and
they began to exercise leniency on many convicted felons through recom
mending mercy to the Crown in the case of capital crimes or simply
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pardoning those convicted of crimes for which the courts could exer
cise clemency independently.^®
Thus, between 1607 and 1754, the history of violence in Virginia
evinced a major pattern based primarily on race.

From 1607 until 1646,

Indians and whites struggled violently with each other in the colony
for control of the wilderness.
racial threat to their security.

Between 1646 and 1705 whites felt no
Not only that, but grievances within

the white society itself boiled over into extensive violence and turbu
lence, disorder which might have been tempered had some external threat
existed to check those wishing to raise a mob.

By 1705 sufficient

blacks had entered the colony to alarm whites.

Between 1705 and 1735

whites and blacks struggled with as well as accommodated to each other,
the one seeking to enforce slavery and the other seeking to resist it.
Following 1735 there existed patterns of violence, one political and
the other criminal, characterizing violence in the colony.

Along with

this primary pattern, there existed secondary patterns, in some ways
related to the primary one such as the institutionalization of violence
in slavery.

Among the more important secondary patterns, however, was

the gradual relaxation of punishment for criminal and immoral behavior.
But the primary pattern was initially determined by English contact
with Indians and blacks at historically the same time.

English re

actions to Indians, explained in part by English ethnocentrism, was
also the result of English suspicions of colored people, suspicions
raised during English contacts with both blacks and reds in the late
sixteenth century.
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oped set of political institutions.
See Craven, Southern Colonies,
129-131, 166-172, 269-294, 391-392.
30The process of colonial integration into a community is treated
in Richard L. Merritt, Symbols of American Community, 1735-1775 (New
Haven, Connecticut, 1966).
3^Greene, "Changing Interpretations," in Billington, ed., Re
interpretation of Early American History, 177, makes this comparison.
32gee Chaps. II and III for this portion of the Indian-white
component of the general racial pattern.
33Edmund S. Morgan, "The First American Boom:
1630," WMQ. 3rd Ser., XXVIII (1971), 169-199.

Virginia, 1618 to

^Although much has been written focussing attention upon the
notion of cosmic order in sixteenth and seventeenth century English
society, this literature has not been connected with a practical means
by which order was preserved in society. English society of the late
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries used a well-developed system of
courts to control those individuals and groups who might disrupt
society. For the literature explaining medieval and English Renais
sance concepts of cosmic order, see E. M. W. Tillyard, The Elizabethan
World View (New York, 1944), passim, but especially Chapters 1 and 2,
and Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: The History of an
Idea (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1936). For some contemporary refer
ences to the ordered nature of the universe and society see William
Shakespeare's classic statement in Troilus and Cressida (New Haven,
1956), 22-23; Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity
London, 1965), 232; and Edmund Spenser, Hymn of Love (Oxford, England,
1960), 439. While the notion of cosmic order infused the whole of
English and colonial society, it bears upon the subject of this dis
sertation only at the point at which governing elites used instruments
of social and criminal control to reinforce that notion of cosmic order.
Thus courts, as those instruments, served as means of reinforcing
theoretic concepts of an ordered society. Disorder, in this context,
does not mean any social or criminal deviance, but disruption of the
orderly progress of the society. Carl Bridenbaugh has argued that the
theoretical notion of cosmic order infused more than literature, poetry,
and philosophy in early seventeenth-century England. The idea of an
ordered society controlled, in part, by a system of punishment meted
out by courts is developed by Bridenbaugh in Vexed and Troubled English
m e n : 1590-1642 (New York, 1968), Chapter VII.
33Bailyn, "Politics and Social Structure," 91. Seventeenth-cen
tury colonists believed in an ordered society in which the rich, power
ful, and dignified ruled as the "better sort." Important men dwelled
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in. Virginia during the Company period, but after 1624 those who had
amassed fortunes on their own became the rulers. That generation
possessed none of the blood or business connections either of their
predecessors or their successors.
3^For the development of Virginia's militia, see Darrett B. Rutman,
"The Virginia Company and Its Military Regime," in Darrett B. Rutman,
ed., The Old Dominion: Essays for Thomas Perkins Abernathy (Charlottes
ville, Virginia, 1964), 1-21. For an alternate view, see Diamond,
"From Organization to Society."
^ C reation of Virginia's county courts has been traced in several
studies.
See Craven, Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century.
129-131, 166-172, 269-291. For the effects of county court development
upon the political situation in Virginia in the mid-seventeenth century,
see Warren Billings, "The Growth of Political Institutions in Virginia,
1634 to 1676," W M Q . 3rd Series, Vol. 31 (1974), 225-243, and M. W. Hiden,
How Justice Grew. Virginia Counties: An Abstract of Their Formation
(Richmond, 1957), 1-15. The colonial government quickly transferred
significant portions of its authority to the local governments.
For the
transfer of jurisdiction over criminal and social control, see William
W. Hening, ed., The Statutes-at-Large: Being a Collection of all the
Laws of Virginia. From the First Session of the Legislature in the Year
1619 (Charlottesville, 1969), Vol. I (1619-1660), 168-170, 185-187, 221,
227, 237, 244-246, 253, 254-255; Vol. II (1660-1682), 41-148.
38gee chap. Ill for cases from the Eastern Shore county court in
the 1630s.
OQ

J?See Chap. IV. Virginians referred to Indians resident well
beyond the colony's borders as "strangers." But most references to
"strangers" in the late seventeenth century meant parties of Iroquois,
usually Senecas.
See George T. Hunt, The Wars of the Iroquois: A
Study in Intertribal Trade Relations (Madison, Wisconsin, 1940), 23, 69,
Chapter X, for examples of Iroquois raiding parties moving southward
through Virginia's backcountry.
For a consideration of the effect
disease had on American Indians, see Alfred W. Crosby, The Columbian
Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492 in Contributions
in American Studies. No. 2 (Westport, Connecticut, 1872).
^Ochap. Ill; Bailyn, "Politics and Social Structure," 96-98;
Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom. 145.
^Ijohn C. Rainbolt, From Prescription to Persuasion: Manipulation
of Eighteenth [sic] Century Virginia Economy (Port Washington, N. Y.,
1974) treats the theme of economic diversification for the latter half
of the seventeenth century, but hiB perceptions seem to apply to the
first half as well.
42gee Chap. IV.
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43por population estimates of Virginia in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, see Wesley F. Craven, W hite, Red, and Black
(Charlottesville, Virginia, 1972), 1-39; E. B. Greene and Virginia
Harrington, American Population Before the Federal Census of 1790 (New
York, 1932), 134-139; Stella H. Sutherland, Population Distribution in
Colonial America (New York, 1936), Chap. V, esp. 180-186.
^Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 239-240.
45ibid.. Chap. 12.
See

Chap. V.

^ S e e Chap. VI for this point.
48see Chap. VII and Jordan, White Over Black, Chap. II, for the
development of slavery.
49David S. Lovejoy, The Glorious Revolution in America (New York,
1972), Chapter III.
■^See Chapter VI.
51chapter VII and Hugh R. Rankin, The Golden Age of Piracy (New
York, 1969).
-^The period between 1706 and 1710 was one in which no governor
lived in the colony to administer the colony's needs. During the
absence of a governor and of instructions from England, the Council
directed the colony's affairs, discovering that it could carry on its
expanded duties quite well.
See Williams, "Political Alignments,"
83-86.
53see Chapter VII.
^Greene, "Changing Interpretations of Early American Politics,"
167-168, and "Foundations of Political Power in the Virginia House of
Burgesses, 1720-1776," WMQ, 3rd Series, XVI (1959), 485-506.
55 S e e Chapter VII.
56See Chapter VIII.
5^Ibid., and Chapter IX.
5 % e e Chapter IX.
59Ibid.
^ T h i s point is developed throughout the chapters, especially
beginning in Chapters VI and VII and proceeding to Chapter IX.

CHAPTER

II

CULTURES IN CONFLICT:
REDS AND WHITES IN EARLY VIRGINIA

The 1607 establishment of English colonization in Virginia made
neither clashes between whites and Indians nor the destruction of the
red man's culture inevitable.

Although each people regarded the other

with suspicion and distrust, attempts were made during the first decade
and a half of life to forge a workable solution to the problem of living
together in the Tidewater wilderness.

The English, seldom numbering

more than a few hundred people during those early years, remained a
valuable asset to the principal Indian leader Powhatan.^

H e could rely

upon them for their technology and aid against his enemies, whether
within his Confederation or without.

The English, in turn, could ex

pect from the Confederation food stores and protection from their own
enemies.
The background to relations between the two peoples, however,
helped create an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust and helped deter
mine the violent aspect of red-white associations.

Englishmen had

attempted settlement on Roanoke Island, North Carolina, twenty years
prior to the 1607 establishment.

North Carolina Indian memories of

those contacts in the mid-1580s left bitter reminders of English ven
geance, for the natives had suffered retribution for alleged thievery
and may have communicated their apprehensions to the Virginia Indians
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with whom they had extensive trade contacts.

The English who arrived

in Virginia, however, probably suffered no anguish over their forebears'
treatment of the Carolina red men, but retained that ethnocentric out
look then characterizing English contacts with so much of the world
beyond England.^
Although the violence attending red-white relations in Virginia
does not represent the full scope of violent activity during the first
fifteen years of settlement, it was by far the most important dimension
of that violence.

Englishmen feared Spanish threats of extermination,

and English state papers of that era are replete with references to
Spanish plots to crush or destroy the infant colony.

Spanish documents

also reveal the extent to which Spanish officials accredited to the
English court believed in the need for the colony's destruction.

Ho w 

ever, Spain's ruler never ordered an attack upon the colony, despite
the fact that from 1611 until 1613 Spanish spies dwelled in Virginia.
Internal disruptions also plagued the colony's foundation, with disorder
within the leadership representing an early crisis for the colony's
existence.

Finally, although only passing references to food riots in

1614 were made in surviving documents, the very existence of such in
that summer suggests the possibility that other such violent events
took place.^
Whites resident in Virginia suspected Indians of treachery and
deceit.

Each incident of violence reinforced whites' distrust of their

red counterparts.

Seldom did whites consider that their own actions

might have provoked Indians to behave as they did.

When the first

landing party set foot on shore on Cape Henry on April 26, 1607, they
were greeted by a small raiding party of Indians, probably of the

Nansemond tribe.

The thirty whites fought off the five warriors,

sustaining only minor injuries.

However, no white seems to have con

sidered the possibility that those Indians knew of the treatment meted
to the North Carolina coastal Indians by Raleigh’s colonists in the
mid-1580s.

Neither George Percy nor John Smith did little more than

mention the incident, although Percy dwelled upon the savagery of the
Indians.

He wrote of the incident:

"At night, when we were going

aboard [abroad], there came the savages creeping upon all fours from
the hills like bears, with their bows in their mouths, charged us very
desperately in the faces...."'’ Throughout the surviving remnants of
his "A Discourse of the Plantation of the Southern Colony in Virginia
by the English," Percy referred to Tidewater Virginia Indians as sav
ages.^

His attitude toward the natives may have been harder than some

of his compatriots, although his sense of ethnocentrism regarding those
people differed little.
Other Englishmen viewed Indians in more objective or even more
favorable light.

Smith seldom delivered himself of the harsh judgment

similar to Percy's, although he often dealt smartly with them.

John

Rolfe advanced his views from the position of a man in love with one of
the native women; thus he sought positive evidence of the hum anity of
the red men in the colony.^

Yet these three men retained their sense

of innate superiority to the Indians of Tidewater Virginia.

Seldom did

they couch their expressions about the natives in less than the overt
terminology of a superior to an inferior culture.

They followed much

the same line as laid out by Thomas Hariot in his Briefs and True Re
port of the New Found Land of Virginia, in which he noted that "dis
creet dealing and government" with the red men would win them more
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easily than overt violence.

However, one infers from his writing that

he considered the Indians could become little more than junior partners
O
in any type of amalgamation of the two peoples.

Thus, Englishmen

brought with them to Virginia in 1607 a set of attitudes which preju
diced their first meetings with natives.
The days and months of first contacts with the Indians further
enhanced Englishmen's suspicions of the Indians.

Language and custom

barriers contributed to those preconceived notions, for misunderstanding
generated by linguistic difficulties frequently resulted in violence
between the two peoples.
on May 18.

A good example was the fight begun at a feast

The Paspahegh Indian werowance and approximately one hun

dred of his warriors came to feast with the whites upon the occasion of
the completion of preliminary landing sites and the disembarkation of
all the colonists.

Indian curiosity was aroused by the assortment of

white metal tools and weapons, especially those with which Indians had
some familiarity, such as their own hatchets or knives.

When a white

spied an Indian fingering a hatchet, he immediately concluded the red
man intended to steal it and attacked him.

More likely, the Indian

simply wanted to examine it, since it bore a resemblance to one of his
own tools.

However, a melee quickly ensued resulting in the colonists

seizing their arms and the Indians fleeing.^

The Paspaheghs became

much more hostile toward the whites after this incident.

The results

of this incident suggest that early confrontations between Indians and
English were not necessarily the result of land disputes, but of cultural differences and misunderstandings.

10

The Paspaheghs retaliated for the incident one week later.

On

May 26, while a party of whites led by Captain Christopher Newport was
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exploring up the James River, a large band of two hundred to four
hundred Paspaheghs and Chickahominies attacked the half-finished fort.
A boy was slain and twenty others were wounded, including four members
of the Council.

Ordnance from the English ships had to be used to ward

off the attackers.

The hostility of the Paspaheghs-Chickahominies con

tinued during spring and early summer.

Ambushes of individuals and

harassment of small parties eventually forced the English to remain in
the fort during much of the s u m mer.^
These hostilities served only to increase white suspicion and dis
trust of the intentions of any Indians with whom they came in contact.
Percy, describing the incident which precipitated the hostilities, once
again revealed his general suspicion of red men.

To Percy, Indians

came more "in villainy than any love they bare us."

They were full of
l O

"treachery," would "betray us," and wished to "execute their villainy."
Smith described the Paspaheghs as "churlish and treacherous," although
when he met Powhatan in late 1607 or early 1608 he was quite impressed
with the werowance's "grave and majestical countenance, as drove me
into admiration to see such state in a naked savage."

13

By June 25, Powhatan had evidently ordered the Paspaheghs and
Tappahannocks (a small tribe closely related to and allies of the
former) to cease their hostilities with the whites.

A messenger sent

by the great werowance informed Edward-Maria Wingfield, President of
the Council, not only that he had ordered the cessation of hostilities
but that he wished peace and friendship with the whites himself.

Win g 

field noted when he composed his Discourse in late 1607 that "this
message fell out true; for both these werowances have ever since re
mained in peace and trade with us."1^

However, nothing was said of the
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Chickahominies, for they were nearly autonomous respecting the great
confederation of Indians over which Powhatan exercised control.
Most likely that tribe was the one which continued hostilities and
depredations against the whites in Jamestown throughout that first sum
mer.

Only sporadic attacks, usually ambushes of one or two individuals,

continued, but they were enough to close off white access
around the fort.

During July

to the region

a minimum of three men died at the hands

of the hostiles and in August at least two more were killed by Indian
attacks.

One of those who died in August was Jerome Alicock, an Ensign

and middle-level leader in the c o l o n y . ^

Thus, by the end of the first

summer of colonial existence in Virginia, from a white population num
bering one hundred and five, hostilities had cost the whites a minimum
of ten men killed and thirty wounded.

How many Indians died or were

wounded is hard to estimate, for no reports of such were made.

Prob

ably no fewer Indians than whites were killed or wounded, and perhaps
many more.
The violence between the
distrust of the natives.

The

two peoples increased white suspicion and
combination of the lateness of the plant

ing season when the Englishmen came and the continued Indian attacks
prevented any extensive harvest of crops by the settlers in the fall.
But the Virginia Company had not intended that the colony should be
self-sustaining.

It had planned to support the settlers from its own

resources in London and from Indian crops in Virginia.

Its instruc

tions to the President and Council, the governing body of the colony,
were to collect a year's supply of c o m from the Indians even before
building the settlement.

Although the colonists were enjoined to

"have great care not to offend the naturals," they were also cautioned
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not to allow the Indians possession of firearms or knowledge of deaths
within the colony.^
Thus, in the fall of 1607 parties had to go out to trade for corn
and other foodstuffs.

John Smith, a member of the Council, led one

party in December up the James to explore and to trade for c o m .

The

party entered the Chickahominy River in the small barge left by Captain
Newport for such purposes.

Leaving two or three men to guard the barge,

Smith set out with three other men to find Indians with whom to trade.
A party of Pamunkey Indians commanded by Opechancanough attacked Smith
and his men, killing two and taking Smith and George Casson prisoner.
Smith, wounded in the thigh, had killed one of his attackers during the
fight.

For that death, the dead Indian's father attempted revenge while

Smith was a prisoner of Opechancanough.

The attack combined with the

subsequent torture and execution of Casson convinced Smith of the sav
agery and barbarity of the Indians.

Despite profferment of friendship

and amity by Powhatan, Smith now believed Indians' nature to be duplic
itous and treacherous.

He commented when three of Powhatan's nobles

presented him gifts that he doubted the existence of such nobility
among Indians.
wrote:

Concerning Powhatan's profession of friendship, he

"experience had well taught me to believe his friendship till

convenient opportunity suffered him to betray us."

He sensed that

Indians had little but "cruel minds towards the fort,"

meaning he sus

pected that the Indians had little intent other than exterminating the

fort.^
But Powhatan never ordered the destruction of the English in
Virginia.

He may have remembered the cruel revenge of the Spanish for

the destruction of their mission in the Chesapeake Bay region during
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the mid-1570s.
in mind.

Powhatan, however, may have had more practical notions

The English, with tools and weapons superior to his people's

or his enemies', could provide valuable assistance and aid in time of
stress.

Furthermore, Indians throughout the North American continent

valued and traded for white goods, often becoming dependent upon those
goods.

Moreover, the English seldom numbered more than a few hundred

during the first three years of settlement in Tidewater Virginia.

Con

sequently, Powhatan, while not liking the English, was willing to toler
ate them for the aid and goods they could provide.

Thus, violence

associated with early relations between the two peoples did not neces
sarily portend a future of constant hostility and warfare, but it did
reinforce in Englishmen's minds their preconceived notions about the
treachery, deceit, and cruelty of Indians in Tidewater Virginia.

18

The six years following Smith's return in 1608 were as filled with
hostility, skirmishing and fighting as the first year of the infant
colony's existence.

Certainly, Indians and whites tried to establish

some other form of co-existence, but the diversity of the Indian popu
lation and the fact that Powhatan could not command the undivided
allegiance of all Indians in Tidewater Virginia meant continued con
fusion between the two peoples, contributing one more ingredient to
strained relations between English and natives.
In the spring of 1608, hostility between reds and whites in Tide
water Virginia mounted.

Indians openly stole whites' tools and weapons

and sometimes dared Smith or other colonists to chase them and try to
capture them.

In one incident Smith and a band of whites confronted

four Indians who had come to take tools.

After Smith beat one of the

natives, the others fled the peninsula upon which was located James
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Fort.

They soon returned with many of the tools and weapons previously

taken.

Evidently, Paspaheghs, Chickahominies, and Pamunkeys had inaug

urated a policy of harassment to obtain colonists' tools.

When Indians

approached the fort with offers of valuable stones, as did one Indian in
the spring of 1608, Smith, believing them trying to entice his men into
19

an ambush, ordered the natives beaten. *
The Indians, however, may have felt cheated by Smith's parsimon
ious dealings with them.

They compared his trade deals with those of

Newport's and found Smith's clearly lacking.

When Powhatan had pre

sented Newport with twenty turkeys before he left in June 1607 to return
to England, Newport had responded with twenty swords.
the same for Smith, Smith returned nothing.

When Powhatan did

Powhatan, evidently con

sidering himself the subordinate of no man, retaliated by ordering
certain tribes to prey upon white tools and weapons.

The Paspaheghs,

their honor probably still hurt by the misunderstanding in 1607 and, by
early 1608, alarmed by the continued presence of the whites on their
lands, most likely responded favorably to Powhatan's orders.

The

Pamunkeys, already hostile as evidenced by their attack upon Smith and
his party, were also willing to participate.

The third nation, the

Chickahominies, could do much as they pleased since they remained
largely Independent of Powhatan's control.
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Smith, the President of the colony by fall 1608, could not direct
ly challenge the Indians, for that action was contrary to Company
orders.

But when he speculated upon what Powhatan was doing and con

cluded that the great werowance had probably ordered the raids, he
decided to offer himself as bait.
that.

In a number of incidents he did just

When Indians appeared before the fort, he went out to allow them
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to attack him.
native warriors.

Whenever possible, he captured, whipped, and imprisoned
The red men soon retaliated with the capture of whites.

They then offered to exchange their prisoners for those held at the
fort.

Smith so intimidated them that they set their own prisoners free

and confessed that Powhatan had ordered them to steal the weapons.
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Powhatan also practiced more subtle means of intimidating the
whites in the colony.

After an attack against the Piankatank Indians

in which twenty-four Piankatanks were killed and the werowance and his
family given to Powhatan as servants, the scalps were hung near Pow
hatan's lodge to overawe the English.

Moreover, the method of attack

used by the great werowance's minions was symptomatic of the Confeder
ation's methods of warmaking.

Warriors entered the Piankatank village

under pretense of friendship to lodge with the villagers the night be
fore and led the attack the next morning.

Although the English knew of

this method of attack, they did not recognize the significance of the
mode of infiltration, and thus became victims of it themselves fourteen
years later.
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Sporadic incidents of violence continued during 1608, including
an attack by Newport upon the Nansemond Indians, who had been respons
ible for the April 26, 1607, hostilities.

Also, Powhatan tried but

failed to trap Smith and forty-six others when they were out trading
with Indians for c o m in the winter of 1608-1609.

The return of the

party to the settlement found Smith in complete charge, and he ordered
martial law proclaimed in order to force discipline upon the colonists.
In an effort to forestall more Indian depredations in the spring of
1609, Smith violated Company instructions by ordering the execution of
seven Indians, the imprisoning of seven more, the razing of Indian
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dwellings and villages in the area, and the seizing of fishing boats
and gear belonging to Indians.

The Company had enjoined the colonists

from provocations of the Indians unless direct attack was made.

Thus,

by the late spring of 1609, Indians and English in Virginia were close
to a state of warfare.
That spring also brought several hundred more colonists in the
Third Supply.

The English at Jamestown had enough difficulties feeding

and caring for themselves without the addition of several hundred more
mouths to feed and provide shelter for.

Moreover, the command vessel

had been lost near the Bermudas, and it had carried not only those
appointed to lead the colony but the new instructions derived from the
rechartering of the Company.

Those colonists who did arrive in the

Third Supply had to be sent away from the center of settlement so that
they might have some chance of survival.

Smith, who resisted all

attempts on the part of those newcomers to assert their own authority,
ordered Francis West and John Martin to take sizeable numbers of the
new colonists to establish forts at the Falls of the James and in Nansemond country respectively.

West, Lord De la Warr's younger brother,

led some one hundred and twenty men to the Falls, and Martin, a like
number to the Nansemond country.

Both leaders evidently behaved bar

barously toward the local Indians, for the Chickahominies and the Nansemonds tried to destroy the colonies.

Martin had kidnapped the Nan

semond werowance and had stolen over one thousand bushels of c o m from
them.

In retaliation, those Indians wiped out almost all colonists

living at his settlement.

West, in the meantime, had ordered the mis

treatment of the Chickahominies, despite the fact that sometime in
mid-1608 they had applied for white protection, perhaps fearing an
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attack upon their autonomy by Powhatan.

Smith attempted to mediate

the situation, but West and his men refused to heed his warnings.

Con

sequently, when Smith returned to Jamestown, the Chickahominies attacked
his fort and killed approximately as many men as had the Nansemonds at
Martin's fort.

Smith had to return to West's settlement to appease the

Chickahominies and to reestablish the fort on higher ground.

It was on

his return to Jamestown in September 1609 that a powder keg blew up,
and the resultant personal injury allegedly forced his return to
En g l a n d . ^
The winter of 1609-1610 has traditionally been depicted as the
most severe test of the colony, resulting in great death, deprivation,
and depression.

When Smith left the colony, he asserted that there

remained from four hundred and ninety to five hundred settlers alive in
the colony.

They had ten weeks' provisions, seven boats, three hundred

guns and ammunition, and a growing number of men trained in Indian lan
guages and fighting customs.

By the spring of 1610, approximately

sixty of the nearly five hundred settlers remained alive.

Although

starvation and disease must have claimed a large percentage of that four
hundred and forty, Indian attacks accounted for many deaths also.

When

the Indians heard of Smith's departure, they immediately slaughtered
those whites who had been placed among them to live until more perma
nent dwellings could be constructed, killed many of those remaining at
West's and Martin's settlements, and besieged the fort.

Moreover, a

band of thirty whites led by Captain John Ratcliffe (alias Sicklemore),
was slaughtered, except for Jeffrey Shortridge, who escaped, and Henry
Spellman, whose life Pocahontas allegedly saved.

25

By 1610, the first three years of English colonization in Virginia

had produced little more than hostility and suspicion of Indians.
Indians, likewise, had responded with animosity and distrust of the
English.

Although Powhatan could have easily destroyed the infant col

ony, his reluctance to do so may be interpreted from two points of view.
As suggested above, he most likely valued the tools, weapons, and mili
tary aid whites could give him.

But white resistance to sharing English

technology with him must have aroused his antagonism.

From another view,

however, he may have reasoned that the colony could not survive anyway.
Thus, he hesitated to annihilate the colony because the English might
retaliate as the Spanish had done forty years before.

If Powhatan

thought in this fashion then he calculated correctly.

With the spring

of 1610, those few colonists still surviving plus the commanders of the
Third Supply, who had arrived from Bermuda, vowed to return to England.
They were floating down the James River when the Fourth Supply, led by
n/!
the appointed governor, Lord De la Warr, arrived. °
The restoration of the colony brought renewed hostilities with the
Indians.

During the summer of 1610 the whites launched bitter reprisal

attacks in retaliation for earlier Indian depredations.

Among the first

targets were the Paspaheghs, who had not remained allies of the whites,
for the English had continued to settle upon their lands.

Captain

George Percy led a surprise party of fifty to sixty soldiers against
the principal Paspahegh village.

The whites killed many warriors,

burned the village, and executed the queen and her children.
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From

that incident arose a state of hostilities which can only be described
as full-scale war.

The war, lasting until 1613, temporarily cleared

the Kecoughtan area of natives and rid the Falls of the James region
of the red men as well.

Expeditions sent into the countryside for
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purposes other than Indian fighting were attacked by the natives and
usually had to retaliate.

28

During the years before peace was made, the whites fashioned a
method of fighting Indians which circumvented the need to pursue
warriors into local woods and forests.

White expeditions attacked

Indians' sources of supply and shelter, their villages.

After forcing

a village's population to flee into the surrounding wilderness, the
Englishmen.then burned the houses in the town and destroyed whatever
cornfields and other gardens they could find in clearings about the
village.

Expeditions did not march against the Indians until late

summer or early fall when Indian crops were maturing and ready for
harvest.

Such delays served a two-fold purpose.

Indians' sources of vegetable foodstuffs.

Whites could destroy

Secondly, they could seize

crops they could carry back to their settlements to serve as supple
ments for their own meager food supplies.

Although no evidence sur

vives to suggest the extent of deprivation that this method of warfare
brought to the Indians on the James-York peninsula during those four
years of warfare, when the next major period of warfare began after
1622, the same method brought starvation and severe debilitation upon
the native population of the peninsula.

How extensive such deprivation

was during the 1610-1613 period is conjectural, but Powhatan's protest
ations in early 1613 suggest that the whites' method of warfare had
had considerable effect upon those Indian populations conducting the
OQ

war against the colonists. ?
The warfare concluded only when the whites succeeded in kidnapping
Powhatan's daughter, Pocahontas.

Japazaws, werowance of the Potomac

Indians, conspired with Samuel Argali to seize the girl when she came
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to visit the Potomacs in the early spring of 1613.

The English held

her hostage for almost a year before Powhatan made peace.

Initially,

the whites demanded only the return of Englishmen held hostage by the
Indians and of tools and weapons taken by redmen.

Then the whites de

manded sufficient c o m to sustain themselves during coming years.

How

ever, when John Rolfe confessed his love for the Indian maiden in early
1614, the opportunity presented itself for the erection of a lasting
peace built upon a formal marriage between prominent persons of the two
peoples.

Rolfe1s letter of 1614 averred that his love for Pocahontas

was motivated by reasons of "the good of this plantation, for the honor
of our country, for the glory of God, for my own salvation, and for the
converting to the true knowledge of God and Jesus Christ, an unbelieving creature."
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His letter suggests that while relations between

Indians and whites had generally been hostile since the foundation of
the colony, some Englishmen retained their altruistic notions about the
Virginia natives.

Moreover, the attitude expressed by Rolfe suggests

more the characteristic attitude of the colony in the next eight years.
After 1614 only sporadic violence between the two peoples evidently
occurred, for little mention of hostilities has survived in existing
sources.

31

What violence did occur, however, altered significantly

the power structure among the various tribes.

In 1616, whites under

the command of Sir George Yeardley attacked and decimated the Chickahominy Indians.

This incident, however, was not the signal for another

round of general Indian-white warfare, but the destruction of a tribe
which had retained its autonomy.

Evidently, Yeardley led out his party

to punish the Chickahominies for their refusal to pay tribute levied of
them in the 1614 treaty.

Moreover, Powhatan probably encouraged the

whites in their attack because he wished to see the semi-autonomous
Chickahominies reduced in order that he might bring them under his con
trol.

The Chickahominies, however, recovered sufficiently to engage in

minor harassment and disturbance of the colony until they discovered
that the whites' powder in 1618 was in short supply.

Then they ex

panded their harassment to include seizure of c o m and other crops dur
ing the fall harvest season.

But their autonomy was seriously cur

tailed.^
Other Indian tribes became hostile to the colonists between 1614
and 1622, also.

The Potomacs, formerly allies of the whites, dissolved

their alliance with the English in 1619.

In December of that year a

Captain Ward journeyed to their country to trade for c o m .

The Potomacs

refused to trade with him, and he and his men seized by force over eight
hundred bushels of maize.

The Indians had perhaps had a poor growing

year or simply might not have been able to provide the size supplies
Ward requested of them.

Not only that, but the whites were also col

lecting tribute from Confederation Indians, tribute which should, the
Indians thought, have supplied them throughout the non-productive
seasons.

Thus, the Potomacs refused tottrade, and by 1620 the whites

had another formidable enemy with which to contend.

They evidently

felt, however, that with the aid of Powhatan's loyal tribes they could
resist any hostilities from the Potomacs.
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From 1607 until 1614, Indians and English in Virginia maintained
their relations in an atmosphere of open hostility and warfare.
1614 suspicion and distrust characterized their associations.

After
Although

many Englishmen then tried to forge a more durable relationship based
upon amalgamation and conversion of the Indians, the record after 1622

demonstrates failure on those points.

By 1614, the English at James

town felt they had sufficient evidence of Indians' treacherous nature
to retain their ethnocentric condescension toward the red men.
more, Englishmen continued to regard Indians as savage.

Further

Despite hard

evidence to the contrary, whites persistently identified differences of
culture and custom as inferior and savage.

The violence generated by

cultural misunderstanding during the earliest days of white settlement
had become general warfare and hostility by 1614.

After that date,

however, more peaceful relations between the English and the Confeder
ation leadership permitted the London Company the opportunity to erect
experiments designed to raise or elevate the Indians to the whites'
cultural level.

This constituted more evidence of the altruistic side

of the colonial experiment that the company had undertaken.

But con

tinued incidents of violence encouraged a more antagonistic attitude
on the part of those whites believing the lands on which they were
situated should be cleared of Indian inhabitants.^

The effect of fif

teen years' hostilities between natives and English upon the colony's
existence needs to be considered, however.

Whether Indian pressure on

the white populace encouraged or discouraged internal violence is more
conjectural than the concrete growth of white suspicion, distrust, and
hostility toward the Indians.
But Indian-white hostility did not fully delineate the violence
of those early years of Virginia's history, for disorder and violence
also marked the formative years of white society.

Englishmen coming

to Virginia possessed a strong sense of order and discipline within
their own social structure and that sense underwent considerable alter
ation when they reached Virginia.

Arriving with no utopian purpose
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similar to Puritans or Plymouth settlers in New England, the Virginia
settlers adapted quickly to Indian methods of living within the wilder
ness.

The Company's instructions to the colony's governors indicated

the concern the Company's leaders felt for the lack of discipline within
the colony.

Martial law was required, they believed, in order to pre

vent further deterioration of the colony into disorder.

One of the

most feared elements of that disorder was running off to live with the
Indians.

Moreover, contemporary as well as later commentators on early

Virginia suggested a close connection between that lack of order and
discipline within the colony and the Indian methods of life with which
the settlers were becoming increasingly familiar.

Robert Beverley,

writing one hundred years after the foundation of Jamestown, declared:
They were no sooner settled in all this Happiness and Security,
but they fell into Jars and Dissentions among themselves, by a
greedy Grasping at the Indian Treasures, envying and overreaching
one another in that Trade. . . .
After the Ships were gone, the same sort of Feuds and Dis
orders happen'd continually among them, to the unspeakable Damage
of the Plantation.
Although Beverley alludes here more to a profit motive than a more
direct connection with Indians as the source of disorder within the
colony, he later referred to the problems and difficulties within the
colony as a direct consequence of the breakdown of hospitable relations
between Powhatan and the English.

Greed, freed from restraints, en

couraged each trader to outbid others for Indian goods.

Beverley

asserted that
by letting one [Indian] have a better Bargain than another....such
of them as had been hardest dealt by in their Commodities, thought
themselves cheated and abused; and so conceiv'd a Grudge against
the English in general, making it a National Quarrel; And this
seems to be original Cause of most of their subsequent Misfortunes
by the Indians.^
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John Smith perceived much the same connection, although not couched in
the trade nexus.

Smith, when called upon to assess the reasons for the

1622 Indian attack, suggested that relaxation of discipline to the
extent that Indians could visit at will within the colony, had encour
aged the aggressive plans of Opechancanough.

Beverley recognized the

same problem, a decline in security within the settlements scattered up
and down the James.

Thus, Indian ways and trade encouraged within the

English a diminution of discipline and order, which, conversely, sug
gested to the Indian leadership a means of attack upon the very heart
of the colony.^
However, violent incidents among the small band of whites in
Virginia during the first years of settlement enhanced the breakdown
of discipline, a breakdown not checked until the advent of Smith as
leader in 1608.

Even before arriving in 1607, the colonists evidently

divided into factions which led to the arrest and imprisonment on board
ship of John Smith for alleged mutiny and treason.

Smith spent some

weeks in chains, but he most likely was set free when it was discovered
that he had been appointed a member of the Colony's Council.
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Smith's

account of the May 1607 Indian attack upon the newly-erected fort
suggests that he was among the exploring party led by Newport which
went upriver to discover what it could.
through others m a l ice."^

But he continued "disgraced

By that time (June 1607) severe divisions

and dissensions were already apparent within the body of the Council.
Smith noted "for the President and Captain Gosnold, with the rest of
the Council, being for the most part discontented with one another, in
so much, that things were neither carried with that discretion nor any
business effected through the hard dealing of our President, the rest
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of the Council being diversely affected through his audacious command."
Only Captain Martin, in Smith's eyes, appeared "very h o n e s t . " ^

Thus,

by the time Newport left for England in June 1607, the experiment of
government by committee was showing considerable signs of weakness.
During the rest of that summer and fall dissensions within the
Council provoked even more divisiveness within the colony itself.

These

troubles within the leadership reached their peak that fall with the
deposition of Wingfield and substitution in his stead of John Ratcliffe
(alias Sicklemore) as President, and the execution of George Kendall
for provocation of dissension on the Council throughout the summer.

By

early fall, however, the problem had developed into a far more complex
situation than just the charges against Kendall.

Councillors suspected

each other and hurled charges and countercharges of mismanagement,
hoarding, and lack of concern for the general body of colonists.

When

Wingfield found himself deposed, he wrote a defense of his actions in
which he refuted every charge brought against him and predicted that
similar circumstances would befall not only his successor, Ratcliffe,
but most of the other councillors,^
This internal squabbling and dissension, however, does not bear
heavily upon any consideration of the impact of violence upon early
Virginia.

But it does provide evidence of the nature of the discontents

and discords encouraging violent confrontations, not only within the
colony, but between the colonists and the Indians.

In November 1607,

however, the discontents boiled over into violence.

For some unex

plained reason the blacksmith of the colony, James Read, confronted
and assaulted the President of the Council, Ratcliffe.

Smith alleged

that Ratcliffe had initiated the assault, while Wingfield asserted that
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Read had first attacked Ratcliffe, who then beat him, only to have Read
renew his assault.

The smith was condemned to hang, but upon the date

of his hanging he implicated George Kendall in a mutiny (a plot or
conspiracy to overthrow the leadership).
dall, he was pardoned and set f r e e . ^

For his implication of Ken

The accusation by Read, Wingfield

alleged, was "framed" by "Master Recorder," Gabriel Archer.

Moreover,

Wingfield asserted that Archer, Ratcliffe, the rest of the Council and
their officers "beat men at their pleasures.

One lies sick till death,

another walks lame, the third cries out of all his bones. . , .were
this whipping, lawing, beating, and hanging, in Virginia, known in
England, I fear it would drive many well affected minds from this
honorable action of Virginia.
The case against Kendall was apparently two-fold.

He had already

been dismissed from the Council and imprisoned before the accusation
of his mutiny was made by Read.

More important, however, is the sug

gestion that Kendall might have been a Spanish spy.

Kendall, an Eng

lish Catholic, was implicated as a spy in the relation of Francis
Maguel, Magnel or Miguel, an Irish sailor who came to Virginia in 1607
and returned with Newport in April 1608.

Maguel's relation referred

to the execution of a Captain Tindol, an English Catholic and Captain,
within the confines of the fort, for the crime of spying for the Span
ish.

His reference to Tindol might be a copyist's misprint for Kindol,

thus Kendall; for Captain Robert Tindall was in the employ of Prince
Henry, was not Catholic, and was not executed.

But the fact of exis

tence of at least this one Spanish spy in Virginia in 1607 suggests
the interest the Spanish ambassadors in England had in this enterprise.
Moreover, when Kendall's suspected duplicity is taken in context with
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the mission of Don Diego de Molina, the duration and level of that
interest indicates how closely the Spanish watched developments in the
infant c o l o n y . ^
During the next two years, the order and discipline among the
colonists continued to deteriorate, although John Smith did all in his
power to enforce a conformity among his English fellows.

But periodic

outbreaks of discontent and unrest suggest that even his strong will
and his perception of the need for discipline were not enough to provide
the cohesion necessary to orderly behavior in the Virginia wilderness.
After the departure of Newport in spring 1608, the committee system of
government continued its slow collapse as more councillors died, re
signed, or were deposed.

The remnant refused to appoint new council

lors; thus by late 1608, John Smith remained as the only leader of the
colony.

He enforced his will harshly, insisting, for instance, that no

one ate unless he worked.^
But Smith was unable to reconcile new arrivals to his discipline.
When the bulk of the 1609 Supply arrived in June of that year, they did
not have with them either the newly appointed political leaders or the
new instructions derived from the rechartering of the Company earlier
that year.

These new arrivals behaved in much the same fashion as had

the first colonists themselves.

They factionalized the colony and

resisted Smith's arbitrary rule as well.

The appointed leaders of that

expedition were stranded on the Bermuda Islands, their ship a victim of
a fierce storm which had washed them up on those shores.

The several

hundred new arrivals, however, brought by word-of-mouth the major
changes effected via the rechartering, and they informed Smith that
they refused to follow his lead.

Gabriel Archer described the situation
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in August 1609 thus:
Now did we all lament the absence of our Governor, for con
tentions began to grow, and factions, and partakings etc. Inso
much as the President [Captain Smith], to strengthen his author
ity, accorded with the Mariners, and gave not any due respect to
many worthy Gentlemen that came in our Ships: whereupon they
generally (having also my consent) chose Master Wes t , my Lord de
la War[re]s brother, to be their Governor, or president de bene
esse, in the absence of Sir Thomas Gates, or if he miscarried by
Sea, then to continue till we heard news from our Council in
England. This choice of him they made not to disturb the old
President during his time: but as his authority expired, then to
take upon him the sole gove[r]nment, with such assistants of the
Captains, as discreetest persons as the Colonie afforded.
Perhaps you shall have it blazoned a mutinie by such as
retain old malice; but Master W e s t , Master Percie, and all the
respected Gentlemen of worth in Virginia, can and will testifie
otherwise upon their oaths. For the King's Patent we ratified,
but refused to be governed by the President that now is, after
his time was expired; and only subjected our selves to Master
W est, whom we labor to have next President.^
The internal discord peaked that fall when the dissidents had the oppor
tunity to send Smith back to England in what they considered disgrace.
Ratcliffe averred that "this man (Smith) is sent home to answer some
misdemeanors, whereof I persuade me he can scarcely clear himselfe
from great imputation of blame."

Thus, at least two letters asserted

that Smith was sent home by the colonists rather than having to return
due to the gunpowder explosion which burned his l e g . ^
Immediately preceding that incident, however, Smith had busily
engaged himself in seating several hundred of the new arrivals of the
massive immigration of 1609 in sites other than Jamestown.

The hosts

had had no time to prepare housing for the new arrivals nor to plant
crops sufficient to feed them.

Smith, who in the spring of 1609 had

ordered both West and Martin to lead parties to the Falls of the James
and Nansemond area respectively, journeyed to each fort where he found
mutinous sentiment mounting against him.

As he approached the site of
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West's fort, he received word that West and his men no longer recog
nized him as their leader.

Smith and his small party seized some of

the leaders of the revolt but were forced to retreat in the face of
greater numbers.

The band managed to seize the provision ship of the

fort, thus bringing many former enemies into alliance with him.

The

revolt was just beginning to collapse when an Indian attack took place.
So many of West's settlers were killed in that fighting that the rest
begged Smith's forgiveness.

He did imprison six of the leaders and

reestablish the fort on higher ground, but so few of the English were
left to man it that the site was temporarily abandoned.^
The "Starving Time," which took the lives of over four hundred
settlers, began that fall after Smith's departure.

Almost all semblance

of order and discipline within the colonists must have disappeared.
The English cannibalized dead whites and Indians, on occasion exhuming
warriors who had been buried near the fort.

In one instance, a settler

who probably hated his wife, killed her, salted her parts, and ate them,
despite the fact that a search of his house revealed large quantities
of oatmeal, beans, and peas.

The colonial leaders had ordered the

dispersal of many colonists among the Indians who had, evidently, prom
ised to support those distributed among them.

However, when the red

m e n learned of Smith's departure, they immediately slaughtered all
AQ

those dispersed among them. 7
Not until the arrival of the group trapped on the Bermudas in
early 1610 did any semblance of order return to the colony.

But that

order lasted just long enough to provide time to collect supplies and
equipment for the purpose of abandoning the colony.

Only when Lord De

la Warr, the appointed governor, arrived with a major supply did the
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colonists sufficiently regain their confidence that the settlement
could be restored.

As John Oldmixon one hundred years later described

the reconstitution of the colony in the summer of 1610, it finally had
the
Form of an Establishment, and several Men of Quality bore Offices
in it, as the Lord Delaware. Lord Governor, and Captain-General
Sir Thomas Gates. Lieutenant-General, Sir George Summers, Admiral,
the Honorable George Piercy [sic], Esq; Governor of James Town and
Fort, Sir Ferdnindo Winman Master of the Ordnance, Capt. Newport
Vice-Admiral, William Strachev. Esq; Secretary; and Appearance
of Officers that has not since that time been seen in Virginia.5
These men immediately set out to restore the colony's strength through
the proclamation of martial law.

The use of that instrument as one of

coercion and discipline lasted several years and has long been debated
as to its effectiveness and need.

It would appear from the state of

the colony in early 1610 that not only was martial law needed,
without

but that

it the extensive order required to preserve discipline was

unattainable.
But colonists fled that regime, running off to live among the
Indians, where they were either killed or retaken.
hanged,

shot, or broken on the wheel.

chained

to a tree until he starved to death.

Those retaken were

In one Incident, a colonist was
However, much of the

evidence upon which the allegations of Dale's harsh treatments of
colonists is either after-the-fact or general with few hard facts to
support the allegations.

It is not altogether impossible that many

statements of Dale's alleged brutality were parts of a broader attack
upon the Sir Thomas Smyth administration of the Company's affairs.
This attack began as condemnation of the physical environment of the
colony.

It then expanded to include the savagery and brutality with

which the colonists allegedly treated the Indians and vice versa.

But
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it reached its culmination during the internal conflicts which marked
the Company's affairs in the early 1620s.

Whatever the reality of

Dale's rule during the years from 1611 until 1614, peace was made be
tween the English and the Indians and some semblance of internal order
was restored within the colony.
But Dale did not succeed in restoring order and discipline com
pletely, for after he returned from the negotiations with Powhatan in
the summer of 1614, he found the colony broken by food riots and mutin
ies.

The government ordered six of the leaders executed.

Whether these

affrays occurred more commonly than in 1614 alone is difficult to tell
because so many sources from the pre-1614 era refer to tumults or dis
sensions, phrases which might mean extensive unrest or localized bicker
ing and discontent.^"*- But other evidence prior to 1614 suggests how
extensive the disaffection within the colony was.
Among the new arrivals to the colony in 1610 was a small vessel
the Swallow, actually little more than a boat of a few tons.

Between

twenty-eight and thirty men volunteered to man the boat to trade for
corn among the Indians.

After accumulating a large stock of c o m , the

men deserted the colony in the boat.

They vowed to make for England,

to pirate whatever vessels they could find along the way, and to do all
in their power to discredit the colony and the land off which it was
existing.

They were the first to relate in England the story of the

man who cannibalized his wife, a story which Sir Thomas Gates later
corroborated.^
Thus, by 1614, the small colony at Jamestown had barely survived
extensive Indian hostility which had broadened into major warfare,
internal disruptions deriving from factional disputes, and Spanish
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threats mounted to the colony's security.

After 1614, the possibility

of Spanish attacks upon the colony clearly declined, although at least
two separate incidents concerning violence within the colony had re
volved about Spanish spies.

Between 1614 and 1622, relations between

Indians and whites became cordial, even friendly, as English and Indians
alike began exploring the implications of the peace treaty.

Too, little

mention of internal disruption appeared, suggesting that the combination
of peaceful relations between the settlers and natives, the introduc
tion of a successful cash crop which would enrich not only the Company
but freeholding colonists, and the imposition of strong discipline
upon the colony had produced, finally, the desired effect, a reduction
of disorder.
Surviving evidence suggests that the colony's government did not
have to deal with extensive disorder or criminality after 1614.

It

appears significant that during the years between 1614 and 1622 the
governor issued several pardons to convicted criminals.
were two men who had run off to live with the Indians.

Among these
One, George

White, had taken arms and ammunition with him, an offense strictly for
bidden by Dale's interpretation of martial law, and the other, Henry
Potter, had stolen a calf to take with him.'^

The apparent significance

of the pardons for these men hinges upon the fact that whenever peace
ful relations were restored between English and Indians permissiveness
of the government then encouraged the growth of informal relations b e 
tween ordinary colonial and Indian families.

Those relations provided

Indians more than adequate opportunity to assess the strength and power
of the whites when planning their secret attacks in 1622 and 1644.
Although formal amalgamation of the two peoples through intermarriage
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apparently halted after the Rolf e-Pocahontas union, more informal
relations ranging from mutual extension of hospitality to physical
liaisons between whites and reds strengthened the peace forged in 1614.
Otherwise, Virginia's governor and Council dealt with low-level
criminal activity or with activity associated with social control after
1614.

For instance, at the first meeting of the Assembly in 1619, that

body tried Thomas Garnett, a servant of Captain William Powell, for a
number of crimes and misdemeanors.

Powell accused Garnett of plotting

against his life, of fornicating with one of his servant girls, and of
making criminal accusations against him.

Garnett, found guilty, was

sentenced to sit in the public stocks for four days and on each of those
four days to receive a public whipping.

This incident may mark the

first of what would become a major drive to effect social control and
some order within the colony during the 1620s.

Other cases of assault

were tried prior to 1622 as well as one case of alleged murder, but the
surviving records of court trials are rather sparse and little may be
said with any certainty about them.'’**
By 1622, the colony had experienced extensive hostility with the
Indians and major disruptions within its social borders.

But for the

years from 1614 until 1622 little major violence occurred, evidently,
and no distinct pattern of criminality developed either.

However,

suspicion and distrust of the Indians remained a principal ingredient
of the settlers' Intellectual make-up while a fascination with the
modes and methods of existence of the Indians motivated many whites to
try to emulate their red neighbors.

This ambiguous situation was not

resolved until the 1622 Indian attack, which reduced white feelings
about Indians to a level of constant hostility.

From that point, the
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extermination, in some form or another, of the red men in Virginia
became a paramount concern of most whites.
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NOTES
CULTURES IN CONFLICT:
REDS AND WHITES IN EARLY VIRGINIA

lAn early analysis of the Indian Confederation led by Powhatan
may be found in William Strachey, The Historie of Travaile into Virgin
ia Britannia; Expressing the Cosmographie and Commodities of the
Country, Togither with the Manners and Customes of the People: Works
issued by the Hakluyt Society, no. VI, ed., by R. H. Major, esq. (Lon
don, England, 1849) pp. 49-51. The suggestion that Powhatan valued the
English for material and military purposes may be found in Nancy 0.
Lurie, "Indian Cultural Adjustment to European Civilization," in James
M. Smith, ed., Seventeenth-Century America: Essays in Colonial History
(Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1959) pp. 43-44. For English population
figures for the early years, see Greene and Harrington, American Popu
lation, 134, where figures suggest that the peak population of 500
occurred in mid-1609.
2()ne of the charges the Company gave the colonists was to seek
the remnants of Ralegh's 1587 colony. The colonists did discover that
some "Lost Colony" survivors might have migrated to the Appomattox
River Valley only to be massacred by order of Powhatan one or two years
before the arrival of the 1607 expedition. The important documents
relating to Ralegh's Roanoke colonies may be found in David Beers Quinn,
e d ., The Roanoke Voyages, 1584-1590: Documents to Illustrate the Eng
lish Voyages to North America Under the Patent Granted to Walter Raleigh
in 1584 (Cambridge, England, 1955), 2 Vols., The Hakluyt Society, 2nd
series, nos. 104-105. For the information concerning the discovery of
information about the "Lost Colony" survivors, see Philip L. Barbour,
ed., The Jamestown Voyages Under the First Charter, 1606-1609 (Cam
bridge, England, 1969), 2 Vols., The Hakluyt Society, nos. 136-137.
For the inference about cultural contacts between North Carolina and
Nansemond Indians, see Lurie, "Indian Cultural Adjustment," 36. She
conjectures that the Nansemond Indians, resident near Cape Henry, had
learned of English treatment of North Carolina Indians in 1585 for the
alleged theft of one silver cup.
^English ethnocentric views of other peoples, especially West
African Negroes, are best set out in Jordan, White Over Black, pp.
3-44, and see above, Chapter 1, for further considerations of ethnocentrism. Almost any surviving document descriptive of late sixteenth
or early seventeenth century coastal Indian tribes reveals the author's
perception of his own cultural superiority. See Strachey, Historie of
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Travaile, 10-13, 16, 19, for allusions to the Indians as savages or
heathens. By 1600 the English used "savage” to refer to a people as
in a state of nature or wild. The word carried connotations of un
civilized behavior or of possessing the lowest state of cultures. It
was, thus, a more pejorative adjective than barbarous. See the Oxford
English Dictionary, IX (S-Soldo), 134-135.
4English state papers as well as Spanish archival materials con
tain many references to plans for extermination of the colony. The
Company's fears of such activity were by no means groundless. Plans
were elaborately constructed for smuggling the mentioned spies into
Virginia. Much of the correspondence is contained in Alexander Brown,
compiler and editor, The Genesis of the United States: A Narrative of
the Movement in England, 1605-1616. Which Resulted in the Plantation of
North America by Englishmen. Disclosing the Contest Between England and
Spain for the Possession of the Soil Now Occupied by the United States
of America; Set Forth Through A Series of Historical Manuscripts Now
First Printed Together with a Reissue of Rare Contemporaneous Tracts.
Accompanied by Bibliographical Memoranda. Notes, and Brief Biographies.
2 Vols. (New York, 1964), Vol. I, passim, but especially 440, 442-443,
451-452, 455-457, 473, 476, 494-495, 509-510, 511-524.
^George Percy, Observations Gathered out of "A Discourse of the
Plantation of the Southern Colony in Virginia by the English. 1606,"
ed. by David B. Quinn (Charlottesville, Va., 1967) 8; John Smith, "A
True Relation of Occurrences and Accidents in Virginia," in Edward Arber
and A. G. Bradley, eds., Travels and Works of Captain John Smith, 2 vols.
(Edinburgh, Scotland, 1910), I, 5.
^Percy, Observations out of "A Discourse," 8, 9, 11, 16-17, 18,
23, 24-25, 26.
7see Smith, "A True Relation," 14-16, 33, 35, 36-39; John Rolfe's
views may be found in "Letter of the Gentle-man to Sir Thomas Dale that
after married Powhatans daughter, containing the reasons moving him
thereunto," in Lyon G. Tyler, ed., Narratives of Early Virginia, 16061625, in J. Franklin Jameson, gen. ed., Original Narratives of Early
American History (New York, 1959), 240-242.
^Thomas Hariot, "A Briefe and True Report of the New Found Land of
Virginia," in Quinn, ed., The Roanoke Voyages. 368-382. Roy Harvey
Pearce, The Savages of America: A Study of the Indian and the Idea of
Civilization (Baltimore, 1965), develops the white colonial perception
of the Indian as savage.
9percy, Observations out of a Discourse, 16-18.
lOLurie in "Indian Cultural Adjustments" pp. 43-48, argues for
misunderstandings arising from linguistic difficulties and cultural
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differences.
■^Captain Gabriel Archer (?), "A relayton of the Discovery, &c.
21 Hay— 22 June 1607," in Arber and Bradley eds., Smith's Works, X,
lii-lv; Smith, "True Relation," in ibid., 7; W. Noel Sainsbury, ed. and
comp., Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series. America and the West
Indies, 1574-1660 (reprint edition, Vaduz, Liechtenstein, 1964), 6.
^■^Percy, Observations out of a Discourse, 16-18. In a sidenote on
page 17 of this document is written "these savages are naturally great
thieves." Whether this was in Percy's handwriting or not the editor
did not state. The reader presumes Percy's authorship, however.
l^Smith, "True Relation," 11, 19.
^Edward Maria Wingfield, "A Discourse of Virginia," in Arber and
Bradley, eds., Smith's Works, I, lxxv-lxxvi.
^Barbour, ed., The Jamestown Voyages, I, 90, 95, 96-98, 110;
Percy, Observations out of a Discourse, 24-25.
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CHAPTER

III

VIOLENCE AND THE SHAPING OF EARLY VIRGINIA SOCIETY

From 1618 until 1622 whites in Virginia had little idea that the
new leader of the Indian Confederation, Opechancanough, would in the
latter year launch a devastating massacre upon them resulting in a war
lasting until 1632.

With the outbreak of that war came the conclusion

of attempts at forging any type of amalgamated red-white society in
Virginia,

Opechancanough *s motivation for the 1622 attack appears to

be tied closely to expansion of white population after 1618.

Although

the Indian werowance had long professed his friendship for the English,
the continual pressure for land after 1618 must have convinced him that
the whites intended to drive out his people.

Not only did his reaction

to that period of rapid population expansion mean war, so did a like
reaction from him produce war in 1644.

Each war was a disaster for the

Indian Confederation and proved a blessing-in-disguise for the English
because they could force the Indians from lands coveted by them without
having to bargain for that acreage.

An important fact, then, of the

period from 1622 to 1644 was that white violence against Indians cleared
large portions of the Virginia wilderness of indigenous population and
prepared the way for more white settlers.
Opechancanough1s origins are still largely unknown.

He may have

been the half-brother of Powhatan or he may have been the leader of an
entirely different tribe which had migrated from Mexico into Virginia
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sometime before 1607.

His succession to control of the Confederation

is also not clear, for Opitchapam, also known as Itopatan, actually
succeeded Powhatan when the latter died in 1618.

By 1619, however,

Opechancanough was the leader, or great werowance, of the Confederation.’*'
Opechancanough perceived the growth of the colony as a direct
threat to his confederation and the Indians of eastern Virginia in gen
eral.

By 1622, the colony had expanded from a primitive fort located

on a low-lying peninsula in the James River to a peninsula-wide group
of plantations and small settlements scattered up and down that river.
Perhaps he understood that the whites would continue pressuring his
people for their lands, gradually pushing the red men back until they
came directly into conflict with their Piedmont Indian enemies, the
Monacans and Manahoacs.

Although the Indians had willingly sold whites

land earlier, it seems apparent that when increased demands for acreage
after 1618 suggested the future loss of much of their home territory,
the Indians resolved upon war.
Other factors convinced the werowance to launch the attack, how
ever,

The colonists had relaxed their vigilance against Indians for

several years.

Their settlements were so spread out that the planta

tions became easy prey in case of hostilities.

Richard Frethome wrote

in the aftermath of the attack that the nearest settlement to his was
over ten miles away.

Other references mention similar distances.

3

Moreover, the colonists had let down their guard so much that Indians
freely came and went within the settlements.

Native hunters brought

food and game to the whites, often spending the night with their hosts.
In some instances, the evidence suggests that Indians were living with
whites, and not as servants.

This close contact enabled the red men to
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gain access to many white tools and weapons, a fact giving them the
opportunity for greater surprise on the morning of the attack since they
did not have to bring their own weapons into the settlements.
There existed another motivation to the attack, also.

4

Contemp

oraries reported that Opechancanough ordered the massacre in revenge for
the murder of Nematanow, a favorite war-captain of his.

Jack-of-the-

Feather, the English version of Nematanow, had long boasted that his
medicine made him impervious to white weapons.

But two apprentices to

the colony's toymaker, a Mr. Morgan, killed the Indian, for they be
lieved he had murdered Morgan.

When word of his favorite's death

reached him, Opechancanough worked himself into a vengeful fury, threat
ening to do great harm to the colony unless Nematanow's murderers were
punished.

However, the English responded in just as harsh a manner,

bringing Opechancanough to declare that he would keep the peace so long
that "the sky should fall [before] he dissolved it."

Revenge was

among the most common motives for war in Indian cultures, although it
seldom assumed the dimensions it did in 1622.

Indians bent upon re

venge usually demanded the death of only those responsible for the
death of the loved one.

Consequently, it would appear that Opechan

canough used the death of Nematanow as his rationale for the attack,
actually intending the destruction of the colony rather than revenge
for the death of his favorite.
The war broke out on Good Friday, March 22, 1622, when several
hundred Indian warriors attacked the small English settlements scattered
up and down the James River.

Opechancanough had so carefully planned

and coordinated the attack that no warning reached the English until
just hours before the fighting began.

Opechancanough used a plan quite

standard for Confederation Indians.

Several warriors entered planta

tions and settlements the night before, just as they had been doing for
several weeks previously.

They remained the night and were joined the

next morning by many more bringing game and other food for the whites.
At a prearranged time, the warriors dropped whatever they were doing
and began the slaughter.

At least three hundred and forty-seven col

onists died in that initial attack and twenty women were taken hostage.
The colonial population was reduced by one-fifth and was quite demoral
ized by the attack, the settlements contracting to six or seven con£.

centrated about Jamestown.

The massacre almost worked to perfection.

Complete surprise was achieved in the outlying settlements, but those
located near Jamestown, the center of the colony, were largely spared
by the warning of Chanco, a Christian Indian in the service of a Mr.
Pace who lived on the south bank of the James directly across the river
from Jamestown.

Perhaps two or three times the number of colonists who

were actually killed would have died that first day of fighting were
it not for the warning.

Chanco, however, alerted his master early that

morning of the attack, two Indians having spent the night with Pace and
having tried to enlist Chanco in the plot.

Although Pace informed the

Jamestown area, the colony's officials did not have enough time to pass
the word to outlying regions and the brunt of the attack fell upon
those areas.^
The Indian attack launched the war.

That war ended for several

decades any further attempts by the colonists to "civilize" the natives
of Tidewater Virginia.

The Indians were cleared from the James-York

peninsula, and whites were assured the opportunity of pursuing their
own economic concerns.

White leadership altered radically its Indian
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policy, approaching a point of genocide.

Virginia colonists, defending

their new policy to the Company on the basis that treachery and deceit
deserved the same response, advocated and carried out the most barbaric
plans against the Indians.

The colony declared total war upon the red

men, holding them to be perpetual enemies.

The Confederation became,

temporarily, an enemy to which white leadership could look as a means
to promote order and discipline within the colony, for simultaneously
with the attack came a significant shift in the government's handling
of deviant behavior.

Much tougher punishments and more careful monitor

ing of the colonists were instituted by colonial leadership, evidently
g

to enforce order within the society.
The massacre so took the colonists by surprise and so demoralized
the colonial government, killing six of the eight members of the Council,
that several weeks were required before reprisals could begin, and the
first feeble efforts at revenge brought little success.

Moreover, the

colonists could not plant their crops for Indians remained close to the
settlements waiting to kill whites caught unguarded.

The government

fell back upon its earlier methods of food gathering, bartering with
friendly Indians for foodstuffs.

In doing so, however, those colonists

charged with food procurement used violence and coercion to force foods
from previously friendly Indians, thus arousing that many more enemies.
Moreover, some form of plague or epidemic disease erupted among colo
nists in December 1622, killing many hundred settlers.

Even though the

Company had dispatched several hundred new colonists and many thousands
of pounds of foodstuffs between July and December of 1622, by early
1623 the colony had approached a state of collapse similar to the spring
of 1610.9

Colonists retaliated whenever and wherever possible.

A pattern of

attack against the natives, used first during the earliest years of
Indian-white hostilities, 1607-1614, was perfected in the war.

The

English adopted a plan of attacking Indians at their source of supply.
Their aims were manifold, but the most important were to acquire food
for themselves and to deprive the red men of their sustenance.

Re

peated attacks of this nature also served to drive the natives farther
into the interior, for the whites mercilessly destroyed Indian villages
as well as Indian crops.

Few Indians were killed in these attacks, for

the red men could flee into the wilderness, but the destruction of their
homes and food proved quite successful.

During the 1620s Opechancanough

sued for peace on at least one occasion; however, the whites decided to
complete the destruction of Indian power on the James-York peninsula
before making peace with the werowance.^
In defense of their actions, the councilors reported to the Com
pany in 1623 and 1624 their rationale for their activity.

The Council

declared that no longer would it interpose itself between Indians and
more aggressive colonists.

Whereas prior to the attack the Council had

carefully followed the Company's injunctions about friendly treatment of
the natives, the Council now advocated any means, no matter how foul,
of prosecuting the w a r , ^

Between 1622 and the end of 1624, then, the

colony devised a method by which it could drive Indians from lands
coveted by the colonists.

Troops went out in late summer or early fall

to destroy Indians' crops, to b u m Indians' villages, and to kill
Indians caught by the forces.

The troops seized whatever crops they

needed to supplement colonial foodstuffs, for until the planting season
of 1624 the colonists had to subsist on very meager supplies, because

pressure from Indian warriors, the plague or epidemic of 1622, and lack
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of sufficient fanning population retarded agricultural recovery. ^
The colonial method of waging war against the Indians proved so
successful that on at least one occasion Indians simply watched as the
whites destroyed their crops and homes.

In 1624, the troops attacked

Otiotan and Pamunkey Indians, driving them from their villages.

War

riors stood quietly by as whites cut c o m sufficient to feed an estim
ated four thousand Indians for a winter.

Although none of the sixty

English troops died, sixteen were wounded, yet the English victory
apparently so demoralized the Pamunkeys, the tribe Opechancanough had
commanded before he became great werowance, that they simply observed
from the woods.

Apparently the English victory also brought a reduction

in faith and confidence in the Pamunkeys on the part of their allies,
an important point since the Pamunkeys probably provided much of the
■to

Confederation's leadership.
Although the evidence so far presented does not support an asser
tion of great white hostility to Indians, treatment of Indians after
1622 does point to a major change in white attitudes.

The extension

of the war long beyond either the Indians' desire or ability to fight
suggests white intransigence.

Chanco, acting as Opechancanough's

ambassador, and another Indian came to the colony in 1623 to offer the
werowance*s terms for peace.

Governor Sir Francis Wyatt and the Coun

cil agreed to enter negotiations so that the colony might recover the
women hostages seized during the Good Friday attack.

Wyatt ordered

Chanco's companion seized to be held as a hostage and instructed Chanco
to return to Opechancanough with word of the colonists' acceptance.
When the women were returned to the colony, however, the colony resumed
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the war.

Using the method of attack described above, the colonial

government prosecuted the war quite successfully from the whites' view
point, for Chanco informed the colonists that the Indians were faced
with starvation and deprivation.

They were moving into the interior of

Virginia, retreating from the whites' aggression.^
Other evidence of white hatred emerges from letters and events in
the mid-1620s.

Edward Waterhouse, in his relation penned in 1622,

wrote:
we, who hitherto have had possession of no more ground than their
waste, and our purchase at a valuable consideration to their own
contentment, gained; may now by right of War, and law of Nations,
invade the Country, and destroy them who sought to destroy us. . . .
Now their cleared grounds in all their villages (which are situate
in the fruitfullest places of the land) shall be inhabited by us^whereas heretofore the grubbing of woods was the greatest labor.
John Smith noted in his "Generali Historie" which he was writing in
England at this time that a few prominent men would now aver that the
massacre "will be good for the Plantation, because now we have just
cause to destroy them by all means possible:

but I think it had been

much better it had never h a p p e n e d . S m i t h , more sympathetic to the
experiment in amalgamation than Waterhouse, mentioned that many English
men had received the impression from pre-massacre letters that the two
peoples were succeeding in forging themselves into "one Nation:

yet by

a general combination in one day plotted to subvert the whole Col
ony.

Even though Smith was living and working in England, his

judgments were no longer heard favorably.

Smith did perceive, as did

others in England, that the Indian attack would provide the English in
Virginia with the excuse they needed to drive the Indians from their
ancestral lands, but he evidently did not foresee the means to be used.
Robert Bennett of Bennett's Welcome in Virginia left an account of

one means by which the colonists fought against Indians.

Bennett wrote

his brother Edward in 1623 relating English methods of negotiating
peace.

On May 22, 1623, Captain Tucker and a twelve-man escort journey

ed to the Potomac River Indian country to treat for the release of white
prisoners held there.

After a treaty had been drafted and signed,

Tucker offered Apochanzion, sachem of the Chiskiacks and head of the
Indian delegation, some sack poisoned by Dr. John Pott, the colony's
only physician.

Tucker then distributed the rest of the wine to the

two hundred Indians gathered at the conference.

As the whites left the

conference, their interpreter leaped aside at the command of Tucker and
a volley was fired into the Indians, killing several outright.

The

colonists then left the rest to die slow deaths from the poison.

On

their way back to Jamestown, the party killed another fifty Indians.
When Bennett's letter and corroborating documents were shown English
royal officials, they were outraged, not only at Pott, but at the
colony for such inhuman behavior.^-®

If this type of behavior occurred

during the early phases of the war when records were better preserved
than for the late 1620s, it is quite possible that the colony practiced
these tactics in the latter part of the decade.
Scanty evidence has survived to detail the course of the war be
tween 1624 and 1632, but sufficient material exists to document not only
the continuation of hostilities but the methods by which it endured.
Whites killed by Indians in those eight years were frequently reported
as the government needed to send such information to England so that
lawyers there could make disposition of the dead colonists' estates.
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In 1629 the Assembly considered it necessary to enact legislation em
powering colonial military leaders to attack Indians whenever they
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deemed such proper.

By no means, however, were the military leaders

given full discretion, for they were instructed to march at least three
times during a year.

Only in time of Indian attack did the commanders

have discretionary authority to summon their troops.

No evidence re

mains to detail these attacks, but many must have taken place for Gov
ernor Harvey, one year after his arrival in 1629, wrote the Crown re
questing two or three lasts (barrels) of powder be sent the colony be
cause that which he had brought with him was already gone due to the
continued prosecution of the war.
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In 1632, the Assembly enacted a

resolution stating the Indians to be the settlers1 implacable enemies.
The Assembly's action suggests that the whites had no intention of re
ducing the pressure on the Indians until they had departed from the
peninsula.

Peace probably came rather quickly after that resolution,

for mention of the war abruptly ceases in that year and, more important,
the colony began a rapid geographic expansion.

Thus, the adoption of a

policy of force and coercion against the Indians worked for the colon
ists. The use of whatever means they could conceive, including some very
inhumane tactics, to drive the Indians from lands coveted by whites en
couraged them to resort to violence again when the need arose for more
land.

If they could not "civilize" the Indians, they could drive them

before them as they expanded northward and westward into Virginia.
The conclusion of the war cleared the Indians from the James-York
peninsula permanently, but it also reinforced white notions of the
inferiority of the Indians.

English ethnocentrism surfaced during the

war and, at times, came very close to overt racism.

The use of extensive

violence had worked successfully for the whites, even though the 1622
massacre had come close to wiping out the colony.

With the accession
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of extensive new lands and Indian withdrawal farther into the interior
of Virginia, whites after 1632 took advantage of the opportunity to
exploit their gains.
During the Indian war Virginia's settlers began the slow transition
from a military-business factory to a colonial society, ^

The 1622

massacre provided impetus to the Crown's decision to revoke the Virginia
Company's charter.

In 1624 the Crown's lawyers won a quo warranto de

cision before the bar and the Virginia Company lost its colony.

The

Crown assumed control of the colony and by 1630 had decided to keep it
as a royal colony.^3

During the war between Indians and whites little

additional migration came to Virginia after the 1622 supply.

Robert

Beverley noted that end of the war and decision about the royal govern
ment provided new impetus to colonization.

He wrote of the 1630s that:

"the Constitution being thus firmly established, and continuing its
Course regularly for some time, People began to lay aside all Fears of
any Misfortune.

Several Gentlemen of Condition went over with their

whole Families."^
During the war the colonial government began to use official
violence to shape order and discipline in a society beset by a terrible
external threat.

Had the government continued the relaxed approach to

discipline inaugurated after 1614 in the colony, all sense of order
might have disappeared.

The need for tight discipline within the

settlements to meet the Indian threat required extensive use of official
violence, usually exceeding the harsh seventeenth-century forms of
punishment.

During the 1620s the colonial government began to transfer

some of its power, however, to local institutions.

The creation in

1629 of military districts and the appointment of local leaders to

command those districts marked an opening step in the process toward
localization.

Until the formation of full county courts in 1634, how

ever, the colony's Governor and Council, sitting as the General Court,
continued to hear all criminal and misdemeanor cases and to impose
official punishments for those convicted.

The General Court, during

the 1620s, used its full powers and authority to punish convicted crim
inals, especially those challenging the social and political order in
some manner.

With the creation of the county court structure in 1634

came the transfer of much of that power to those local institutions.
By 1640 there existed in colonial Virginia an elaborate court system
consisting of local courts and the General Court, and this system was
shaping, with the use of official violence, the early society of
Virginia.
The collapse in 1632 of Indian resistance relieved Virginia's
young society of a major threat to its security and safety.

The rapid

growth of the colony during the 1630s contributed, however, to the
development of new stresses within the society and those stresses were
complicated by the creation of the Maryland colony.

Between 1634 and

1640 the Maryland proprietary effectively halted Virginia's northerly
expansion up the Chesapeake Bay.

Virginia traders found their entre

preneurial and colonizing efforts in the northern part of the bay
blocked and their efforts to remove that block failed during the decade.
Moreover, another important stress appeared as Virginians who possessed
wealth struggled to secure their positions of power and privilege in
the colony.

The colony's post-1624 leadership consisted largely of

self-made men such as William Claiborne, Edward Digges, or Samuel
Mathews.
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These men did not fulfill the seventeenth-century definition

of leadership.

Their power derived from economic wealth in Virginia,

control of large numbers of laborers who could be exploited ruthlessly,
and direction of the tobacco and Indian trade, the twin economic foun
dations of Virginia.

Colonists refused to defer to men who had come to

Virginia like themselves and did not possess the associations of wealth,
birth, and rank which marked English leadership.

In order to fashion

respect for their control men such as Claiborne or Mathews, sitting as
members of the General Court, used official violence to secure the
deference they felt their economic preeminence accorded them.

In the

decade of the Indian war, that leadership also used official violence
to coerce the colonists into discipline and order to insure a united
front against the enemy Indians.

Thus, the General Court became a

major instrument in the establishment of Virginia's society after 1624.
Between 1622 and 1634 the General Court tried numerous criminal
and misdemeanor cases and in those instances in which the accused did
not challenge the authority of the government he received the prescribed
seventeenth-century form of punishment.

If his offense involved some

direct challenge to the government, however, the General Court ordered
much more brutal forms of punishment.

56

It would be misleading to

suggest that punishments for crimes or misdemeanors were not more
stringently enforced after 1622 than before, however.

What records of

trials have survived from the pre-1622 period suggest that some leniency
was characteristic of colonists sitting in judgment of their peers.
For example, Thomas Garnett was severely punished for his crimes
and false accusations in 1619, but several other accused criminals were
either pardoned or were ordered to pay fines in tobacco and to post
bond for their future good behavior.

In one case of assault tried just
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before the 1622 massacre, the accused were ordered only to pay fines
upon their conviction. ^

Few cases tried by the General Court between

1622 and 1634 demonstrated the leniency suggested for the pre-1622
years.

The combination of great profits to be made from the tobacco

trade and the ever-present danger from the Indians created an atmos
phere in which the court could use its authority to suppress social and
«
OO

criminal deviance.
The level of deviance, either social or criminal, between 1622 and
1634 does not appear to have been very high.

Thus, it would not appear

that the court had to impose strict discipline in order to curb crime
or social disorder.

Most trials conducted before the General Court

consisted of fornication, assaults, batteries, or petty thievery, yet
the court used levels of punishment quite severe by seventeenth-century
standards.

The combination of Indian war, need to create deference,

and desire to exploit labor explain the severity of the court when it
inflicted punishments.
Food was so scarce in the immediate post-massacre period that many
colonists resorted to stealing their fellows' animals and slaughtering
them for meat.

On August 5, 1623, Daniel Francke and George Clarke

were found guilty by the General Court of stealing, slaughtering, and
eating a calf belonging to Sir George Yeardley, a leader of the colony.
Francke, found guilty of that offense plus stealing a carpet, a pullet,
and one napkin belonging to Randall Smalewoods of Jamestown, was hanged,
but Clarke, a gunsmith and found guilty only as an accessory, was re
prieved without even a whipping.

The Court must have acted in such a

fashion because of Clarke's obvious value to a society under siege.

The

trial implies that food was a main concern for many Virginians at that
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time, as Francke stole not only the calf but the pullet. Yeardley, a
leader in the colony and a two-time former governor, owned a great deal
of property and on a social scale must have ranked near the top.
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Francke*s offense must have been quite common, for on September 21,
1623, Governor Wyatt issued a proclamation against stealing animals.
The problem appeared sporadically throughout the rest of the decade, on
some occasions the penalty being death, on others, corporal punishment.
Most of those caught stealing animals were servants, suggesting that
their masters forbade them sufficient food on which to survive.
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Other forms of petty thievery occurred in the colony, many times
the result of servant discontent.

Servants attempted to run off from

their service, stealing from their masters items they felt necessary to
secure their escape.

Nicholas Weasell received sentence of a whipping

and one year's service for stealing and wrecking a boat belonging to
Henry Geney.

He had to serve Geney for that year.

John Joyse ran off

from his master Ensign Francis Epps in the summer of 1626.

At his trial

in August, testimony revealed that he had taken two Snaphance pieces,
powder, and shot.
of his accusers.

He had also stolen a canoe from Symon Sturgis, one
The General Court ordered that he receive thirty

lashes, a half year's extra service for Epps, and five years service
for the colony when he finished his service for Epps.
This harsh treatment of Joyse helps confirm the suggestion of the
extensive abuse of labor in Virginia in the 1620s.

However, the need

for foodstuffs for sustenance and tobacco for profit suggests that the
colony had been thrown almost completely upon its own resources, re
sources that required extensive and hard labor.

The collapse of the

Company, the constant hostility of Indians (even those who were not
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part of the Confederation), and a cautious policy toward the colony
on the Crown's part after official recovery of the Charter in 1624 all
meant that Virginia whites had no other resources than their own upon
which to rely.

Thus, the extensive use of labor, even to the apparent

abuse of it, continued unchecked throughout the 1620s.

The official

violence used to control labor remained part of Virginia's later
servant and slave policy.
The General Court seldom interfered with the right of a master to
treat his labor as he pleased, thus encouraging the growth of deference
through master-servant violence.

Laborers, especially those arriving

in the colony already servants, received severe and harsh treatment.
The incident most often cited as evidence of this extraordinarily harsh
mistreatment is that of the death of Elizabeth Abbott due to the brutal
beatings administered to her by her master, John Proctor,

The General

Court took no action against Proctor for his obvious mistreatment of
the girl.

He had beaten her with fishhooks and whipped her at least

two hundred times consecutively.
the ordinary.

This case, however, was quite out of

Similar instances of such maltreatment simply have not

survived, if they occurred at all in the early seventeenth-century
history of colonial Virginia.

The Proctors evidently ordered their

other servants to beat the Abbott girl and when one manservant refused
to comply with their orders, Proctor beat him severely with a rake
handle.^

The Proctors were apparently extreme cases of sadistic

masters and mistresses in early Virginia, and they were certainly not
representative of those complaints brought before the General Court
alleging mistreatment of servants by masters.
Thus, the Proctors do not highlight the use of violence made by
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those possessing power in Virginia, for they were irrational.

The fact

that the General Court allowed them to mistreat their servants in such
a fashion demonstrates that the court was more concerned with estab
lishing a social order than it was in protecting the lives and rights
of servants, despite the fact that masters and servants had contracts
guaranteeing some rights to servants.

The General Court itself made

free use of violence whenever it felt its power, prestige, or position
threatened by subordinates.

Although deference may have been expected

from inferiors, the free use of violence by those leading the colony
suggests strongly that only where principles of deference were rigidly
enforced did such behavior occur. J
In some recorded incidents, one of which aroused the ire of the
English government, the court clearly abused its authority.

The most

noted incident and the one which aroused the Privy Council's ire
occurred during the Crown's investigation of the operations of both the
Virginia Company and colony.

A royal commission came to Virginia in

1623 to seek answers to a variety of questions concerning the Company's
handling of its colony.

Edward Sharpies, Clerk of the colony's Council,

gave unauthorized information to the commission.
covered his offense, it tried him for treason.

When the Council dis
The Council averred

that when he had taken office he had, in an oath required of him, sworn
himself to secrecy about that body's affairs.

He had allegedly broken

that oath and for that was severely punished.

He was sentenced to the

loss of both ears, but only one was cut off.

His trial, occurring in

May 1624, came to the attention of the Privy Council, which demanded an
explanation and the Council rather arrogantly replied that he had been
treated leniently.^

At the same session, another case representing the jealousy with
which the Council guarded its new-grown prestige occurred.

Richard

Barnes was convicted by the Court for "base and detracting speeches,r
to the Governor, at that time Sir Francis Wyatt.

His sentence suggests

the distance to which the Court would go to protect its prestige and
power within the colonial structure.
were broken and destroyed.

After surrendering his arms, they

Then he had to have his tongue punctured by

an awl, run a gauntlet of forty men, and be literally kicked out of
Jamestown and off the island upon which it rested.

All his privileges

and freedom of the country were removed from him and he had to post a
sf200 sterling bond as surety for his good behavior.

The Court clearly

was dealing with a freeman here, one who probably held extensive lands
and numbers of servants, since he had weapons and money.

What his

offense beyond the speeches against the governor was was not specified,
but speculation suggests that he may have given information to the in
vestigating committee detracting from the image the government in Vir
ginia had tried to establish.

The combination of his trial and that of

Sharpies on the same date suggests furthermore that the Court was in a
particularly bad mood, willing to use the limit of its power to enforce
its authority.^
Official violence was also used just to maintain seventeenthcentury concepts of social order.

Women who did not refrain from gos

sip, scolding, or more violent expressions of opinion were frequently
beaten by their husbands.

Although husbands who administered such to

their wives were taken to court by neighbors, the court usually did
nothing other than require a bond as surety for the good behavior of
the man.

In 1625, Cadwallader Jones accused Joseph Johnson of beating
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his wife repeatedly.

Moreover, Johnson, a servant belonging to Mr.

Bransby, had often strayed from the plantation despite Bransby's warn
ing about the Indian danger.

Upon further testimony, it was concluded

that Johnson was guilty of such behavior, but the Court required only
a bond for good behavior.

In August 1626 Doctor Pott testified that

Thomas Wilsone had beaten his wife.

Wilsone, drunk when he beat her,

was sentenced to sit in the stocks and to pay a 20s fine.

The sentence
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was for his drunkenness, not his wife-beating.
Women, however, who broke the social peace in the colony usually
received severe punishments.

Margaret Jones, for attacking several

males, was sentenced to be towed at the s t e m of a boat out to the
Margaret and John, anchored in the middle of the James River, and back.
She had attacked Steven Webb and John Butterfield in September 1626,
perhaps because they were gathering food from her garden.

In 1627 Ann

Usher and Avis Partin received sentence of forty lashes, for what
offenses not stated, but presumably for fighting with each other.
Later that year Alice Thombury received a similar sentence for having
beaten Anne Snoade to the extent that the Snoade woman had miscarried.
Duckings and towings tied at the s t e m of a boat presumably were re
served for those who attacked men.

Amy Hall, wife of Christopher Hall,

had scolded, had beaten and had fought with many of her neighbors.

The

Court ordered her not only towed to the Margaret and John, but ducked
three times while at the b o a t . ^
The English conviction that courts were an Instrument for the im
position of order and control within a society carried over into the
creation of the county courts.

If the uses of violence to impose social

control on the Eastern Shore are any indication of the general usage
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practiced by county courts after 1634, then county courts became a
principal agent for social control in Virginia.

Although the General

Court retained the power to impose capital punishment, the Assembly
delegated authority to impose corporal punishment to county courts.
Those bodies followed much the same traditions after 1634 as had the
General Court prior to that date.

But Indian-white violence which

helped shape the General Court's interpretations of the law and resulted
in the imposition of such stringent punishments disappeared after 1632.
The conditions of warfare creating the need for strict control
within the white society ended with the clearing of the peninsula of
Indians following the war.

Officials moved rapidly to establish local

governments and county courts quickly responded to the need for control.
However, county courts apparently used violence to establish respect
for their authority and power within the system of local government,
just as had the General Court.

Moreover, to secure respect for that

system of government, the Governor and his Council usually appointed
the most influential men of any county to that county's commission of
the peace.
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Accomac County Court began trying cases of social control and
minor criminal misdemeanors in 1634.
Court did not end.

But associations with the General

That body remained interested in cases it felt

beyond its skill or authority.

Moreover, the General Court and county

courts generally acted well together where cooperation was needed, the
General Court usually upholding a county's authority when it was chal
lenged.

For instance, when Stafford Barlowe, the under-sheriff of

Henrico County, challenged the decision of the Henrico County court
ordering him whipped for slander, the General Court approved the county
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court's decision despite evidence that that body may have been wrong. ^
But the county courts, measured by the Eastern Shore court records,
generally used the same harsh methods as the General Court to enforce
their authority.

However, the county courts evidently began their

careers of law enforcement somewhat gingerly.

In May 1634 the Accomac

County court heard the case of William Berriman vs. Daniel Cugley.
Berriman accused Cugley of assault and battery.

Cugley admitted his

guilt, but asked the court that he be fined the charges of "daubinge
the Church,” a request the court granted.
lenient in other early cases.

But the court was not so

In September 1634 Phillip Taylor com

plained that John Little had defiled his house by bedding one of Tay
lor's maid-servants, Ellen Muce.

Although the Muce girl entered a plea

of forcible rape against Little, the court believed neither her plea
nor Little's denial.

The court ordered her whipped but decreed that

Little had to "lie neck and heels" (lie in the stocks) for three hours
and to pay a 5s fine for drunkenness.^

Even though the Muce girl was

physically punished, Little was not, suggesting that differences of sex
and class played significant roles in county court sentences, just as
they did in the General Court's decrees.

Moreover, the fine and public

humiliation of Little were for his drunkenness and not his abuse of the
Muce girl, just as in the Wilsone trial.
Differences of sex played the most frequent role in the Accomac
County court's sentences of punishment, with women receiving rather
severe punishment and men usually fines or confinement to the stocks.
These were typical punishments in the seventeenth century.

Thus, the

imposition of corporal punishments usually marked only the enforcement
of laws by county courts, but during the early years of a county's
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existence, its court frequently imposed much harsher punishments than
the law demanded so that citizens would respect the authority and power
of the court.

Women convicted of fornication by law were to receive

twenty-nine lashes, but many received thirty-nine or more.
Those cases in which men and women were charged together reveal
this fact most clearly.

The Muce-Little trial coupled with the John

Holloway-Catherin Joanes trial in November 1638 illustrate differences
in punishment based upon sex.

Phillip Chapman, a churchwarden on the

Eastern Shore, testified that Holloway and Joanes had had illicit
relations.

The court ordered Holloway to confess his sin before the

church congregation the next Sabbath and pay a fine of two hundred
pounds of tobacco, but the Joanes woman received thirty lashes on her
back.

Although Holloway was clearly a freeman, probably owning property,

such may not have been the case with Catherin Joanes.

She might have

been a servant, but court records usually mentioned someone of such
class and she was not listed as a servant.
That there were clear differences in punishment meted to offenders
of different classes is evident both in General Court and county court
decisions.

In February 1636 George Hort swore in Accomac County court

that one Mrs. Stonne went to Thomas Wyatt's shop to deny that she had
refused milk to Wyatt's wife because the goodwife was sick.

Hort test

ified that William Evans, a servant of Wyatt's, had told her that she
lied, whereupon Mrs. Stonne accused Hort of illegally milking Mr. Dodworth's cattle.

In defense of Hort, Evans then accused Mrs. Stonne of

keeping and starving her servants.
whipped.

The court ordered Evans severely

Some interesting points may be made about this case.

First,

Evans, clearly defined as a servant, received the only punishment.
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Second, apparently neither Hort nor Mrs. Stonne was a servant.

This

conclusion emerges from the enumeration of Mrs. Stonne's cattle and
servants and the fact that Hort was not defined as a servant.

Third,

while each made accusations against the other bordering on slander (a
crime carrying severe whippings), neither received even a fine, sug
gesting that both were prominent socially and economically, if not
politically, on the Eastern Shore.

Moreover, Hort, aged twenty, must

have been a son of a prominent figure, for he appears too young to have
yet made a significant figure for him s e l f . ^
Thus, between 1622 and 1640, the colony had begun to forge a sys
tem of colonial and local government which institutionalized methods of
violent punishment for the purpose of enforcing social control.

Offenses

against the social order such as slander, fornication, and assault be
came means by which local courts could use their authority to impose
order.

Whenever those courts' decisions were challenged, they could

rely on the General Court to uphold their power, even if evidence sug
gested that they had made an unjust decision.

Methods of corporal pun-

ishment included whipping and ducking as the most common.
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The use of a system of public ridicule in which the offender was
incarcerated in a pillory or stocks dated from English precedent, but
in early Virginia, prior to the 1620s, it was not frequently used.
system of such ridicule was introduced in the 1620s and 1630s.

A

The

government relied upon more direct and physical means of punishment.
As the society began to grow, the character and usage of official
violence expanded and broadened.

No longer was early Virginia dependent

upon the Virginia Company, thus it abandoned its factory character.
Englishmen in Virginia following 1625 had to form their society them

94
selves and one means by which they did so was their court structure,
which, using official violence, enforced social order, even helping to
create that order.

A system of social control b o m of the need for

discipline in the society to withstand external shocks from hostile
Indians was quickly adapted for use to give structure to that society
after the Indian threat declined.
The security attendant upon the decline of the Indian threat en
couraged a rapid growth of population after 1630.

That population in

crease brought new stresses in the colony, stresses erupting in revolt
in 1635.

Prior to that event, evidence argues that some disruption and

discontent existed in the colony during the late 1620s.

Governor Harvey

had appointed Sergeant-Major George Donne, second son of the poet, John
Donne, as special agent to the Crown to prosecute "those persons that
were lately seditious and disturbed the peaceable government."

Donne

petitioned the Crown in 1631, stating that he had completed his assign
ment and that he requested the return of his Sergeant-Majorship entitling
him to admission to the Council of the colony.

Although no mention of

the nature of the mutiny was made, a trial for petit treason was held in
1630.

William Mathews, a servant of Henry Booth, was convicted of the

crime and sentenced to be drawn and quartered, a punishment usually re
served for those convicted of treason.^
Governor Harvey, reputedly a difficult man to get along with, had
been involved in two violent Incidents in the colony long before his
governorship.

During his first journey to Virginia in 1623 the master

and mate of the ship on which he sailed raised a mutiny against him.
Harvey claimed that the Virginia Company had appointed him Admiral for
the voyage and that the master, one Guyar, and his mate, a Mr. White,
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had incited the rest of the crew against him.

Later, in January 1625,

Harvey assaulted William Mutch for insolently refusing to deliver
certain written covenants between the two to Harvey.

Mutch took Harvey

to the General Court, but that body refused to punish Harvey.
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The turmoil suggested by the Donne-Mathews evidence either con
tinued or revived in late 1634.

In December of that year, Governor

Harvey ordered the arrest of William England, Captain Martin, and
Francis Pott, brother of Dr. John Pott, for conducting a series of
secret and unlawful meetings.
incipient mutiny.

Harvey hoped that that action quelled

Instead, the mutineers, both in and out of jail,

continued their plotting.

On the night of April 27, 1635, William

Barrene, the sheriff of York County, held a secret meeting at his house
at which about two hundred citizens appeared.

Barrene spoke and circu

lated a paper written by Francis Pott and smuggled out of jail.
paper alleged three complaints against Governor Harvey:

The

a tax imposed

by him, a lack of justice on his part, and a fear that his Indian
policies would bring on another Indian massacre.^
When Harvey heard the next day of the meeting at Barrene1s he
summoned the Council.

Councilor Mathews, speaking on behalf of most of

the Council, informed Harvey that "the fury of the people was up
against him" and that if he did not go to England to respond to the
complaints, the Council could not appease the populace.

Harvey attempt

ed to assert his authority to quell the meeting, but when forty to fifty
musketeers commanded by the Council surrounded the house, he acquiesced.
Harvey's return to England did not lessen the difficulties. The Crown
ordered him back to Virginia, even if only to demonstrate the King's
authority.

Virginia's Council had chosen John West, Lord De la Warr's
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younger brother, as the new governor.

West and members of the Council

who had conspired against Harvey--Samuel Mathews, John Utie, William
Pearce, and William Claiborne— ran the colony in Harvey's absence.
Throughout the next five years, political disruption continued to ham
per the colonial government's operations.

The Crown appointed Sir

Francis Wyatt as a replacement for Harvey in 1638, but after Wyatt had
served only eighteen months, the Crown appointed Sir William Berkeley
as governor.

Berkeley arrived to assume his duties in February 1642.

Little violence attended the expulsion of Governor Harvey, al
though the Council used great force against the governor.

Harvey was

an irascible man and that characteristic has marked him through the
histories of the uprising which bears his name.

However, those who

fomented the uprising evidently did so for personal, selfish reasons.
They possessed estates, plantations, and trading posts along the north
ern coasts of the Chesapeake Bay and the settlement of Maryland in 1634
alarmed those men who stood to gain so much by exploiting their ad
vantages in that area.

Counciler Claiborne had a major Indian trading

post in the northern Chesapeake as well as a plantation on Kent Island
which fell within Lord Baltimore's grant of Maryland.

Baltimore had

already used force and violence to expel Claiborne's colony from Kent,
an incident which cost three lives and led to bitter rancor between the
two men during the next two decades.

While the actual violence of the

revolt against the Governor was minimal, those who fomented the rebel
lion did so because Harvey had violated their interests and they would
not forgive him for those transgressions.^

The fact that they aroused

so much support from the populace suggests that their hold on Virginia's
society was beginning to consolidate.

While there would continue to be
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some unrest and disorder in the colony, the next decade would reveal
the strength which the newly-emergent elite had.
The colony remained disorderly, although little violence occurred,
in part due to the continued ill-feelings generated by the expulsion of
Governor Harvey.

Events in England affected the stability of the col

onial society, and Berkeley himself did not contribute to harmonious
relations initially.

Berkeley had ordered the administration of a

religious oath which required submission to the Church of England.
Virginians of Puritan persuasion balked at this oath, for they did not
wish to renounce their own faith.

The oath was "tendered at mens houses,

the people murmured, and most refused to take it:

Those few that took

it did it more for fear than affection."^
The unrest and turbulence brought about by this action encouraged
the ancient Indian leader, Opechancanough, in his old dream of destroy
ing the English settlements.
remained quiet.

During the 1630s the Indians had generally

Cleared from the peninsula between the James and York

Rivers, the natives had retreated to the southwest, along the Appomat
tox River and to regions west of the colony.

Although Indian labor had

been tried, neither imported Indian slaves nor native Indian servants
sufficed.

A band of West Indian aborigines described as Caribs had been

imported into Virginia sometime before 1627, but they had evidently
plotted to kill their own masters and to raise a servant revolt.

At

least, the General Court, meeting October 11, 1627 concluded that those
Indians had plotted to overthrow their own masters and the colony as
well.

The Caribs had already killed several whites and some of the

fifteen had run off from their service.

The Court decreed that upon the

capture of those runaways, the whole band should hang.^®

The Caribs posed no real threat to the colony in 1627 when its
population numbered probably no more than 1,500, and by 1640 such a
plot required far more extensive participation and planning.

By the

latter date, whites in Virginia were quite confident of their ability
to master the Indians.

In 1640 a pair of incidents occurred suggesting

significant alterations in white attitudes to the natives still inhab
iting Tidewater Virginia.

On June 23 Arthur Price complained to the

General Court that an Indian had stolen a gun, a pair of breeches, and
a shirt from him.

Price suspected that the Indian had come from among

those living with a Mr. Panton, the owner of a plantation adjacent to
Price's.

The Court granted Price leave to seize the first Indian who

had information of the thief.

In December, John Burton killed an

Indian who he presumed was stealing from his plantation.
proved the dead Indian was not the culprit.

Later evidence

The Court ordered Burton to

pay a J^20 fine and leave the county in which he resided, a punishment
little more than a slap on the wrist.

Yet a few of the "great men" of

the local Indians interceded on his behalf and the punishments were
remitted.
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The Indians themselves seem to have accepted a role sub

missive to the whites.

These incidents suggest that the General Court,

the highest judicial body in Virginia, had come to regard Indians as
beings whose rights were clearly limited by their culture and race.

In

the Burton case, the court apparently believed that a white who murdered
an Indian should go unpunished.
By the time of the second attack in 1644, Opechancanough may have
been one hundred years old, and he lived at a considerable distance
from the white settlements.

Moreover, he evidently still regarded whites

as the single greatest threat to the security and safety of his people.
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Whites, in the meantime, had discarded all humanitarian concerns for
natives in Virginia, although the xenophobia of the 1620s had lessened
considerably.

The high-minded phrases with which English preachers and

colonial propagandists had encouraged white settlement among Indians for
the purpose of converting them to English Christianity had disappeared.
By the middle 1650s propagandists could write pamphlets in praise of
Virginia and Maryland without even mentioning the native population.
John Hammond's Leah and Rachel made no reference to Indians, even though
it was penned and published a decade after the 1644 attack.
Virginia's government and the Indians after 1632 made no new at
tempts at forging a common society.

They remained separate culturally,

although in close proximity geographically.

The white population had

swelled to approximately eight thousand by 1640, and regions of settle
ment well beyond the already-established counties were flourishing.

Ope-

chancanough's Confederation of Algonquin-speaking peoples probably num
bered no more than the whites and most likely several thousand fewer,
for attrition of the native population proceeded rapidly as cultural
disintegration set in.

That Indian Confederation had lost population

through a variety of means, war being among the more important.

While

comparatively few Indians probably died from hostilities, the losses
due to starvation and deprivation from white methods of war quite
possibly accounted for a considerable percentage of the population
d e c line.^
Opechancanough possibly perceived the tension and divisiveness in
the colony as an opportunity which he could exploit.

The attack, occur

ring on April 18, 1644, took the lives of over five hundred colon
ists, the Southside and western frontiers being the areas of heaviest
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loss of life.

The Indians sustained their fighting for more than two

days, but just as had been true in 1622, whenever whites stood their
ground the Indians gave way.

White frontier settlements were most

susceptible to attack, for those settlers had allegedly returned to the
pre-1622 relations with Indians, a pattern counter to the government's
policy of separation.

Indians had been able to enter their homes at

will, bringing game and presents and receiving hospitality in return.
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According to John Winthrop, Opechancanough was well aware of the
dissension within the colony.

Winthrop reported in his Journals that

a Virginia ship arrived on May 22, 1644, with first word of the massacre.
The ship's master told Winthrop that an Indian prisoner had revealed
Opechancanough's assessment of the Virginia situation.

The werowance's

motivation for ordering the attack was the continued English demand for
land.

The settlers were driving the natives out of their own country.

But, evidently, the Indian leader wanted assurance that an attack would
force the English from Virginia.

He understood that unusual conditions

in the colony had to develop before such an attack could be made.

He

had learned that Civil War existed in England itself, and the English
could not help their Virginia colonists.

Moreover, it appeared to

Opechancanough that the Virginians themselves were at war with one
another.

Opechancanough had apparently seen in the Chesapeake Bay a

battle between a London vessel sailing for Parliament and a Bristol ship
sailing for the King.

He had misunderstood the nature of the battle,
CO

assuming that the ships signalled warring factions in Virginia itself. J
Winthrop's journal entries appear acceptable in the face of the
dissensions aroused by Berkeley's religious oath, an oath part of the
general tension wrought by the onslaught of the Civil Wars in England,
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Furthermore, the unrest engendered by the Harvey revolt of nine years
before might have had an effect in disrupting the colony's social order.
Moreover, another anonymous document pointed out that several whites had
kept the old chief well-informed of the unrest and disorder in the
colony, especially the unrest associated with divisions over the English
Civil Wars.

The Indian chieftain had concluded that even if he could

not surprise and kill all the whites, the disruption of the local econo
my and the lack of supply from England would so discourage the survivors
C/

that they would leave Virginia.
Virginians recovered slowly from the attack.

They did not possess

much powder, "so that it is the opinion of judicious men that if the
Indians had but forborne for a month longer, they had found us in such
a combustion among our selves that they might with ease had cut off f]
every man if once we had spent that little powder and shot that we had
among our s e l v e s . O n June 3, 1644, the Assembly voted to send Mr.
Cornelius Loyd to New Netherland to act as agent for the colony.

The

Burgesses instructed Loyd to seek any aid and supplies he might find,
but especially to obtain arms, powder, and ammunition from other
colonies.

Neither he nor agents sent to New England were particularly

successful in obtaining those needed supplies, for Winthrop stated in
his Journal for early September that a Virginia pinnace had arrived to
seek arms, but the Puritans had turned down the supplicants claiming
they did not have enough for their own defense.
Thus, not until 1645 did Virginians begin offensive operations
against the Indians.

In the meantime, the Assembly ordered the erection

of several forts to be placed at the heads of the major Virginia rivers.
In late winter, 1644-1645, the Assembly also created flying forces
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charged with pursuing any Indian bands coming into the settlements.
In March 1646 the Assembly ordered tactics similar to those used
against the natives in the war of the 1620s:

cutting up the Indians'

corn, destroying their villages, and killing any Indians caught.

The

intent was to drive Indians farther into the interior so that Virginia
could win more land.
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Opechancanough had already offered to treat for peace, but the
colony had refused, for the Assembly wished to prosecute the war to a
total victory.

By early 1646, the Assembly could write Parliament that

"the savage King, who contrived the massacre of our people is so aban
doned by his people, and they so routed and dispersed, that they are
no longer a nation, and we now suffer only from robbery by a few starved
outlaws, whom by God's assistance, we doubt not to root out in another
year."'*®

They did not have to wait that long, for the Indians sur

rendered later that year.
Governor Berkeley had returned from England, where he had gone to
obtain instructions and to clarify for Virginians conditions resultant
from the Civil Wars.

Colonial military activity "first, by the valour,

courage and hot charge of Captain Marshall, and valiant Stillwell, and
finished by the personal and resolute march and victory of Sir William
Berkeley, Governor there, taking the old King Ope Chancino [Opechancanough] prisoner" had crushed Indian will to resist.
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The capture of

the ancient werowance brought the complete collapse of native inde
pendence,

His death from a shot in the back from one of his guards,

who may have killed him more out of mercy than malice, ended the career
of one of the first Indian leaders in North America to recognize the
potent threat to Indian culture posed by whites.
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The Confederation's new leader, Necotowance, entered peace nego
tiations with the whites and a treaty was ratified in October 1646.
The document provided that no longer could Indians enter any parts of
the colony, even areas which might be described as frontier.

The

treaty itself is an expression of the conclusion of the great violence
which had characterized Indian-white relationships in early Virginia.
The provisions of the treaty suggest that the whites become patriarchs
over the red men of the defunct Confederation.

The English not only

claimed the right to educate Indian children, but to govern and to con
trol Indian governments.

Necotowance even accepted the King of England

as his overlord and, thus, Virginia whites had won completely the
struggle for mastery of the Virginia wilderness.
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Those negotiations ended forty years of fighting and violence
between the whites and Confederation Indians.

Having arrived with the

mission of "civilizing" the Indians, the English converted their pre
conceptions of Indians as savages into hostility and condemnation.
The Indians were not to amalgamate with the English after 1622, and
after 1646 the natives of Virginia became the vassals of Englishmen.
Although the two societies remained separate and the Indian tribes
comprising the Confederation were confined to reservations following
1650, the clear dependency of Indians upon whites is perhaps no better
expressed than in their new appellation of Tributary.

No longer were

Confederation Indians independent, but dependent upon their white
masters.

The natives had surrendered not only control of their chil

dren, but control of their governments in the treaty.

The ethno

centric notions inaugurated in English ideas of the savages of the
wilderness had hardened into racist thought, considering Indians not
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only different, but inferior and properly subordinate.

White usage of

violence and the technological-military advantages they possessed over
the Indians had insured that ultimate success.
Moreover, official violence had become an important means by which
white leadership assured its control in the society being fashioned in
Virginia's wilderness.

Bringing institutionalized means of corporal

and capital punishments with them, the leadership had had to strengthen
its control of the colonists in the face of the great Indian threat and
economic boom of the 1620s.

The disappearance of that threat meant

some relaxation of governmental vigilance as the government struggled to
inculcate deference in the new society.

Severe and often harsh punish

ments were still meted out to transgressors in an effort to insure
stability and order within the society.

By 1646, then, violence had

come to play an important role not only in assuring colonial Virginia's
security but also in shaping the early society.
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CHAPTER

IV

VIOLENCE IN THE FORMATION OF VIRGINIA SOCIETY:
1646-1675

With the collapse of the Indian Confederation in 1646, Virginia
whites no longer had to be concerned with threats of internal Indian
hostility over resistance to expansion.

Tension in Indian affairs re

mained high until 1675, but the threat of massive Indian attack ravaging
the colony itself had ended.

Virginia Confederation Indians became

tributary to whites and those natives lost control of their own affairs.
They no longer possessed the independence of action they had had prior
to 1646, becoming dependents of white Virginians.

Violent outbursts by

frontier Indians not part of the Confederation, especially in the 1660s,
continued, and those no longer threatened colonial security as they had
in 1607-1614, 1622-1632, or 1644-1646.

Moreover, "strange" Indians,

meaning natives from well beyond Virginia's borders, also entered the
colony to present violent problems.
deal with three groups of Indians:

Thus, whites in the colony had to
Tributaries dependent on the colony;

frontier Indians, not part of the Confederation, feeling increased pres
sure from Virginia's expansion; and "strange" Indians, resident well be
yond the colony, who raided in Virginia or passed through Virginia's
expanding backcountry on their way to hunting grounds.
The collapse of internal Indian resistance ushered in a period of
rapid expansion for Virginia.

The population of the colony grew from
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approximately 15,300 in 1648 to 40,000 in 1671, an increase unprece
dented in earlier Virginia history.'*'

By 1675, no longer was Virginia

an insecure outpost of English civilization along the Chesapeake and its
tributaries.

Moreover, during the third quarter of the seventeenth

century, Virginia society developed along many lines inaugurated in the
years since 1624:

agriculture continued the predominant mode of econ

omic existence, with tobacco providing not only income from its produc
tion but the principal medium of exchange in the colony; farms and
plantations, scattered along major or minor rivers, remained basic
economic units; families were defined as much by numbers contained with
in one household unit as by blood; laboring systems consisting of free
men and freeholders, indentured servants, and a small number of slaves,
both Negro and Indian, continued to work the fields; Indian trade,
especially with major Indian nations of the Southeast such as the Chero
kee, provided many Virginians lucrative incomes; and county courts b e 
came the principal foci of government for most whites in the colony, as
those institutions refined the definition of their duties during the
last half of the seventeenth century.^

The use of violence by all

courts in the colony remained an important instrument of control of the
society, even though fines, measured in tobacco, were often levied.
Violent behavior among whites in the colony, however, reached its
highest levels during the fifty years between 1650 and 1700.

No sooner

had the Indian Confederation commanded by Opechancanough been crushed
than Parliamentary forces, in the aftermath of the successful overthrow
of royal authority in 1648, came to the colony to demand its surrender
to Parliament.

That event passed peacefully enough, but evidence of

the early 1650s suggests that not all Virginians accepted the decision
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rendered.

Confrontations between Royalists and Parliamentarians con

tinued in the colony during the decade of the 1650s, resulting in
threats of violence.
On occasion the General Assembly refused to seat duly elected mem
bers from counties because they had uttered seditious statements royal
ist in sentiment.

At the 1653 session of the Assembly, neither John

Hammond nor James Pyland was permitted his seat.

The two men, repre

sentatives from Isle of Wight County, were accused of seditious and
rebellious behavior.

The Assembly alleged that Hammond was a disturber

of the peace in both "libellous and scandalous manners."

Pyland had

supposedly aided and abetted Thomas Woodward in his mutinous and rebel
lious declaration, a reference to a royalist movement initiated by
Woodward.

At the same session of the Assembly, Captain Abraham Read was

tried for behaving "contemptuously" to the governor and government of
the colony.

Read had claimed authority over both Cornelius Loyd, agent

to the northern colonies, and Governor Bennett himself.

He had also

made disparaging accusations about the loyalty of the Virginia govern
ment to the royalist cause.

Read pleaded guilty and the Assembly fined

him 10,000 lbs. of tobacco and cask."*
Although neither of these incidents involved violent behavior,
they do provide indications that resistance to Parliamentary control did
not disappear with the surrender of the colony by Sir William Berkeley
in 1652.

Moreover, the offense of which Read was accused was generally

punished by severe whipping.

However, people of importance in the

colony were seldom punished in such fashion.

Neither Hammond nor Pyland

received any punishment, suggesting that they also possessed significant
social status.
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Those Incidents did not end resistance to the Parliamentary form
of government.

On the Eastern Shore, a major insurgency rose, motivated

by imposition of Parliamentary control.

When the Parliamentary Commis

sion received Virginia's formal submission on March 12, 1651/2, two
members of the newly-appointed Council for the Commonwealth of Virginia,
Colonels Nathaniel Littleton and Argoll Yeardley, crossed the Chesapeake
to obtain the submission of strongly disaffected Northampton County.
Between March 12 and 25, Colonel Edmund Scarburgh, a prominent merchant
and strong royalist, circulated a petition known as the Northampton
Protest among the populace.

Many Eastern Shore residents signed the

document by March 30, although by March 25 over one hundred settlers
there, including Scarburgh, had signed another statement acceding to the
commissioners who had arrived on March 12.

The Protest expressed re

sentment of the imposition of very heavy taxation upon the Eastern Shore
despite the fact that no Assembly burgesses had been returned from that
region since 1647.

The signers complained that the newly proclaimed

Virginia Parliamentary government had neither the power nor the right to
impose such taxation when no representatives from the Eastern Shore were
present to remonstrate.

Neither Governor Berkeley nor Governor Bennett

had ordered elections on the Eastern Shore.

Later that spring the

Assembly proclaimed the signers of the Protest "scandalous and seditious,"
appointing a commission made up of the governor, colonial secretary, and
several assistants to go to Northampton to try those accused of such
behavior.

Many were tried and convicted.

Rather than receiving corpor

al punishment, they were deprived of political offices and were fined in
sums ranging from three hundred to five hundred pounds of tobacco.^
Once again, socially and politically prominent men were fined rather

116
them whipped.

This principle of distinguishing punishments on the

basis of class standing in the colony doubtless had its origins in Eng
land, but became a method of reenforcing class distinctions in Virginia
during the colonial era.
Although the English social system displayed more fluidity than
any of its European counterparts, by 1650 it was obviously more sharply
stratified and defined than its Virginia offspring.

Land and birth,

two of the principal requisites for gentility in England, were not rep
licated in Virginia.

Acquisition of land was much easier in the colony

than it was in England.

The nobility did not migrate to Virginia in

sufficient numbers to replenish themselves and to establish a nobility
based upon birth and descent.

Thus, those in Virginia Interested in

establishing a position of high social rank for themselves had to rely
upon devices of their own making.

Admission to the county commissions

of peace provided one avenue of recognition for those who had acquired
economic and social prominence in their counties.

To assure the con

tinuation of distinction became, however, one purpose for the use of
official violence in county and colonial courts.

Different punishments

based upon class or sex for the same crime served as a reminder to
ordinary Virginians, whether servant or free, of their status.
While white resistance to Parliamentary control was building,
Virginians and Indians began working out the implications of the 1646
treaty.

That treaty had placed Virginia Indians under white control,

assigning the colonial government responsibility for directing and
protecting the "Tributary" Indians of the colony.**

Virginia’s govern

ment, thus, was thrust into a role which governments throughout Ameri
can history have had, the role of attempting to remain true to treaties
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with natives in the face of constant expansive pressure and land-grab
bing by ordinary white citizens.
In an effort to establish and to enforce governmental authority in
Indian-white affairs, on May 10, 1651, the Northampton County Court
tried Edmund Scarburgh, Thomas Johnson, Richard Vaughan, John Dollings,
John Tomlin Pierce, and "diverse others" for breaking colonial laws by
illegally attacking Eastern Shore Indians, probably the Pocomokes,
natives unconnected to Virginia tributaries.

The attack, made on April

28, included an attempt upon the King of Pocomoke's life.

The whites

shot at Indian prisoners and bound one of them with a chain.

As a re

sult of the raid, large numbers of Indians were currently Invading the
county.

The county court ordered the sheriff to take the men to James

town to stand trial before the General Court there.^
Evidence from later in the 1650s and the early 1660s suggests that
the colonial government took seriously its charge to protect Tributary
Indians.

On March 23, 1661/2, the Assembly ordered Gerrard Fowke and

Giles Brent to pay 15,000 pounds of tobacco each.

Moreover, they were

stripped of all their civil and military offices and forbidden from
holding any offices for the rest of their lives.

The two had bungled

a case in which several Indians had been turned over to them by
Wahanganoche, sachem of the Potomacs, on charges of murder.

The two

had allowed at least one of the murderers to escape and, to cover their
mistake, had illegally ordered the arrest and confinement of Wahanga
noche, contrary to the safe conducts for the sachem and his advisers
issued by Governor Berkeley.

The two officers, however, received very

high fines not only for their treatment of Wahanganoche but also because
they had alleged that they had done so by Governor Berkeley's authority.
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The sachem was set free, but depredations by non-Tributary northern
Indians continued.

Indian violence in the Potomac region persisted

during the whole third quarter of the seventeenth century.^
As early as 1653, Potomac-area Indians provoked warfare with the
colony.

In 1654 the Assembly instructed Lancaster, Northumberland, and

Westmoreland Counties to raise a force to march against the Rappahan
nock Indians, a nation that had no connection with Tributary natives.
The three counties had complained repeatedly of "injuries and insolencies" done their citizens by that tribe.

The Assembly instructed

Lancaster to levy one hundred men, Northumberland forty men, and Westmoreland thirty men to march against the Indians.

Q

The frontier Indians

had remained outside the peace of 1646 and their lands lay along the
path of northward Virginia expansion.
The summer prior to the Brent-Fowke trial, Richard White of the
Northern Neck had lost his son, two servants, and his crops and farm
buildings during an Indian raid.

The Assembly voted him compensation

in the amount of 10,000 pounds of tobacco at the same session as it
tried Fowke and Brent.

Evidently, the Indian murderers entrusted to

their care were those accused of taking part in the raid on the White
q

plantation.
While the Northern Neck was the subject of repeated raids, more
Indian depredations broke out on the Eastern Shore, doing significant
damage.

On March 13, 1659/60, the newly-restored Governor Berkeley

and Speaker of the Assembly Theodorick Bland ordered 71,500 pounds of
tobacco paid to inhabitants of Accomac County who had suffered damages
during the "late war."

Most likely the reference was to the series of

raids occurring late in the 1650s.
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Indian migrations and movements, difficult to trace in anything
more than very general terms, appear to have reached high levels in the
1650s and 1660s.

The Iroquois had begun their wars of conquest and

expansion to the southward during those decades; thus, they frequently
intruded into Virginia's frontiers as they raided Indians geographically
close to the colony.

Moreover, rapid growth of colonial population

after 1650, especially in Virginia, increased pressure upon frontier
natives to vacate their traditional homelands.

Consequently, Indian

migrations throughout the whole of the colonies, from New England to
Virginia, created tensions that bred violence.
Virginians compounded their problems with natives by enacting laws
asserting full governmental authority over Tributary Indians.

These

laws provided that the colonial government should appoint all sachems
for the Tributaries and stipulated that any resistance to their de
cisions required the death penalty.

Indian villages located near the

scene of a murder of a white were responsible for conducting a search
for the murderer, especially if he were an I n d i a n . ^

No evidence sur

vives to demonstrate whether these laws affected Indian violence in the
1660s or 1670s, but they do provide a clue to the increasingly patern
alistic and ethnocentric attitudes of whites to Indians.

Thus, the

disintegration of the Tributary Indian culture continued throughout the
decades from 1650 until 1675, leaving those natives ill-prepared to
resist aggressive, frontier whites when war between Indians and whites
broke out in 1675.
Another factor contributing to Tributary resentment of whites was
that whites used them as pawns to protect settlements from "strange"
Indians raiding into Virginia.

"Strange" Indians were those from well

beyond the colony's frontiers, who raided backcountry plantations or
settled in Virginia.

In 1656 between six and seven hundred Indians

identified as Richahecrians, probably a Siouxan-speaking people,
settled near the falls of the James.

The Assembly considered those

Indians a great danger, "it [the falls of the James] being so apt a
place to invade us and within those limits which in a just war were
formerly conquered by us, and by us reserved at the last conclusion of
1o

peace with the Indians."

The Assembly then ordered Colonel Hill to

lead a force of one hundred against the Indians and required Tottopottomoy, the successor of Necotowance, and one hundred Indian warriors
to accompany the whites.

In a military disaster almost the whole two-

hundred man force was wiped out by the "strange" Indians, who evidently
then moved out of the colony.

Although the Assembly tried Hill for

incompetence, found him guilty as charged, and stripped him of all
offices, the incident left considerable bitterness among the natives.
In 1675, Tottopottomoy's widow, the Queen of the Pamunkey, refused aid
to the whites during that Indian war because she resented the treatment
given the Indians after 1656. J
In the decade of the 1660s Indian difficulties persisted.

Al

though tributary natives no longer posed a direct threat to the col
ony's security, and remained passive, the possibility of "strangers™
attacks and frontier-native skirmishes created considerable tension in
the colony.

The Richard White and Fowke-Brent incidents suggest that

Indian hostility helped block northward expansion.

Moreover, continual

raids by Doegs and other northern frontier Indians during that entire
decade kept the Northern Neck region perpetually disrupted.

In 1666

the Council received several reports of murders and raids along the
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Potomac River's southern bank.

The Council, evidently resolved to end

the menace which had been going on for four years, ordered war made
upon the villages of Montazion, Nansimond, and Port Tobacco.

The mil

itia was instructed to kill all males and to destroy totally the vil
lages, but to capture as many women and children as possible for sale
as indentured servants.

It was this crisis which provoked Governor

Berkeley to assert that the only feasible policy regarding the Indians
along Virginia's northern frontiers was complete extermination.

He

wrote in 1666 that "I think it is necessary to Destroy all these
Northern Indians for they must Needs be Conscious of the Coming of
these other Indians, twill be a great Terror and Example of Instruction
to all other Indians."

He added that the sale of the women and chil

dren would defray all costs of the w a r . ^

Thus, even Berkeley, by no

means an avowed hater of Indians, had concluded that white power in
Virginia was now so strong that the colony could destroy with impunity
those non-Tributary, frontier Indians who attempted to protect their
lands.
Berkeley's phrase the "coming of the other Indians" referred to
movement of Iroquois war and hunting parties down the Virginia backcountry.

During the third quarter of the seventeenth "strangers" who

were Iroquois remained particularly bothersome to Virginians, and
Berkeley meant them as much as he did frontier Indians in Virginia
when he wrote that the destruction of the Northern Indians would "be
a great Terror and Example of Instruction to all other Indians."

Thus,

by 1670 Virginia whites no longer feared internal Indian power, but
Indian hostilities in newly-settled lands could still provoke consid
erable tension, tension alleviated only by the extermination of Indians
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living on the colony's northern fringes.
Even attempts by whites to expand Indian trade resulted in Indian
violence.

Abraham Wood, a prominent Indian trader who had received

the grant of Fort Henry upon its abandonment by the colony after 1646,
annually sent out trading expeditions to the south-central portions of
modern-day Virginia.

These expeditions traded at first mostly with the

Occaneechee Indians, a nearby band having their principal fortified
village on an island in the Roanoke River.

By 1673, however, Wood

felt confident enough to order his traders to extend their contacts
directly to the Cherokee nation.

The party, led by James Needham and

Gabriel Arthur, and accompanied by Indian guides, set off on April 10.
They lodged with the Occaneechees for a few weeks, discussing with
those Indians the shortest and quickest routes to get to the Cherokees.
The Occaneechees resented this attempt at circumventing a trade they
had controlled as middlemen for so long.

When the traders sensed the

shift in Occaneechee attitude, they made plans to escape, but Needham
was killed before they could flee.

Arthur escaped successfully, but

he did not return to Fort Henry until June 18, 1674.

This incident

may have prompted Bacon's revenge in 1676, when he and his men de-

1s

stroyed the Occaneechee fort. J

Thus, by the outbreak of the Susquehanna War in 1675, tensions
between frontier Virginians living on the northern reaches of the
colony and on its southwestern fringes and frontier Indians resident
in those two areas had mounted to the point of open warfare.

Moreover,

Virginia's leadership had concluded that the only way to deal with
hostile Indians was extermination.

Ethnocentric beliefs of white

superiority, implicit in the assumption of control of Tributary Indians,
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became explicit in the decision to assert control over or to extermin
ate all Indians resident within or near Virginia's borders.

The d e 

cision to control or to exterminate would depend on the circumstances,
but in either instance violence was required.

Although the colonial

government tried to enforce the Injunctions of the 1646 treaty,
occasionally applying force against white citizens in Virginia, the
resolution of the tension over whether to protect Indians from whites
or vice versa ultimately resulted in the latter. ^
What effect the repeated use of force and violence against Indi
ans had upon the English in the colony is difficult to assess.

How

ever, applications of harsh and cruel punishments even by seventeenthcentury standards suggests that colonial courts relied not only upon
English systems of punishment but upon their own experience in the New
World.

Moreover, disregard for Indian life may also have conditioned

white violence in colonial society itself.

Mass violence and the use

of harsh physical punishments to correct criminals or social deviants,
when taken together, leave an impression of declining respect for
human life.

Frequent resort to violence within white society and uses

of violence not only against Indians but Negroes suggest a connection.
Whether the New World wilderness conditioned whites to use those means
of violence they possessed and to devise new uses of violence for means
of control is conjectural; however, the evidence points to such a con
clusion.
Repeated use of official violence to punish both incidents of
social control and crimes involving loss of life In the third quarter
of the seventeenth century argues that Virginians had accepted decisions
made in the 1620s and 1630s concerning discriminations of sex and class.
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In cases of fornication tried during the 1650s or 1660s, the courts
usually ordered the man involved to pay a fine or to be jailed for a
period of time.

Women normally received corporal punishment, a severe

whipping being the most frequent form.

In August of 1652, Lancaster's

county court ordered Charles Snead to pay a fine of five hundred pounds
of tobacco and costs for the trial for having fornicated with Eliza
beth Wig.

The Wig girl, however, received a sentence of twenty stripes

"well laid on" her bare back.

It is possible that she was a servant

girl having no money with which to pay a fine.

However, courts often

required masters or husbands to pay fines for servants or wives caught
misbehaving.

In another incident of fornication occurring in 1662,

William Burgh [Burg] was ordered jailed by the Assembly until he could
pay a bond for his future good behavior.

His partner, Elizabeth

Billingsley, received a whipping for her participation.

By the early

1660s, however, colonial courts, either the General Court or the
Assembly sitting as a court of final appeals, were discouraging cases
of such a nature from their dockets.

They preferred to let county

courts, meeting more frequently, have full jurisdiction in such
matters.

17

Servants received more severe punishments for crimes they com
mitted than did freemen for similar misdeeds.

In cases of assault in

which servants beat a freeman, the servants received harsh physical
punishments and additional time added to their service.

In 1672 the

General Court tried two servants for having assaulted their overseer.
Although the service time of the two had expired, the court ordered
that they be severely whipped.

On the other hand, in a case of assault

tried before the court in 1673, Mr. Wheeler, a freeman of Charles City

125
County, was found guilty of assaulting Captain John Rudd.

Wheeler

confessed and the Court ordered him to pay Captain Rudd 2,000 pounds
of tobacco and cask, to beg the captain's pardon, and to pay all costs,
both for Rudd's medical treatment and the trials.
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However, servants possessing special skills such as carpentry
could expect lighter punishments for such offenses as running off or
assaulting their overseers.

In 1674 seven servants were tried for

attempting to run off from their service.

The seven pleaded guilty

before the General Court, but one, Edward Day a carpenter, received no
sentence of whipping despite the fact that he was implicated in the
planning.

The other six were ordered whipped and additional service

added to their indentures, all except a Negro belonging to Mr. Richard
James, who was probably an "indenture for life."

The distinction of

Day was that he possessed a special skill, one which was valuable to
the colonial society.

He was also a servant of the governor; however,

four others were also servants of the governor, and they were ordered
severely w h i p p e d . ^

This indicates that courts discriminated among

servants based on their abilities and skills, establishing further
evidence that courts used violence to discriminate among classes and
groups in early Virginia in an effort to secure an orderly society
progression from bottom to top.
Evidence suggests, moreover, that those at the top of the social
pyramid frequently were excused from judicial process when accused of
crimes.

For instance, Lieutenant Colonal Thomas Swann of Surry County

was brought before the 1654/5 session of the Assembly for the murder of
one of his servants, Elizabeth Buck.

The Surry County Court had al

ready arraigned him on the charge and certified to the Assembly that
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sufficient presumptive evidence existed to warrant a trial of him.
Swann, leader of a prominent social family in Surry County and holding
high office in the county, denied his guilt, alleging that the Buck
girl had died by accident.

The Assembly accepted his plea and pardoned

him, finding that the girl had died by misadventure.

20

Not only did the colonial government use official violence to aid
in the construction of a social structure, but the government helped
to define limits of acceptable behavior within the colony.

To some

degree, those limits were elastic, expanding in times of security and
confidence and contracting when insecurity and fear appeared.

21

For

instance, witches and religious dissenters represented deviant b e 
havior which, in the middle of the seventeenth century, the colonial
government was unprepared to accept, but a half-century later the
government was willing to tolerate.

The Assembly had empowered county

courts to handle cases of witchcraft, and in 1656 the Northumberland
County Court tried William Harding for such an offense.

Mr. David

Lindsaye, an Anglican minister, charged Harding with being a witch,
and on November 29, 1656, a twenty-four man jury found Harding guilty
as charged.

The court, however, sentenced him to ten lashes and banoo

ishment from the colony.
Religious dissenters were no more acceptable to colonial leader
ship in the 1650s than witches.

Puritans, although tolerated if they

remained quiet and peaceful, were subject to persecution when they be
came too visible.

Virginia was officially an Anglican-established

colony, but it remained low-church in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, for the Virginia Anglican Church was shorn of its ceremony
and vestries controlled the appointment of ministers*

Thus, the colony
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tolerated Puritans as long as they did not disturb the religious status
quo.

When three Boston, Massachusetts, Puritan ministers came to Vir

ginia in the 1640s to preach and to convert Virginians to a more Calvinistic view of religion, Governor Berkeley threatened to use force
to rid the colony of them.

Quakers of the 1650s and 1660s were even

more reprehensible, for they were at the peak of their proselytizing
zeal, often returning repeatedly to colonies which had banished them
from their boundaries.

A handful of Quakers returned to Massachusetts

so frequently that they were eventually hanged.

Virginia's government

had many more Quakers with whom to deal and by the early 1660s had
imprisoned most of them.
The 1659/60 session of the Virginia Assembly prohibited Quakers
from entering the colony.

The law directed the governor to arrest and

imprison all Quakers currently in the colony, allowing them their free
dom only when they promised to leave Virginia.

By 1662 this action had

come to the attention of King Charles II, and recorded in his Domestic
Papers were the facts that Virginia Quakers had been banished and
others had had their worldly goods confiscated.

The Quaker problem

remained to plague the Virginia government for several years, for
Charles II repeatedly requested an explanation for Virginia's official
policy regarding these dissenters.

The King evidently considered

Virginia's actions high-handed, although Sir William Berkeley had
always supported the Church of England against dissenters of whatever
religious stripe. ^
The colonial government used violence to limit another social
problem that exceeded the limits of permissible deviance.

Following

the restoration of the monarchy, the Crown began sending convicts to

the colonies to rid England's jails of them.

Many of these convicts,

political prisoners arrested by the Crown for participation in the
Civil Wars, were sent to Virginia, but large numbers of felons were
also shipped to the colony.

The surviving records suggest that many

of these prisoners, whether criminal or political, had to remain in
service in Virginia for a minimum of twelve years.

The colonists

needed a large labor supply, relying upon indentured servitude to fill
that need.

The transported convicts would certainly have augmented

the supplies of labor, and at a cheaper price than those indenturing
themselves of their own free will, but during the 1660s those convicts
seriously disturbed the social fabric of the colony.

In that decade

Virginia evidently experienced serious social disruption by the con
victs, for in 1670 the Virginia Governor and Council forbade further
introduction of convict servants into Virginia's society.
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Once

again, the colonial government helped define the society's limits of
deviance.

In this instance, a policy promising economic rewards had

to be rejected on the basis of overarching social considerations.
Violence and threats of violence that resulted from the introduction
of convicts into the lower classes of the society had become apparent
to Virginia's leaders, and they had had to act to curtail that immi
gration.
The peak of that convict-servant violence occurred in 1663 when
a large band of servants from Gloucester County planned and mounted an
insurrection against their masters.

On Sunday, September 6 , 1663, the

leaders met at Newman's Land in the county to plot their uprising.
They agreed to meet the following Saturday at midnight at Poplar Spring
and from there to march to the house of Councilor Willis to seize the
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county militia's arms and drum stored there.

Leaving the councilor's

house, they planned to march to Governor Berkeley's plantation, Green
Spring, collecting more arms and servants as they went.
Berkeley's, they intended to demand their freedom.

Once at

Their plot was

revealed, however, by John Birkenhead, a servant of Major John Smith
of Purton, Gloucester County.

Governor Berkeley stationed the county

militia at the meeting point on the night of the plot, and it was
broken before it began.

Four ringleaders were hanged and the Assembly

rewarded Birkenhead with freedom and 5,000 pounds of tobacco.

Al

though most of the plotters were former Cromwellian soldiers who be
lieved their true station in life was not servitude, the growing social
disruptions attendant upon the tobacco trade and its decline, and u n 
rest created by extensive persecution of the Quakers and other sectaries
in the colony contributed to the fears and tensions helping to set off
the plot.
By 1675, then, the courts of Virginia, especially the General
Court, had helped shape Virginia's society through the use of official
violence.
From 1625 until 1675, colonial and county courts had used their
authority to give substance to the social structure of the colony and
to help define acceptable limits of deviant behavior for colonists
within the social structure.

By using that authority extensively, the

courts had refined what punishments fitted what social classes.

Those

punishments usually were most physical and severe for those at the
lower edges of the social structure.

Those at the top could expect

fines, if they received any censure for their behavior.

If they could

afford a fine, they could usually expect such proportional to their
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ability to pay.
The colonial courts had less difficulty dealing with criminal
deviance.

Behavior defined as criminal was more easily delineated than

social deviance and, thus, colonial courts, generally more poorly
trained in law than their English counterparts, had less trouble estab
lishing guilt in criminal cases.

Virginia's Assembly and courts large

ly adopted English precedents for criminal definition in the colony.
Murder, rape, and other crimes against the person were stipulated crim
inal and carried punishments either corporal or capital, mostly the
latter.

Crimes against property were not as well defined, thus pro

viding an opportunity for the Virginia government to adapt the definition of criminal behavior according to conditions in the colony.
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The evidence from criminal trials of the third quarter of the
seventeenth century reveals that Virginia courts tried to model their
procedures on English practice.

Virginians even practiced the "ordeal

of touch," an English medieval system for determining guilt in certain
types of criminal cases, especially murder.

In at least two instances,

that ancient practice was used by county courts in the colony in order
to ascertain whether the accused should be bound over to the General
Court for trial.

Although county courts tried accused criminals for

misdemeanors requiring corporal punishments, the General Court retained
the power to try those committing crimes requiring the death penalty.
The "ordeal of touch" required that the accused touch the body of the
deceased and, if that body then bled, the accused was ordered bound
over for trial for murder.

In two instances, county courts used that

practice, but in only one case was the accused ordered to stand trial
before the General Court.
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By the 1670s criminal activity had become widespread and the
General Court heard many cases during its sessions.

The high level of

criminal behavior may be read as a sign of the great tension and unrest
building in Virginia.
abounded.

A number of murders occurred and lesser crimes

The General Court usually had a full docket of criminal

cases every session from 1670 until the outbreak of Bacon's Rebellion,
and the criminal activity in the colony ranged from robbery and simple
assault to murder and rape.

The punishments used by the Court point

up the tension within the colony.

Although the Court might have wished

to defer to the King's judgment in some cases, it usually applied the
full measure of the law to convicted criminals.
Even those convicted of crimes in which courts had discretion
about punishments received the harshest of the choices.

At the spring

1671 session of the General Court Edward Reddish was convicted of man
slaughter.

The law permitted a range of punishments for this crime

from branding to a fine.

Reddish, accused of murder, had his charge

reduced to manslaughter by the grand jury.

After he pleaded benefit

of clergy, the General Court ordered him burned in the

hand.

At the

same session the Court heard the murder case of Thomas

Shaw.

He was

accused of the murder of Thomas Seaman and was convicted of that crime.
Although sentenced by the court to hang, acting governor Sir Henry
Chicheley, old and frequently indecisive, ordered a delay until the
King's pleasure might be known, suggesting at least one instance in
which the Court doubted its own power and prerogative.

The case dragged

on through 1672 with the Crown ordering a reprieve which arrived in
March 1672.

But

in 1673 Shaw finally hanged.

Between the 1671 and 1673 spring sessions of the General Court,
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several other murders occurred in the colony, and two of the alleged
murderers were caught and tried that latter spring.

Grand juries

brought in true bills against Richard Thomas and Mary Blades for the
murders of Edward Morrice and Phillip Lettice respectively.

At the

March 15, 1672/3, session of the General Court the juries of life and
death found both defendants guilty and the court ordered them hanged.
Thomas hanged soon thereafter, but the Blades woman was ordered reprieved until the next court session that fall.
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The numbers of murder and other major criminal trials increased
after that date, until by the outbreak of B a c o n ’s Rebellion, the
General Court was hearing three to five murder cases per year, an
unusually high number compared to other eras.

Although few General

Court records have survived from periods other than 1622-1632 and
1670-1676, those that have do not suggest a similarly high level of
major crimes; thus, the incidence of murder and other capital crimes
for those few years prior to Bacon's Rebellion appears symbolic of the
growing unrest and uneasiness within Virginia.
The fall 1673 session of the General Court brought another murder
trial, this one of William Lightly for the murders of James and Ann
Canady, husband and wife.

The grand jury indicted him on October 23

and the jury of life and death found him guilty on the next day.

The

Court ordered him hanged and his execution took place a few days after.
One year later, "Harry the Indian" was tried and found guilty of murder
by the jury of life and death.
for his crime.

The General Court sentenced him to hang

Moreover, trials of women for the murder of their

illegitimate children began to appear before the General Court in these
years.

Sarah Greene, although acquitted, was tried for the murder of
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her bastard child at the same session as the trial of "Harry the
Indian.
Although court records mentioned no motives for any of these
murders, they suggest growing tension within the colony.

By spring

1675, murder had apparently reached major proportions as individual
General Court sessions heard three, four, or five cases.

Moreover,

the prevalence of guns in the colony had become a subject of discus
sion, at least by Governor Berkeley himself, who was a member of the
General Court.

Berkeley wrote in 1673 that "at least one third are

Single freedmen (whose labor will hardly maintain them) or men much
in debt, both which we may reasonably expect upon any Small advantage
the Enemy [the Dutch] may gain upon us, would revolt to them in hopes
of bettering their condition by Sharing the Plunder of the Country
with them."

During Bacon's Rebellion, Berkeley became even more ex

plicit in his fears of the lower sort when he wrote "how miserable that
man is that Governs a People where six parts of seven at least are
Poor, Indebted, Discontented, and Armed.
Berkeley's fears, best exemplified by Bacon's Rebellion itself,
were certainly not allayed by his experiences on the General Court
which was hearing so many cases in which guns played a significant
role.

Immediately after the Susquehanna Indian War began in late

summer 1675, the General Court tried at least four cases for murder.
Evan Ward was indicted, convicted, and sentenced to hang for the
murder of Jonathan Button.

The Court, while agreeing with the verdict

of the life and death jury, had to banish Ward from the colony because
"invariances" of the evidence and a lack of a corpse prevented the
implementation of the full death penalty.

In other trials, the accused
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were found guilty of manslaughter and pleaded benefit of clergy, re
quiring branding in the hand.

Both Edward Washington and Jonathan

Douglace received such sentences for the killing of William Norcott
and Jonathan Taylor respectively.
The combination of a higher level of violent crimes against the
person and greater need for social control, imply significant unrest
within the colony.

Moreover, citizens' violent reactions to political

and economic problems besetting the colony between 1650 and 1675 add
weight to the perception of a white society increasingly violent and
disorderly, freed from internal Indian threats.

Virginians found them

selves plagued by a configuration of political difficulties with which
neither they nor their government could adequately cope.

English im

perial policy, huge grants of Virginia lands to court favorites, ex
ternal Indian tensions, Dutch invasions in 1667 and 1673, natural
disasters such as hurricanes, high levels of taxes, and periodic gluts
of Chesapeake tobacco on English markets came together in the third
quarter of the seventeenth century to produce great political tension
within the body politic of Virginia.^

These tensions resulted in

disorder and disharmony and helped to produce a major rebellion in
1676.

But many signs of that rebellion appeared in Virginia prior to

that year.

In addition to the Northampton Protest, a "taxpayers'

revolt" occurred in Surry County in 1673.

The protest, confined to

Lawne's Creek parish of that county, marked a significant challenge
to magistrates' authority to levy and to collect t a x e s . N o t only
that, the "revolt," actually a protest, reflected growing discontent
about increased levies in the colony, levies resulting from the need
to raise better means of defense.

The Dutch attack in July 1673 had
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demonstrated the colony's weak defensive posture.

New taxes had been

levied in the fall 1673 session of the Assembly in order to correct
the problem.

But heavy taxes for various other needs and projects had

so angered colonists that grumbling and discontent mounted and resis
tance flared in Lawnes Creek parish.
On December 12, 1673, a small group of protesters met at the
parish church of Lawnes Creek.

The leaders of the conspiracy were

Mathew Swan, Roger Delk, Jonathan Barnes, and William Nancock.

They

claimed that the county magistrates had no right to levy them for ex
cise taxes on liquor and eider down.

Their protest was symptomatic of

the fact that Virginians resisted higher levies to be used to correct
problems the government seemed unable to rectify.

They hoped that

many other residents of their parish would join them, but a total of
only fourteen men took part in the first meeting.

They agreed that

they would protest the new levies, maintaining that the taxes fell
exclusively upon their parish.

Between December 12 and the new year

the plot fell apart as some participants revealed their roles to local
authorities.

Although a second meeting was held at Devil's Field near

Smith's Fort on Gray's Creek in early January 1674, sufficient inform
ation about the nature of the protest had been revealed to officials
for them to quell it.

By April, when the General Court heard appeals

from the Surry County Court about the decisions in the case, the
protest had come to an end.

In a gesture of leniency, however, Gov

ernor Berkeley pardoned all the leaders of the plot on September 23,
1674.36
Additionally, whites in Virginia were becoming more violent in
their responses to political and economic problems over which they
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believed they had no control.

The very fragility of political insti

tutions coupled with a rapidly growing society to produce major stresses
in the colony, stresses that released violence.
was still experiencing growing pains.

Virginia's society

Her political institutions

represented attempts at recreating English practices, but the necessary
social ingredients had not yet been fabricated.

Although county and

colonial courts used their power in part to create social distinctions
and gradations, the process had not yet reached its fruition.

In the

stress of birth of a distinctive Virginia society between 1650 and
1675, even ordinary problems assumed disproportionate dimensions.

But

the extraordinary difficulties experienced in that quarter century
could not be siphoned off into a mature, well-developed political and
social system because that did not yet exist in the colony.

The rising

level of violence, both criminal and civil, during that quarter-century
demonstrates not only that the institutions of government and society
were unable to control the population, but that that population was
losing its respect for its institutions.
Even such minor incidents as the trial of Richard Price by the
Lancaster County Court suggest the breakdown of ties that bound to
gether the society.

Price had intruded himself into parish church

pews reserved for the high sheriff and county justices of the peace
and the court tried him on November 8, 1671, for his offense.

The

county's high sheriff described Price as a "rude irreligious and
uncivil man."

The sheriff further stated that although two justices

of the peace and he had tried to eject Price, the man had pushed and
shoved his way into the pew, knocking over the sheriff.

The court,

perplexed by the incident, sent it to the General Court, believing that

137
since two justices and the sheriff were involved personally, they might
be prejudiced.^7

The court's decision suggests that not only was it

perplexed by Price's behavior, but was insecure in its own authority.
Seldom did a county or colonial court behave in such a manner later in
the colony's history.

Any alleged affront to the authority of a judi

cial body usually resulted in swift and harsh punishment or in public
humiliation, but the Lancaster County Court apparently was quite con
fused about its ability to handle Price and his behavior.
Other incidents coming before courts in the quarter century prior
to 1675 indicate disorder may have been increasing.

In July 1652 Jane

Safford, a servant, testified before the Northampton County Court that
she had witnessed a fight between Jane Hartly and Susannah Smyth, two
other servant girls.

The Hartly woman had owed a debt to the Smyth

girl and had refused to pay.

When the Smyth girl confronted her, she

asked Jane Safford's mistress to loan her money to repay "this turnip
woman."

The Smyth girl thereupon tossed a jug of beer in Hartly's face

and a scuffle ensued in which some blows were exchanged, but no damage
done.

Jane Hartly then drew a knife, but Jane Safford managed to keep

her from the Smyth girl.

The court, strangely enough, considering its

handling of similar cases, took no action on the basis that no damage,
either property or personal, was done.

In other servant-related in

stances, a Mr. Dennis complained before the Surry County Court against
his mistress, Fortune Mills.

She had written him a note in which she

said "I would entreat you to do me the favor as to come down to me &
do me a little work for my occasions are very urgent at present."

Upon

his arrival she and some of her friends whipped him severely and smeared
palm oil over his wounds.

The oil caused him as much pain as had the
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whipping.

The court rendered no decision in the matter, probably due

to the family connections of Mrs. Mills.

She was the sister of Lieu

tenant Colonel George Jordan of the Royal Army and had first married
Colonel John Flood and then James Mills, a London and Surry County
merchant.^®

Once again, officials, withholding the use of their

authority, encouraged the growth of social and political distinctions
based upon social status.

But at the same time, they contributed to

disorder by withholding punishment, thus encouraging those willing to
disobey social constraints.
The colony's restlessness exemplified in both court trials and
serious disruptions of the body politic were products of deep-seated
difficulties within the institutional situation, but also manifesta
tions of tensions produced by specific incidents in the colony.

During

the last two Anglo-Dutch wars Dutch fleets invaded the Chesapeake Bay,
wreaking havoc with the tobacco crop.

Governor Berkeley in 1660 had

asserted that Virginia could easily resist any invasion force the
Dutch could mount against the colony.

In a letter to the King dated

August 1, 1665, the governor reported a list of every man fit to bear
arms and informed His Majesty that if an invasion did occur, the men
could either fight on land or man merchant ships to repel invasion from
the sea.

In another letter of the same date to Lord Arlington, Secre

tary of State, he told him that Virginia would raise 1500 men for
dragoons and 2500 men for infantry in case of a Dutch attack.
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More

over, no apparent threat of a Dutch invasion could be discerned.
Not until 1666 did the first sign of danger from the Dutch appear
when a caper, a Dutch privateering vessel, seized a tobacco ship in
Hampton Roads.

This privateer was the harbinger of the 1667 invasion
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which virtually destroyed the tobacco fleet that year.

On June 1,

1667, a Dutch fleet consisting of four men-of-war and two fire-ships
entered the Chesapeake.

In a two-hour fight the men-of-war destroyed

Captain Conway's guardship and sailed up the James, where they found
HMS Elizabeth (forty-six guns) completely unprepared for action.

After

burning her to the waterline, the fleet attacked the tobacco ships,
burning five and seizing thirteen others, the whole fleet for that year.
The destruction of the crop contributed significantly to the impover
ishment of middling and lower sorts in the colony in that and subse
quent years. ^

Again, Virginians found themselves having to bear heavy

taxation for defense and other purposes when little could be done to
prevent recurrences of such violence.
Although taxes for such events were usually temporary, they added
significantly to the already high tax load the average white colonist
had to bear.

It is difficult to estimate the total percentage of in

come collected for taxes each year in the colony, but it must have been
quite high, probably on the order of thirty-three to forty percent
during times of crisis such as the Second or Third Anglo-Dutch Wars.
However, those collections bear little upon violence except as motiva
tions to violent behavior on the part of individuals and groups in the
colony.

It was the excessively high rates imposed after the second

Dutch incursion in 1673 prompting the Lawne's Creek revolt detailed
above. ^
The second Dutch attack occurred in 1673 after war between England
and the Dutch Republic broke out.

On Friday, July 11, 1673, four Dutch

men-of-war entered the Chesapeake Bay searching for the tobacco fleet,
scheduled to sail that month.

Even though the colonists were fore

warned and prepared to meet the attack, the Dutch fleet proved too
strong for their resistance.

Sixteen tobacco vessels were destroyed,

five being run aground and eleven sunk.

As in 1667, that comprised

almost the whole tobacco fleet for that year.

On July 16, 1673, Sir

Henry Chicheley wrote his brother, Sir Thomas, informing him that if
England did not have a care and provide some aid for Virginia, she
could never expect the colony to withstand attacks of this nature.

The

royal government had instructed the colony to build a fort on Point
Comfort to protect the entrance to the James River, but Governor
Berkeley had consistently pointed out that a fort there could not
expect to command that river without very heavy artillery sent from
England itself, artillery which the English government would not send.
The colony was ordered to build at its own expense a fort on that site
and that necessitated new and higher levels of taxation.

Thus, by

1674 Virginia colonists were paying very high levels of taxes and were,
in their viewpoints, receiving very little for those taxes.^
Although political events such as the Dutch wars and Navigation
Laws encouraged disaffection in Virginia society during the third
quarter of the seventeenth century, there existed deep-seated social
grievances as well.

Since the 1620s Virginia laborers had been brutally

exploited by their masters.

The price of tobacco governed the demand

for and exploitation of.llabor in the colony.

When prices were very

high, as in the 1620s, the demand was almost insatiable.^

When

tobacco prices "busted," the demand for labor remained high only be
cause the great planters of the colony could afford to grow the weed
profitably, and they became the principal producers of Virginia's major
export crop.

The exploitation of labor in the colony continued during
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the post-1660 years largely because those who could afford labor
worked their servants long and arduously in order to be able to afford
more servants as their old hands earned their freedom.

This point was

a fundamental paradox of the Virginia economic system after 1660.
Masters found that they had to exploit their labor selfishlessly and
brutally in order to provide themselves sufficient land and labor to
produce tobacco necessary to cover their expenses.

Only a very few at

the pinnacle of Virginia's society were actually becoming wealthy
during the third quarter of the seventeenth century.

Other planters

either marked time or lost ground, some falling into the class of small
planters, owning perhaps one or two hundred acres and a servant or

two.^
The most important result of the increased numbers of indentured
servants between 1650 and 1675, however, was the eventual freedom they
won, for then they became threats to the society's safety and order.
Frequently, the newly-freed servants resorted to a variety of disorderly
activities as they found avenues of opportunity closed to them.

The

great planters engrossed enormous quantities of acreages during the
third quarter of the seventeenth century as they acquired positions of
power in Virginia.

Consequently, those entering the free ranks after

their terms of service ended found opportunities closed, assuming they
had ambition to better themselves.

They became idle in a disorderly

sense, committing minor crimes, inciting Indians, squatting on lands
not theirs, or provoking election riots and other types of brawls.^
This growing class of newly-freed servants provided the core of dis
orderly, violence-prone individuals necessary to a major violent up
heaval.
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By the outbreak of Bacon's Rebellion Virginia society had reached
a high level of disorder.

Although the internal Indian danger had

disappeared in 1646, no longer threatening the security and safety of
the colony, frontier and "strange" Indians still aggravated tensions
and slowed expansion.

Confederation Indians had become Tributaries of

the colonial government and had given up attempts of resistance to
white expansion.

Tributaries became, in effect, the wards of Virginia's

government.
At the same time, social and political discontent mounted rapidly.
The government's apparent inability to solve political problems affect
ing the colony's society and economy aroused widespread resentment
reflected in protests and disorder.

Exploitation of labor, the freeing

of large numbers of servants annually from their indentures, and the
lack of opportunity for those former servants bred a high level of
social discontent.

Moreover, that discontent was easily fused with the

political discontent, for the political leaders who could not solve
the political problems were the social elite exploiting the rest of
the society for their own advantage.

Thus, the discontent of white

society joined with an increasing number of frontier Indian raids and
"strange" Indian incursions to produce a situation which could set off
mass violence and revolt.
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CHAPTER

V

INDIAN WAR AND CIVIL WAR:
BACON'S REBELLION, 1675-1677

The years 1675 until 1705 comprise a period of turbulence and dis
order generally in the English American colonies, and Virginia was no
exception.

Virginians resorted to mass violence three times during

those three decades.

Discontent remained rife and colonial leaders

worried constantly about new uprisings.

The colony's government did not

possess sufficient police powers to control the disorder and officials
in Virginia repeatedly warned English imperial officers they feared
violent outbreaks and disruptions during those years.

Their fears were

well-grounded, for their experience during the decade and a half prior
to 1675 suggested that discontent and disorder had not subsided but
rather had increased as that year approached.

Problems breeding the

unrest included English governmental attempts to alter significantly the
relations between colony and mother country.

The continued exploitation

of the laboring classes and smallholders by those possessing power and
wealth aggravated the situation in Virginia.

Political factions with

in the elite heightened the unrest, for they competed for political
support from those beneath them socially.

■I

During the fifteen years between 1660 and 1675 the turbulence, as
measured by political protests and violent or near-violent uprisings,
had mounted until all that was needed in the latter year was some trigger
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to set off the populace in a rebellion.

The pressures built solely

within the white society, so that it appears surprising that an Indian
war provided the occasion for the outburst of mass violence.

After 1646

this older pattern of violence within Virginia disappeared as a distinct
threat to the safety and security of the colony.

No longer did the

Indian Confederation pose a threat to the colony's survival.

Indians

resident on the colony's frontiers had presented problems of security
for the frontiersmen of the colony, but those problems since 1646 had
by no means suggested a massive, violent confrontation between frontiers
men and colonial leaders.

Indian policy had remained in the hands of

Governor Berkeley and his Council, although by 1676 many Virginians
suspected that the Governor had used the lucrative Indian trade to his
own advantage, a suspicion probably without major foundation.
The bulk of Indian violence preceding the 1675 Indian War occurred
on the colony's northern frontiers, a region growing rapidly as colO
onists competed for the rich lands of the Northern Neck peninsula.
Indians of both sides of the Potomac River had long enjoyed hunting in
the present-day Stafford and Prince William Counties, regions Into which
colonists were already intruding by 1660.^

But even the recurrent in

trusions and threats of land appropriations had brought little more than
skirmishes and raids between Indians and whites before 1675.

The inci

dent triggering the Indian War occurred in July 1675 and revealed that
whites had little to fear from Indians resident near Virginia's borders.
Those Indians could be treated harshly and severely if the colonists so
chose.
Virginia and Maryland whites had long traded with the Doeg Indians,
a tribe probably created from the remnants of several tribes partially
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destroyed by disease and war in the first half of the seventeenth
century.

The Doegs resided on the north bank of the Potomac, well up

river from the nearest Maryland or Virginia settlements.

The Doegs had

allegedly murdered several whites in Virginia during the 1660s, but by
1675 their hostility had been replaced with extensive trade with the
whites.

They had, however, been subjected to new pressures, for they

had had to welcome the Susquehanna Indians into their homeland due to
the failure of the Susquehannas to maintain control of their own lands
located at the northern end of the Chesapeake Bay and along the banks of
the river that bears their name.**

The Susquehannas, being among the

Indians visited by John Smith in 1608 during his explorations of the
Chesapeake Bay, had long been acquainted with the whites.

A formal

treaty of protection had been drawn between the Susquehannas and Mary
land in 1651 in order to shield the Indians from their aggressive and
war-making linguistic cousins, the Iroquois Confederation.®

The Sus

quehannas had done little to antagonize whites prior to the summer of
1675, for they required white protection from the Iroquois.

But their

hosts, the Doegs, began a series of raids into Virginia to take hogs
and other meat animals.
The Doegs raided in July 1675 to recover from Northern Neck plant
ers such as Thomas Mathew payment for truck and other agricultural goods
provided the whites.
as stealing.

The whites preferred to interpret the Doeg actions

Approximately thirty planters, including Mathew, pursued

the Doegs, catching many of the natives.

The whites beat and killed

their captives, while those who escaped reported to their chiefs their
reasons for their actions and the colonists' responses.

The warriors

insisted that they had taken the hogs only as payment for goods whites
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had ordered and received from them.

In revenge for the killing of their

fellow-warriors the Doegs recrossed the Potomac and raided Mathew's
plantation, killing two of his servants and, somewhat later, his son.^
These skirmishes did not portend a rapid escalation into a fullscale Indian war, for neither the Doegs nor the Maryland settlers wished
to make war on each other.

The Doegs and Maryland whites preferred to

negotiate, but the actions of Virginia settlers in the Northern Neck
expanded the hostilities into war.

Colonels George Brent and George

Mason raised the local militia to pursue the colonial boundaries, cross
ing the Potomac River into Maryland, where they soon found two cabins
filled with Indians.

Mason and Brent divided their force into two

commands and surrounded the two cabins, which the two Virginia leaders
suspected of harboring hostile Doegs.

One cabin, in fact, contained a

Doeg chief and several of his warriors, but they denied any knowledge
of or participation in the skirmishing with the Virginians.

Colonel

Brent, commanding that force, ordered the chief immediately executed
and instructed his men to begin an attack on the cabin.®

Although the

appearance of the Doegs in the cabin so far from their home villages
would have alarmed any white party searching for hostiles, it was quite
possible that the natives were hunting as the chief averred.

It was one

of the traditional hunting seasons for Chesapeake Bay Indians, and they
frequently ranged over hundreds of square miles in search of game.
Moreover, the regions encompassed by the Northern Neck, Stafford, and
Prince William were traditional Indian hunting grounds, and the natives
evidently resented continual encroachment upon those lands by whites.
If the source of friction was land possession, then the whites were
acting aggressively to rid the region of Indians.^
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Although the Doegs' raids prompted the outbreak of hostilities, it
was a case of mistaken identity which launched the Indian War.

The

Doegs remained neutral when the war actually broke out, preferring the
protection of Maryland's government to the attempt at making war chosen
by the Susquehannas.

The second cabin containing Indians was filled

with Susquehannas, not Doegs.

That cabin, located about a mile from

the scene of the skirmish with the Doegs, was surrounded by Mason's
force.

When the Susquehannas heard the firing from the first cabin,

they fled in alarm, only to be picked off by Mason's men.

Not until a

Susquehanna chief made it clear that they were Susquehannas did the
firing cease.

By that time, however, fourteen warriors had died.

Doeg battle had taken ten Indians' lives.

10

The

Thus, by the middle of Aug

ust, at least three whites and twenty-five or thirty Indians had died in
the skirmishing.
Yet the fighting did not mean that an Indian War actually had to
break out.

Mason remained most apologetic to the Susquehannas for the

mistake he and his men had made, but the Virginians had furnished both
the Susquehannas and the Doegs with motives for revenge.

The escalation

of the skirmishing into a full-scale war came only with the northern
Virginia militia's deliberate violation of orders issued it by Governor
Berkeley.

Most probably the settlers from the northern regions of the

colony assumed that the Susquehannas and Doegs were both responsible for
the murders and raids which had occurred in their home counties since
the early 1660s.

But, as had already been pointed out, there had been

a number of years of peace in that area; otherwise such extensive trad
ing relations as hinted at by the Doeg relations probably never would
have developed.

However, the reaction of northern Virginians to Governor
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Berkeley's instructions to investigate the situation suggests that
hysteria about the Indian problem was already beginning.

11

On August 31, 1675, Governor Berkeley ordered Colonel John Wash
ington and Major Isaac Allerton to call together the various militia
officers of the Northern Neck to make "a full and thorough inquisition"
of those inaugurating the attacks on the Indians.

He instructed the

two militia officers to investigate the reasons for the unprovoked
hostilities against the Susquehannas.

But the hysteria alluded to above

prevented a successful conclusion of the investigation.

Rather than

follow their instructions, the two leaders summoned militia forces in
preparation for war and wrote Maryland authorities requesting their aid
in the matter.

The Virginia forces met Maryland militia units in late

September and surrounded the principal Susquehanna fort.

12

When the whites completed their investment of the Susquehanna fort,
located on the Maryland side of the Potomac upriver from Stafford County,
they summoned the Indian leaders for a conference.

Five Susquehanna

chiefs appeared and demanded an explanation for the whites' hostility.
Approximately one thousand white men surrounded an Indian fort containing
1O
no more than one hundred warriors and their wives and children.

Rather

than explain to the Susquehanna chiefs the reason for the warlike pos
ture, the Maryland commander, Major Thomas Truman, demanded satisfaction
for the murders of that summer.

The chiefs denied first-hand knowledge

and participation in those murders.

They were then led a distance from

the fort and murdered by the whites.

Neither Maryland's nor Virginia's

government took strong measures to punish whoever was responsible for
the murders of the Indians.
siege for several weeks.

Rather, the militia forces continued the

When Berkeley heard of the incident, he wrote
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that "if they had killed my Grandfather and Grandmother, my father and
Mother and all my friends, yet if they had come to treat of Peace, they
ought to have gone in Peace.

But he did nothing to punish Washington

or Allerton.
Berkeley's words are revealing, for they suggest the caution and
diplomacy with which he intended to pursue the war.

Yet he could not

control the irresponsible behavior of his officers and men in the field,
nor could he foresee that the Indian war would occasion mass resistance
to his Indian policy from civilians.

The slaughter of the five chiefs

and the obvious fact that government leaders took no reprisals against
the murderers convinced the remainder of the Susquehannas to make re
venge.

The killing of the chiefs provided the occasion on which the

war formally broke out.

The warriors and their families remained in

the fort for the next several weeks, maintaining a desultory skirmishing
and sharpshooting.

They apparently did have arms and ammunition, but

that began to give out after a few weeks.

The braves may have killed as

many as fifty Englishmen besieging the fort before resolving to break
out of the fort and to kill as many English troops as necessary to effect
their escape.

As the hostile Susquehannas fled from their fort one

October night, they clubbed to death ten sleeping English guards.

IS

J

The fleeing Indians crossed the Potomac into Virginia's backcountry where
they held a council of war to decide their course of action.

Their

leaders resolved to avenge the murder of their chiefs by killing ten
English for every chief slain.

The hostiles, numbering perhaps one

hundred Indians, set off for the headwaters of the James River after
having conducted a series of raids for revenge in Sittingboume Parish,
Old Rappahannock County.

Beginning in late January and continuing into
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early February, they killed at least thirty-six settlers in that parish,
forcing the settlements to contract from seventy-one to eleven planta
tions.**’ The English could do little to abate these raids, for they
lacked the means to launch search parties and to establish a protective
posture.

But the hostiles seem to have finished their raiding with the

destruction of that parish, for evidently they requested peace negotia
tions with Governor Berkeley and historians who have studied Bacon's
Rebellion intensively have found no further direct evidence of Indian
raids and hostilities.

17

The Virginians, however, would not allow Berkeley to make peace
with the Indians.

The hysteria first noticed during the fall of 1675

rose to a peak in the spring of 1676.

There already existed consider

able discontent in the colony, both with imperial relations and with
local government.

Throughout the years from 1660 until 1675 discontent

among the settlers had mounted over the government's inability to allev
iate the distress and over officials' obvious misuses of power and
privilege.

But in the early spring of 1676 that social discontent was

exacerbated by the Indian war and by other factors.
Word reached Virginia in February 1676 of the outbreak of King
Philip’s War in New England and Virginians were quick to believe that
connections between the Susquehannas and New England Indians already
existed.

Although many historians have discounted the possibility of a

conspiracy between the Susquehannas and Doegs on the one hand and the
New England Algonquins on the other, two modern-day historians, Wilcomb
Washburn and David S. Love joy, have explored the likelihood of such an
occurrence.

Washburn makes only a conjectural case that the conspiracy

did exist, while Lovejoy asserts it as a fact.*®

Whether such plotting
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did occur, the fact remains that extensive talks between independent
Indians of the Chesapeake Bay and New England may have happened.

The

important point is that Virginians believed the talk of a conspiracy
and reached the conclusion that if Philip's minions were successful in
New England, they would expand their operations and bring in more allies
all along the east coast.

Virginians also believed that the Susque

hannas had killed far more than the thirty-six slain in Sittingboume.
Rumors began circulating that over three hundred settlers had died at
the hands of the Indians that winter.

While the records do not bear out

the assertions that Indians slaughtered that many colonists, an abnormal
number of Virginians did die in an epidemic.

Several hundred— some re

ports mentioned three hundred— died of a malady which carried off mostly
children and old people.

News of these deaths may have been confused

with word of the Indians' raids and created a false impression of largescale loss of life from the Indian fighting.

Apparently, then, by the

time the March 1675 meeting of the Assembly began, Virginians had hys
terically demanded war against Indians, regardless of who they were and
what the circumstances of the current hostilities.^
The colony had reached a point of discontent and instability which
required only a catalyst to launch a revolt.
provided just such a catalyst.

Nathaniel Bacon, Junior,

The young man had arrived in the colony

in the summer of 1674, welcomed by the one for whom he was named, Nathan
iel Bacon, Senior, and his cousin-by-marriage, Governor Berkeley.
two men represented the highest levels of power in Virginia.

The

Berkeley,

as governor, and Bacon, as a senior member of the Council, held posi
tions of great trust and authority.

The younger Bacon was probably in

his mid- to late-twenties when he came to Virginia.

His father was a
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well-to-do member of the Suffolk County gentry in England and the
younger Nathaniel had had many advantages, including some education at
Cambridge.
stable.

Evidently, however, the young man was psychologically un

His father had withdrawn him from Cambridge for he had "broken

into some extravagancies."

He then married Elizabeth Duke against the

will of her father and proceeded to defraud another young man of his
lawful inheritance.

His father then decided to ship the young man to

Virginia, hoping to correct some of his errant ways.

Although the evi

dence of his Instability in England suggests more a willful and selfish
disposition; his behavior in Virginia argues for a much more unstable
character. u
Once Bacon was in the colony, Governor Berkeley nominated him to
the Council (this in March 1675), indicating his reception in the high
est social and political circles in the colony.

But he and his wife

settled on the frontier fringes of Henrico County, near the Falls of
the James,

His neighbors who described him called him a loner, a picture

he himself painted when he remarked that he "always, . .delighted in
solitude and mistique employments."

Others pictured him as "not given

to much talk or to make sudden replies, of a most imperious and danger
ous Pride of heart, despising the wisest of his neighbors for their
Ignorance, and very ambitious and arrogant."

Perhaps it is misreading

his character to label him unstable, but his behavior in Virginia, both
before and during the rebellion, seem to point to instability deeply
rooted in his personality.^*
His actions in the colony bearing most heavily upon his later
rebel leadership occurred in the fall of 1675.

While the siege of the

Susquehanna fort was going on, Indian troubles began to erupt on the
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western frontier.

Bacon was mixed up in one such incident when he

seized a small group of Appomattox Indians for stealing c o m .
belonged neither to his neighbors nor to him.

The c o m

Governor Berkeley re

buked his young relative for his action, pointing out to Bacon that
little good would come from such behavior toward Indians.

Berkeley

feared that all Bacon did was to excite already-nervous settlers and to
anger Indians long the tributaries of the colony. ^2
Bacon's volatility and impetuous behavior provided the catalyst
necessary for the outbreak of mass violence and resistance to the gov
ernment's Indian policy.

Governor Berkeley summoned the Assembly in

March 1675 to prepare a defensive plan for the colony.

He proposed to

the Assembly that a line of forts along the frontiers be created and
garrisoned.

To protect the interstices the governor suggested that a

two-hundred man "flying force" composed of cavalry be reated to range
those open spaces.^3

His proposals suggested to frontiersmen that new

taxes would result and that little would be accomplished.

They wanted

revenge for the more than three hundred they supposed had died at the
hands of Indians, but the Assembly accepted his proposals.
In April a group of Charles City County planters petitioned Berkeley
for a commission to pursue Indians.

Berkeley refused their request, re

plying that the Assembly's plan would work much better.

Berkeley feared

that frontiersmen chasing Indians would be more likely to slaughter
friendly or neutral Indians than they would be to catch hostiles.

He

remembered quite vividly what Washington and Allerton had done the fall
before.

Finally, he pointed out that the Susquehannas had already sub

mitted an offer of peace and that he wished to explore that possibil-

i t y . 24
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Berkeley's response did not mollify the frontiersmen; rather it
infuriated them more.

By that time Bacon's own plantation had been

raided and his overseer killed.

Men from the frontier regions now

turned to Bacon to seek his leadership.

Although he had been appointed

to the Council one year before, he had attended only three meetings of
that body.

He was impetuous and critical of Berkeley's policies, char

acteristics which made him attractive to the frontiersmen.

Moreover,

his social and political prominence provided dissident Virginians the
leadership considered necessary in the seventeenth c e n t u r y . T h u s ,

the

turbulence, discontent, and upheaval of the years prior to 1676 came to
a head in the person of Bacon.
When Berkeley refused the commission to the Charles City planters,
they turned to Bacon and made him their leader.

He already had attract

ed considerable support from residents of his home county of Henrico,
and that combined with the Charles City dissidents provided a force
sufficient to demand a commission to fight the Indians,

By that time,

word had reached the colony that a band of Susquehannas had camped near
the village of the Occaneechee Indians, a fort on an island in the
Roanoke River located near the point at which the Dan and Staunton
Rivers join to form the Roanoke.

Berkeley had already realized that his

policy of protecting those Indians tributary to Virginia had failed, but
he still refused to allow Bacon a commission.
Bacon led a party of approximately one hundred men to the Occaneechees, who had informed the whites of the presence of the Susquehannas.
Once they arrived at the fort, the whites began feasting and negotiating
with the Indians.
and Bacon accepted.

The Occaneechees offered to attack the Susquehannas
When the war party of Indians returned successfully
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from their mission, fighting between the Occaneechees and the whites
began.

Bacon may have wanted to secure the,^1,000 worth of furs which

the Indians had or he may have wanted to make sure that he could return
to the colony and report that his mission had been a success.

The

accounts of the outbreak of fighting between the Indians and the whites
differ, but they all suggest that the Virginians intended to wipe out
the Occaneechees completely.^
Bacon and his men killed over one hundred and fifty Indians and
destroyed their palisaded village.

The destruction of the Occaneechees

removed the Indian middle-man trading complex interrupting the direct
flow of goods between Virginia whites and Cherokee Indians to the south
west.

During the early 1670s Virginians had been making every effort to

expand their Indian trade toward the southwest, and Bacon simply may
have taken the opportunity to clear the trading path completely.

More

over, the Occaneechees had attacked without provocation Abraham Wood1s
trading expedition In 1673, and Bacon may have been interested in aveng
ing that attack.

Whatever the motivation, white ethnocentric suspicion

of Indians certainly played a role in the destruction of the Occaneech
ees.
The attack on the Occaneechees confirmed Berkeley's worst fears and
suspicions about frontiersmen’s desires to hunt Indians.
resisted whites' aggressive advances.

He had long

Frontier colonists intended the

destruction of any Indians, whether they posed a threat to the settle
ments or not.

Moreover, whites intended to clear the last enfeebled

resisters to colonial expansion from lands coveted by whites.

The con

clusion appears warranted that the Baconians were motivated not by a
sense of fear or terror of Indian attack but, on the contrary, by a
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sense of confidence that they could and should crush Indians who might
possibly obstruct the colony s future expansion.

29

By the time the Baconians returned to the colony in late May, word
had been received of their exploits.

Berkeley had issued warrants for

elections for a new Assembly, the first such warrants since 1661.

The

dissolution of the "Long Assembly" paved the way for the drafting of
grievances about the royal government and imperial administration.
Bacon's constituents in Henrico County promptly elected him to a bur
gess seat from that county, a move Berkeley disliked because It removed
the young man from the Council where Berkeley could better watch him.
This new Assembly heralded changes for the colony, changes which might
have resolved some of the manifold social and economic problems.
When the new Assembly began its sessions in June of 1676, however,
the problem between Berkeley and Bacon had not been resolved.

Berkeley

had proclaimed Bacon a rebel when he inarched off to attack the Occan
eechees and, when he appeared in Jamestown, Berkeley ordered him seized,
clapped in irons, and imprisoned as a traitor and rebel.

After Bacon

offered his abject submission, Berkeley ordered him restored to his
Council seat and promised him a commission to lead Virginians against
Ol
hostile Indians only.
But by the end of July, Bacon had raised a full rebellion against
Berkeley's authority, for when he found that the populace supported him,
he concluded that he could make himself master of the colony and petition
the Crown for redress of grievances.

Bacon's willingness to lead the

rebellion was in part derived from the mounting evidence of the general
population's acceptance of his rebellious ways.

The level of the rebel

lion and the number of participants belies the small number of casualties
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resulting from it.32
But the important factors contributing to the growth of the rebel
lion in the summer of 1676 were the unrest, discontent, and disorderliness of Virginia's population, especially among the young men of the
colony who could look to no economic future.

From 1660 until 1676 dis

content within the white society had mounted to a point at which some
one of Bacon's nature could exploit the unrest to his own advantage.
This is not to say that Bacon was not sincere in his devotion to the
rebellion.

His constant energy and movement on behalf of the rebellion

and Indian war, both events proceeding simultaneously after August 1,
1676, provide sufficient evidence of his own belief that a restructuring
of the political leadership in the colony was essential.

However, his

own volatile character and impetuous behavior encouraged not only his
own act of rebellion, but his willingness to exploit what he considered
an ideal situation for general rebellion.

The sources of discontent in

Virginia were basically economic, a tobacco price depression and ex
tensive taxation to pay for governmental services such as defense and
qo

suits to break royal grants of lands, especially in the Northern Neck. J
But many social and political grievances existed as well.

Extensive

repression of lower-class whites, both freemen and servants, by masters
combined with the unrest of many upper-class whites who did not believe
that they had been sufficiently rewarded politically for their social
status.3^

Bacon, whose own act of rebellion was generated by his con

frontation with Berkeley over Indian policy, concluded in late July that
he could convert the discontent with that policy Into general rebellion.
Thus, he was able to provoke full-scale rebellion in Virginia when he
required citizens loyal to him to renounce the royal government of
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Berkeley.
oncilable.

Until Bacon made that decision, the situation was not irrec
Although Berkeley had proclaimed him a rebel once, he had

rescinded that proclamation upon Bacon’s offer of submission in June.
But the chain of events directly responsible for the outbreak of the
rebellion began when Bacon demanded the commission to fight Indians in
June.
Bacon's decision for a full rebellion also hinged on Berkeley's
Indian policy, a policy ratified by the colony's March Assembly, yet
questioned by many colonists.

Bacon wanted to fight Indians.

The

death of his overseer the previous fall, the political trust placed in
him by his constituents in Henrico County, and the opportunity to lead
his fellow frontiersmen against Indians encouraged his demands for a
coiuinission«
In June Bacon heard rumors after his restoration to the Council
that Berkeley was plotting his arrest and imprisonment, so he sneaked
out of Jamestown to raise supporters who would provide him a bodyguard
against Berkeley's alleged machinations.

Upon his return to Jamestown

the young man demanded the commission to fight Indians, threatening to
use force to get it.

The old governor grudgingly gave it and the four

hundred Baconians marched from the town to search for Indians.

Berkeley,

for the second time, proclaimed Bacon a rebel and summoned the Gloucester
qc

County train-band (militia) to march against Bacon.
When Bacon heard word of Berkeley's duplicity, he reversed his
march and made an encampment at Middle Plantation (the future Williams
burg) .

The Gloucester County train-band revolted In favor of Bacon and

Governor Berkeley had to flee to the Eastern Shore of Virginia because
he had no support on the Western Shore.

No real fighting between the
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two forces had occurred yet, but the break appeared irreparable at this
point.

Berkeley waited on the Eastern Shore for developments which he

might turn to his advantage while Bacon prepared his Pamunkey Indian
campaign and planned his coup within the government.
With the exception that he desired a commission to fight Indians,
Bacon never was clear about the nature of his grievances against Gov
ernor Berkeley.
to his followers.

Yet he prepared a series of oaths to be administered
In those oaths Bacon announced his seizure of control

of the colony, but he did not renounce his allegiance to the Crown.

He

may have Intended to free Virginia from its ties to England and, if so,
he hoped to exploit the widespread discontent in the colony.

In order

to crush Berkeley's resistance to his revolt, he ordered William Carver
and Giles Bland to take two hundred men and some heavy artillery with
them to the Eastern Shore.

The expedition used as its flagship a sloop

formerly commanded by Captain Thomas Larrimore, a loyalist who remained
aboard as master under duress. ^
The vessel and its consorts reached the Eastern Shore without in
cident, but Berkeley succeeded in seizing control of it.

The governor

occupied Carver in negotiations while Colonel Philip Ludwell, a member
of the Council and one of Berkeley's warmest advocates, slipped aboard
the vessel along with a party of loyalists and they, with Larrimore's
aid, overpowered the rebel crew.

When Carver and his escort returned

to the ship, they were immediately seized.

This first action between

the rebels and loyalists resulted in no loss of life and almost no
in j u r i e s . B e r k e l e y then recrossed the Chesapeake with six hundred
men and several vessels, mostly sloops and ships.
Berkeley quickly effected the recapture of Jamestown, a strategic
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point which the rebels could ill afford to lose since it commanded many
of the important water routes of the southern end of the colony.

When

Berkeley's fleet appeared before the town, Thomas Hansford and the nine
hundred rebels occupying the city fled, for they could not resist the
guns of the ships.

The town's artillery had been dismounted and placed

on Larrimore's ship when Carver and Bland tried to capture Berkeley.

In

the meantime, Bacon had marched off to fight the Pamunkeys, an Indian
tribe he was convinced had participated, either with direct aid or inOQ

formation, in the attacks in the colony.
Bacon's party, some one hundred and fifty, marched against the
Indians following the promulgation of his oaths.

The Pamunkeys had a

reservation located on the peninsula separating the York and Rappahan
nock Rivers and It was surrounded by low, swampy land.

Many Pamunkey

warriors had died In 1656 when they had participated in an attack with
the Virginians against the Richahecrians.

Their losses from such mili

tary defeats coupled with their decline in population resultant from
disease had reduced their numbers to approximately two or three hundred
men, women, and children by 1675.

They had remained quiet and passive

since the end of the Indian wars in 1646, but white frontiersmen and
even many Virginians living within the settled portions of the colony
now believed that tributary Indians such as the Pamunkey were doing all
in their power to bedevil the colony.
Bacon intended to destroy the tribe when he caught the natives,
but when the marchers reached the Pamunkey reservation in mid-August,
they found that the Indians had fled into the swamps surrounding their
village.

The whites found one woman whom they killed, seized one child

as a prisoner, and set off in pursuit of the natives.

They discovered
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one old woman, a nurse to the Queen of the tribe, and forced her to
show them where the rest were hidden.

She, however, led them in the

opposite direction from where her people were hidden, and when Bacon
found this out, he ordered her clubbed to death.

Finally locating the

main encampment, the Baconians killed only a few Indians, captured
forty-five others to be sold into slavery, and carried off three horse
loads of plunder.

The Baconians seized more Indians to be sold as

slaves than they killed.

Bacon wishes, probably, to pay the expenses

of the expedition from the captives and plunder, a common practice
among European peoples in the seventeenth century and a very common
occurrence during Bacon's R e b e l l i o n . U p o n the completion of the
attack in late August, Bacon returned to Jamestown to face Berkeley who
had, by then, retaken the town.
The rebellion reached its culmination in the succeeding month as
the opposing forces directly confronted each other.

The two men, Bacon

especially, became symbols of the two sides of the rebellion.

Bacon's

own instability and volatile personality matched that of the colony in
general and Berkeley's early attempts to reeffect his control suggest
how much Bacon represented to Virginians.

Most Virginians must have

supported the rebellion, with the exception of the Eastern Shore popu
lation who continually welcomed Berkeley when he fled from Jamestown.
But wherever Bacon went, the rebellion went figuratively and literally.
When he and his men returned from the campaign against the Pamunkeys in
late August, Berkeley had easily effected the reduction of the Baconians
controlling the capital city, Jamestown, and no rebels had dared to try
to force him out.

Yet Bacon's return infused new spirit into the move

ment and within a month Berkeley was back on the Eastern Shore.

Bacon
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erected fortifications at Paspahegh Old Fields, an old Indian clearing
directly in front of Jamestown.

To prevent Berkeley from driving his

men from the fortifications while they were being constructed, Bacon
ordered that several wives of prominent colonists be kidnapped and used
as hostages.

By the last third of September, Jamestown was surrounded

on all sides, although Berkeley still controlled the waterways.^
Berkeley had to commit his forces in a charge trying to break the
siege.

When on September 20 he sent between six and seven hundred men

against the rebel fortifications, the Baconians broke the charge with
great loss of life inflicted on the loyalists.

No accurate estimates

of losses have survived, but a surmise suggests one-quarter to one-third
were killed and wounded.

Berkeley departed hastily for the Eastern

Shore again so that he might regroup his forces and plan new strategy.
Bacon reinvested Jamestown that evening, but in a strategy conference
with his lieutenants he concluded that the town was untenable with
Berkeley still controlling the waterways.

Richard Lawrence suggested

that the town be burned to the ground and promptly set his own house
afire.

In the ensuing hours the Baconians burned Jamestown to the

ground, probably fearing that Berkeley would use the town again if royal
troops arrived and he could rally support.

It was good tactics to re

move the one urban center of the colony, especially since it was so
accessible from the water, and Berkeley held the waterways.^
Following the evacuation of Jamestown, Bacon tightened security
and discipline within his ranks.

He established courts-martial to try

suspected loyalists, and these tribunals convicted several suspected
Berkeleyites; however, only James Wilkensen was executed.
loyalists were not Bacon's only discipline problem.

But suspected

His own men were
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plundering and seizing the property not only of loyalists but of those
trying to remain neutral in the conflict.

Bacon had to halt those ob

noxious practices before they destroyed his bases of support, the
settlers from whom he drew his food and supplies.

Moreover, if the

revolt succeeded and Berkeley were forced from Virginia, those settlers
would be his subjects until some sort of settlement with the Crown was
made.^

So, even if he defeated Berkeley, without the cooperation of

the rest of the colonists his movement was doomed.

Consequently, Bacon

tightened discipline and threatened those who plundered neutrals with
severe punishments.^
The peak violence of the rebellion lasted from late August until
mid-October.

When the destruction of Jamestown was complete, Bacon

turned his attention to the Indian problem, but the two-front character
of the rebellion had so taxed Bacon's health that he died in mid-October.
He had not fashioned a chain of command within his own rebel forces, nor
had he provided any means whereby some followers might be included in
a reconstituted royal government.

His death removed the one symbol

around which dissident groups in Virginia could rally.

The rebellion,

of short duration, collapsed with his death, although resistance con
tinued.

While he lived, Virginians disenchanted with Berkeley's rule

had someone to look to for leadership.

Even though several men of high

status had joined Bacon's revolt and supported him wholeheartedly, they
did not possess the qualities to which Virginians would look for guidance.
Bacon had directed that Joseph Ingram assume leadership of the movement,
but the latter was never able to effect his control as the movement
dissolved into at least five pieces.^
The five groups fortified themselves in strategic locations and
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prepared to resist the return of Berkeley.

Whether the rebellion con

tinued depended now upon the success of the rebels located in fortified
positions in the southern end of the colony.

The five combined forces

probably totalled one thousand men, but they could expect substantial
reinforcements if their resistance to Berkeley proved successful.
in a sense, Bacon's Rebellion had come to its proving point.

Thus,

Had the

rebels resisted the return of royal government, they might have estab
lished something similar to what occurred in Maryland thirteen years
later.

But Berkeley recovered his rule even before the two regiments

of royal troops sent by the Crown arrived in Virginia in December 1676.
When Berkeley learned of Bacon's death, he immediately returned to
the Western Shore to destroy the movement.

He did not know how success

ful he would be until he met Major Robert Beverley, father of the
historian Robert Beverley, who, as a loyalist, had already crushed a
small group of rebels stationed at a Mr. Howard's house in Gloucester
County.

Berkeley and Beverley joined forces to attack Joseph Ingram's

force at West Point, an attack resulting in the surrender of the whole
two-hundred-and-fifty man rebel unit.

Analysis of that group revealed

that it consisted of slaves, servants, and freemen, meaning those who
were franchised but who did not possess much land, if they held land
at all.

These three groups comprised the lower classes of Virginia at

that t i m e . ^

it is impossible to relate what percentages of the popu

lation servants and freemen represented then.

There were some two

thousand slaves in the colony in 1671, and that number had probably
not risen much by 1 6 7 6 , ^

Edmund Morgan's analysis of the grievances

and discontents of Virginians in the 1660s and 1670s suggests that
freemen, described as young men just out of service with little or no
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prospect of obtaining land, were among the most discontented people in
the colony.

Thus, it is not surprising that they participated freely

in the rebellion.^
With the surrender of Ingram's force, the second group of rebels
across the York River from West Point, under the command of Lawrence
and Drummond, combined with Captain Drew's forces stationed at Berkeley's
Green Spring plantation to begin a march westward through New Kent
County in an effort to flee the colony.

The force began breaking up,

however, and by the end of December Berkeleyites had captured many of
its leaders, including James Crewes, burgess from Henrico County and
described by Berkeley as "Bacon's Parasyte"; Major John Page; a Captain
Young; and a Mr. Harriss.

Lawrence successfully escaped, but Drummond

was captured on January 14, 1677.
The two other rebel strongholds were similarly reduced by Berkeley,
although the army regiments arrived in Virginia just as he was doing so.
Bacon's Rebellion marked the peak of violent discontent in Virginia in
the late seventeenth century.

Formal grievances submitted by the var

ious counties at the invitation of the royal commission which arrived
with the army regiments reveal the extent of discontent and disorderliness in the colony.^

But the rebellion had helped release much of

the tension within Virginia,

Moreover, the Indian problem was now

settled to the satisfaction of Virginia's settlers.

From 1677 until

1754 Indian violence remained a frontier phenomenon and no longer affect
ed the nature or levels of violence within Virginia.

Within the white

society, the rebellion scored some accomplishments, aside from the
psychological release of tension.

The reduction of the tobacco crop

of that year helped raise the weed's price temporarily as the massive
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glut on the English market subsided.
colonists prior to 1676 continued.

But many grievances plaguing the
Taxes remained high, the Northern

Neck suit continued, and masters continued to exploit their servants
brutally.

Although county governments were opened to those desiring

political recognition for their status, positions at the provincial
level remained in the possession of those who had surrounded Berkeley
for so long.
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The old governor extracted severe penalties from those who had
challenged his authority, hanging at least twenty-nine rebels he thought
might encourage new rebellion or contest with him for political power.
Although his executions of so many rebel leaders in the early months of
1677 might seem harsh and unwarranted, he was aware of the institutional
weakness of the colony and the need for a clearly-recognized authority.
To destroy the rebellion root and branch might have been Berkeley's
aim.

He surely must have known that if Bacon could so easily play upon

the discontents of the settlers, so could someone else in the future.
In the interests of the colony, then, Berkeley may have elected to ex
ecute so many leaders of the rebels.

Those hangings would have a two

fold effect, crush out the last vestiges of rebellion and assert the
authority of government.

Institutional weakness in Virginia was one of

the signal problems of the late seventeenth century, and Bacon's Rebel
lion highlights the shortcomings of the colony's institutions.

Berkeley

may even have believed that his own leadership during the critical days
of 1676 had been too weak, not too strong.

He had encouraged the

counties to file grievances with their newly-elected burgesses in the
spring of 1676.

He had offered to resign if the colonists wished.

may have believed that he was operating in an even-handed, rational

He
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manner, offering to negotiate with colonists, and showing restraint
where force might have been used.

When the rebellion erupted, however,

he may have concluded that stronger rule rather than the rational ap
proach was necessary and decided to crush root and branch the last
vestiges of rebellion.

Thus, Berkeley may have had much more than re-

venge in mind when he presided at the trials of so many rebels.

53

The rebellion ended by January 1677, having accomplished some re
lief from the conditions which had aroused discontent and unrest.
Indian-white violence became in the ensuing years a frontier phenomenon
as whites seized the opportunity offered by the destruction and dis
ruption of frontier Indian tribes to expand once again.
society the revolt alleviated some of the tension.

Within white

Tobacco prices rose

temporarily, removing some of the economic misery, but masters continued
to exploit their servants harshly and greedily.

Few imperial political

problems were resolved, either, as taxes remained high to raise monies
to fight royal land grants and other difficulties.

Within the local

systems of government, however, came some important readjustments, for
the opening of new lands permitted the growth of new counties and ad
mission to those county administrations provided political recognition
for those who both desired and warranted such recognition.
The rebellion marked the high point of white social and political
violence between 1607 and 1754.

Some fighting and loss of life occurred,

but perhaps not as much as might be expected from a revolt which in
volved almost the whole population of the colony at one time or another.
Why the social unrest which it represented did not bring on more such
high-level disturbances later in the century is difficult to explain,
for many of the problems which had brought on the revolt remained.

How
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ever, tighter authority and official violence in punishment, the shift
to slavery from indentured servitude, and the expansion of the colony
may have helped to resolve the social tension.

f
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NOTES
INDIAN WAR AND CIVIL WAR:
BACON'S REBELLION, 1675-1677

^■Recent secondary works concerning Bacon’s Rebellion have focused
on one or more of these problems within Virginia. Much earlier histor
ical work on the revolt confined itself, however, to analysis of the
personal differences between Governor Berkeley and Bacon. See Thomas
J. Wertenbaker, Torchbearer of the Revolution: The Story of Bacon1s
Rebellion and Its Leader (Princeton, 1940) for the fullest discussion
of the clash of personalities. Wertenbaker, however, did not confine
himself exclusively to those personal differences. Indian policy and
class conflict were fundamental to Wertenbaker's analysis of the u p 
rising. Wilcomb Washburn in The Governor and the Rebel: A History of
Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia (Chapel Hill, 1957) replied to the Werten
baker interpretation. Washburn largely confined himself to analyzing
a body of new material in light of Wertenbaker's interpretation. He
did broaden the discussion by identifying several problems creating
tensions in Virginia other than the issues spelled out by Wertenbaker.
With the publication of his work, other scholars began to explore the
directions he had suggested: tobacco policy, factional politics at the
upper levels of Virginia society, Navigation laws, and royal land grants
threatening freeholders in the colony. At the same time as Washburn
was publishing his work, Bernard Bailyn in "Politics and Social Struc
ture in Virginia" suggested that fundamental institutional weakness
exemplified by continual competition for political office helped ex
plain the onslaught of Bacon's Rebellion. Bailyn argued that, rather
than class consciousness fostering the revolt, a group of political
"outs" who saw no peaceful means to get "in" incited the rebellion.
Billings' "'Virginias Deploured Condition'" analyzed the institutional
weaknesses and instabilities suggested in Bailyn's work and demonstrated
that avenues to political power had been closed by 1676. But the con
tinued expansion of population through immigration created tensions and
pressures requiring relief through new political openings. Craven's
White, Red, and Black revealed the extent of the immigration into Vir
ginia in the quarter-century between 1649 and 1675. While ambitious
and power-hungry young men were certainly among those entering the
colony, the very fact of the rapid population growth itself dislocated
and disjointed the fragile social and political fabric being woven
prior to 1649. The exploitation of the servant classes has been thor
oughly explored in Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom. Chap. 12.
^For Indian raids on the northern frontiers, see above, pp. 118-119.
Wertenbaker, Torchbearer of the Revolution. 80-86, 90-94, points out
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Berkeley's control of Indian policy. "Frontier" is used here in much
the same sense as Washburn defined it in Governor and Rebel. 182n 10.
The seventeenth-century Virginia frontiersman is defined solely in
geographic terms. There were many wealthy educated, well-connected men
living on Virginia's frontier in the seventeenth century. In this
sense, Bacon was a frontiersman even though he was a product of English
culture and education.
^Washburn, Governor and the Rebel. 20, for the growth of the
Northern Neck.
^See above, pp. 118-120; Fairfax Harrison, landmarks of Old Prince
William: A Study of Origins in Northern Virginia in Two Volumes (Berryville, Virginia, 1964), 37-39.
-*For the Doeg raids, see Chapter IV, pages 120-122. Virginians
as early as John Smith had contacted and befriended the Susquehannas.
By-and-large continuation of those contacts have been lost, William
Claiborne, however, provides one link between the first settlements and
the 1675 war, for he, as a principal Indian trader of the mid-seven
teenth century, maintained contact with the Susquehannas and other
Indians of the northern end of the Chesapeake Bay. For a discussion of
Claiborne's role in Virginia Indian history, see John Herbert Claiborne,
William Claiborne of Virginia (New York, 1917). Iroquois Confederation
expansion is detailed in both George T. Hunt's The Wars of the Iroquois
(Madison, Wisconsin, 1940), 131-145, for Virginia; and Allen W. Trelease,
Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century (Ithaca,
New York, 1960).
^Wertenbaker, Torchbearer of the Revolution, 74; Lois Green Carr
and David W. Jordan, Maryland's Revolution of Government. 1689-1692
(Ithaca, New York, 1974), passim, for Maryland-Indian relations.
^Captain John Berry, Colonel Herbert Jeffreys, and Francis Moryson, "A True Narrative of the Late Rebellion in Virginia by the Royal
Commissioners, 1677," in Charles McLean Andrews, ed., Narratives of the
Insurrections. 1675-1690 (reprint edition, New York, 1959), 105-106.
®T[homas] M[athew], "The Beginning, Progress and Conclusion of
Bacon's Rebellion, 1675-1676," in Andrews, ed., Narratives. 16-17.
Hereafter cited as TM, "Beginning, Progress, and Conclusion." Royal
Commissioners, "A True Narrative," 106.
^Washburn in Governor and the Rebel, 20, makes this suggestion.
^ R o y a l Commissioners, "A True Narrative," 106.
^Washburn in Governor and the Rebel. 25-26, mentions that hyster
ical fear of the Indians originated in February 1676, but Virginians'
reactions to the Doeg-Susquehanna activity argues for an earlier origin.
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■^Washburn, Governor and the Rebel, 21-23; W M Q , 1st Series, 4
(1895), 86.
l^Mrs. Ann Cotton, "An Account of
written in 1676," in Peter Force, Ed.,
Royal Commissioners, "True Narrative,"
and Conclusion," 18-19, 23. Washburn,

Our Late Troubles in Virginia,
Tracts and Other Papers, 3;
106; TM, "Beginning, Progress,
Governor and the Rebel, 23-24.

■*-^Ibid. Maryland’s government did conduct an investigation of the
incident. During the inquiry into Truman’s actions by the Maryland
Assembly, the point was made that "the Unanimous Consent of the Virgin
ians and general Impetuosity of the Whole field" forced Truman to com
port himself as he did in order to "prevent a mutiny of the whole army."
Governmental officials would be faced with this problem during the
history of Indian-white hostilities.
Seldom could officers of a white
government control in the field a situation between Indians and settlers.
Washburn, Governor and Rebel, 23; William Hand Browne, ed., Archives of
Maryland, II, 500-501, 504.
•^Cotton, "An Account of Our Late Troubles," 3-4; TM, "Beginning,
Progress, and Conclusion," 18-20; Royal Commissioners, "True Narrative,"
106-107. Wertenbaker asserts thatnmany more than fifty Virginians were
killed and great quantities of materials taken, especially horses for
eating. But he provides no figures. Torchbearer of the Revolution.
82-83.
■^Cotton, "An Account ofi Our Late Troubles," 3-4; TM, "Beginning,
Progress, and Conclusion," 18-20; Royal Commissioners, "True Narrative,"
106-107.
■^Wertenbaker, Torchbearer of the Revolution, 85; Washburn, Gov
ernor and the Rebel, 25.
■*-®Washbum, Governor and Rebel, 25-26; Governor William Berkeley to
Secretary of State Williamson, April 1, 1676, CO 1/36, 65-66, Reel M-317,
VCEMP, CWRL; Washburn, "Governor Berkeley and King Philip's War," New
England Quarterly. 30 (1957), 363-377; David S. Lovejoy, The Glorious
Revolution in America (New York, 1972), 35. Beverley, History and
Present State, ed. Wright, 77; Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New
York
®The only specific mentions of victims of the Indians are found in
Cotton, "An Account of Our Late Troubles," 4; TM, "Beginning, Progress,
and Conclusion," 19-20; Royal Commissioners, "True Narrative," 107.
Washburn highlights this point in Governor and Rebel. 24, 32-33; Nathan
iel Osborn at Waymouth to Secretary Williamson, April 15, 1676, SP
29/380, 184, VCRPM, CWRL, for the epidemic.
^^Wertenbaker, Torchbearer of the Revolution, 39-50.
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^Washburn, Governor and the Rebel, 17-19.
22ibid., 22; Cotton "An Account of Our Late Troubles," 3-4; TM,
"Beginning, Progress, and Conclusion," 18-20; Royal Commissioners,
"True Narrative, 107.
2%ening, ed., Statutes-at-Large, II (1660-1682), 327, 331-332,
336-337; Wertenbaker, Torchbearer of the Revolution. 86-87.
2^Royal Commissioners, "True Narrative," 107-108, 110, 112; Wash
burn, Governor and the Rebel, 26-28, 32-35; TM, "Beginning, Progress,
and Conclusion," 21; Cotton, "An Account of Our Late Troubles," 8-9.
23Wertenbaker suggests this, although in a different light than
used here. Moreover, Wertenbaker implies that Bacon consciously sought
the support of his fellow frontiersmen, Torchbearer of the Revolution,
91-93. The observation by Washburn that "it is doubtful whether the
'vulgar' would have followed him in rebellion against Governor Berkeley
unless he had been a gentleman" supports the point that a fusion of
education, wealth, social status, and political power were requisites
of leadership in the seventeenth century. Washburn, Governor and the
Rebel, 182n 10.
^^Washbum, Governor and the Rebel, 35; Cotton, "An Account of
Our Late Troubles," 8-10; TM, "Beginning, Progress, and Conclusion,"

21.
27washbum» Governor and the Rebel, 42-45; Cotton, "An Account of
Our Late Troubles," 8-9; TM, "Beginning, Progress, and Conclusion,"

21

.

23Ibid.; Chapter IV, pp.122-123, for the Wood expedition.
^^Washburn, Governor and the Rebel, 46-48.
30cotton, "An Account of Our Late Troubles," 8-10; TM, "Beginning,
Progress, and Conclusion," 21-22; Washburn, Governor and the Rebel,
49-51; Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 263-264.
SlRoyal Commissioners, "True Narrative," 110-112; TM, "Beginning,
Progress, and Conclusion," 21; "History of Bacon's and Ingram's
Rebellion," 53-54.
32Ibid.
33see Chap. IV,125, 128-129, 133, for incidents of violence and
other signs of unrest.
34jjorgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, Chap. 12, for
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evidence and interpretation of the exploitation in the colony of labor
ers, servant or free, by the masters in the years prior to the outbreak
of Bacon's Rebellion.
33Royal Commissioners, "True Narrative," 116; TM, "Beginning,
Progress, and Conclusion," 28.
36Ibid.
3Afashbum, Governor and the Rebel. 72-74; "History of Bacon's and
Ingram's Rebellion," 60-63; Billings, ed., Old Dominion, 277-280; John
Fiske, Old Virginia and Her Neighbors (2 vols., Boston, 1877), II,
83-86.
38R0yal Commissioners, "True Narrative," 122, 128-129; TM, "Be
ginning, Progress, and Conclusion," 36-37; "History of Bacon's and
Ingram's Rebellion," 65; Cotton, "An Account of Our Late Troubles,"
6-7.
3% o y a l Commissioners, "True Narrative," 131-134; "History of
Bacon's and Ingram's Rebellion," 67-71; TM, "Beginning, Progress, and
Conclusion," 35; Cotton, "An Account of Our Late Troubles," 7-8.
^®Royal Commissioners, "True Narrative," 114; Chapter IV, pp. 118122 . Bacon's oaths, promulgated in early August, indirectly illustrate
the young man's frustration with Berkeley's vacillations about Indian
policy, for he proclaimed himself ruler of the colony on August 3.
Bacon wanted complete control of Indian policy, hoping to destroy
Indians in Virginia. For the Richahecrians' war, see above, Chap. IV,
PP. 119-120.
^ R o y a l Commissioners, "True Narrative," 124-125, 127. For the
point about plunder in Bacon's Rebellion, see Morgan, American Slavery.
American Freedom, 267-268.
^ R o y a l Commissioners, "True Narrative," 131-134; "History of
Bacon's and Ingram's Rebellion," 67-71; TM, "Beginning, Progress, and
Conclusion," 35; Cotton, "An Account of Our Late Troubles," 7-8.

43ibid.
44carr and Jordan, Maryland's Revolution of Government. passim,
makes this point. The point is, in fact, a major thesis of that book.
^Berkeley had already ordered the execution of several rebel
leaders captured on the Eastern Shore. They included Thomas Hansford
and Captains Wilford, Carver, and Forlow. Major Thomas Cheesman died
while in prison. "History of Bacon's and Ingram's Rebellion," 81-82,
84.
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46Ibid., 85-89, 94-95.
^ H i story
Bacon's and Ingram's Rebellion," 85-89, 94-95. Com
position of the forces of Bacon's supporters has always been conjectur
al, especially those of the rank-and-file. The leadership has been
analyzed to reveal their social and political standing and the con
clusion seems to be that men such as William Drummond and Richard
Lawrence were expressing their dissatisfaction, jealousy, and envy of
those garnering the political plums of the colony. Moreover, those who
led the rebels generally held extensive estates on the frontier and
apparently wished to despoil their Indian neighbors of even more lands.
Washburn suggests the appeals that rebel leaders made to the "meanest"
sorts of people were the results of their desires to destroy Indians.
Governor and the Rebel, 164. Moreover, there is a possibility that the
extensive dislocation of the impoverished led to the creation of a
"household" situation akin to the aristocratic households of retainers
who supported their lord or master militarily. The prevalence of young,
unpropertied men armed with guns was considered an important danger in
Virginia in the late seventeenth century. William Byrd I suggested
that fortified towns be created along the frontiers.
In the aftermath
of the rebellion Byrd's suggestion that two hundred and fifty armed men
be stationed in each of a series of towns appeared quite attractive to
the Burgesses and Councilors. Some criticized the program for what it
was— an opportunity to erect a private army--thus it was suppressed.
But Byrd's proposal might have been nothing more than an attempt to
legalize a phenomenon already proceeding. Morgan, American Slavery.
American Freedom, 279-280.
4®The estimate of the five elements of the Baconians was derived
from the approximate strength of each unit. No account was taken of
other forces. The population may have risen from forty thousand to
fifty thousand between 1671 and 1675, a point that has not been consid
ered in the outbreak of violence. Population figures for the colony as
a whole were taken from Greene and Harrington, American Population, 136.
Although the rise of ten thousand in four years seems excessive, by
1680-1681 estimates range from eighty to one hundred thousand. Slave
population figures were reported by Berkeley in 1670.
4 ®Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom. Chap. 12.
^"History of Bacon's and Ingram's Rebellion," 97-98; Washburn,
Governor and the Rebel, 90.
-**The royal government received first word of the Indian and civil
unrests in April 1676, but almost six months of delay occurred before a
royal commission and an armed expedition were ordered to Virginia. Not
until November 1676 did the first ships leaving for Virginia depart.
Washburn, Governor and the Rebel, 92-97. Grievances submitted by
various counties have been printed in early issues of the VMHB, e.g.,
II (1895), 291, 380-392, as well as in other sources.
^Bailyn, "Politics and Social Structure in Virginia," 105-106,
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points out some of the political results of the rebellion. Morgan,
American Slavery. American Freedom, 276-292, demonstrates how much ex
ploitation of laborers continued during the last quarter of the seven
teenth century. As a factor in the continuing discontent, it retained
its importance.
^^Wertenbaker, Torchbearer of the Revolution. 14, 32, makes the
most trenchant arguments against Berkeley's authoritarianism and venge
fulness. Washburn, Governor and the Rebel, Chapter VIII, defends
Berkeley, but does not suggest that Berkeley might have had motives
other than revenge. He had lived too long in the service of the colony
to make convincing the argument that he had become an arbitrary autocrat,
bent on destroying for the sake of revenge those who opposed him.

CHAPTER

VI

TENSION, VIOLENCE AND THE TRANSITION
TO PROVINCIAL SOCIETY:

1677-1705

Between 1677 and 1705 colonial Virginia society approached its
maturation.

This transition from settlement to province did not pro

ceed smoothly or nonviolently.

Violence ensued from tobacco policy and

religion, both of which became imperial problems in the 1670s and 1680s.
The poverty and class conflict which had encouraged mass violence in
the Bacon era kept tension high in the colony during the last decades
of the seventeenth century, although the poverty did ameliorate some
what after 1680.

The large-scale plantation system, worked increasingly

by slave labor, provided enhanced social prestige for those aspiring to
recognition of their worth.

Those amassing fortunes in those thirty

years, however, still relied on the brutal exploitation of their labor
supplies as well as a variety of enterprises such as Indian trade,
merchandising of English imports, participation in the slave trade,
shipbuilding, and other forms of economic endeavor to accumulate their
wealth.

County formation accelerated in the late seventeenth century,

providing those enriching themselves economically with political recog
nition and relieving one possible source of tension and violence.

Yet

violence and threats of violence remained an integral part of the col
ony's existence until 1705.^

The sources of those tensions were mani

fold, including fears of an imperial reversion to Catholicism, continued
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problems in the imperial tobacco trade, labor exploitation, population
growth, and border disputes with Maryland.
By 1700 the General Court remained the single colony-wide insti
tution empowered to use violence as an instrument of control.

Official

ly composed of the Governor and Council, the Court sat every six months,
April and October, and had original jurisdiction in capital crimes and
appellate jurisdiction on important misdemeanors requiring corporal
punishment.

No centralized police power existed in colonial Virginia,

unless the James City County sheriff could be called such.

2

The surviving criminal trial record for the late seventeenth
century, a record which is quite scanty, suggests that the Court had
inaugurated a process altering its traditional view of capital crimes,
that it was no longer binding itself to quick trials.

The Court appar

ently explored new avenues of defense and appeals during the late seven
teenth century.

Certainly those convicted of murder and other capital

crimes continued to be hanged, but the Court, perhaps more assured of
its authority and power and perceiving increased respect and deference
from those below it both socially and politically, constricted the
definition of murder and began to explore means of ameliorating the
harsh criminal code of the colony.

Of fifteen murder cases for which

records have survived, seven of the accused were executed, one was
acquitted, two were transported, three were reprieved and two were sent
to England.

These cases do not account for all murders in the colony

nor do they reflect accurately the extent of capital felonies tried in
Virginia,

They are suggestive, however, of changes taking place in

Virginia's criminal jurisprudence, for in earlier eras, almost all
those convicted of murder were executed.

The colony's major law en
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forcement and judicial agency was beginning a change in its role, one
reducing the level of violence applied in criminal treatment.
Not only did the Court inaugurate procedural changes, but it also
began some substantive alterations.

Women in English jurisprudence

were allowed to "plead their bellies," that is, claim pregnancy in order
to escape execution for a capital crime.

The Virginia General Court had

seldom used this device before the end of the seventeenth century.^
Joanna Hardy used the plea in 1683 to escape execution for a murder she
had committed.

Other women used the plea successfully before 1705.

In

another type of case involving women the Court before 1705 made some
significant changes.

The concealment of the death of an Illegitimate

baby was defined as murder by English criminal law and some Virginia
women had been hanged earlier in the century for such concealment.

By

1705, however, the Court required positive proof that the mother had
murdered her baby before it convicted her.

Had the baby been b o m dead

or had it died after birth of natural causes, even if unreported, the
Court no longer imposed the death penalty.

Moreover, Sarah Williams in

1703 petitioned the Court for release on bail, for she had been jailed
on suspicion of murdering her illegitimate infant.

The Court allowed

the petition, thus introducing another innovation, that of bail, in its
jurisprudence.

g

The Court's use of official violence suggests not that its members
were themselves becoming more sympathetic to criminals but that crim
inals had certain avenues of defense the judge felt should be explored.
The era appears to be a transition to a more relaxed period respecting
criminal control.

Yet the rapid population growth of the colony,

soaring from forty thousand in the years of Bacon's Rebellion to approx-
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imately eighty to one hundred thousand by 1705, suggests a major in
crease in crime.

Virginia's jails were not equipped to maintain crim

inals for long periods of time nor was the society willing to spend
money for such maintenance.

The only other alternative was increased

court sittings so that criminals could be tried quickly.

Between 1677

and 1705 the Governor and Council examined possibilities of using
special Oyer and Terminer courts to handle the increased case loads.
Coupled with the population increase as explanation for the crime rate
came tensions In those years and the growth of a black population re
quiring special attention according to colonial criminal law.
The first experiments with Oyer and Terminer courts began in the
1680s and were done on the basis that special cases be handled by them.
They had no regularly assigned schedule of sittings, being used only
when the governor issued a warrant.

The question of appointment re

mained thorny, however, for the Council demanded that it comprise those
Oyer and Terminer courts whereas the governor wanted freedom to choose
whom he pleased.

For example, in 1691 Rappahannock County Court ordered

that Jonathan Devoll be tried for the murder of Robert Peachy, but that
order reached the General Court too late for trial.

The Council directed

Governor Francis Nicholson to issue writs for an Oyer and Terminer
court, yet required that the governor appoint the Council to try the
case.

The Council would continue to experiment with this procedure

for the next three decades and by 1720 the Oyer and Terminer courts had
become a permanent fixture of the judicial system of colonial Virginia,
7
meeting every six months as did the General Court.
By 1705, then, the criminal system of Virginia had altered with
the addition of new methods of trying cases, new courts, and new

184
penalties such as transportation to substitute for hanging.

Arthur

Jarvis was transported to another colony in 1698 after his trial for
burglary and felony.

Jarvis, a yeoman of James City County, was also

suspected of burning the Statehouse in Jamestown that year, but no
Q
evidence of his participation in the arson could be found.

Along with

these new procedures and punishments for cases within Virginia, the
General Court began hearing cases from other colonies.

The Maryland

government underwent considerable tension during the 1680s.

That tension

was expressed in the murder of two customs collectors, Christopher
Rousby in 1684, and John Paine in 1689.

The two collectors were killed

by proprietary favorites, thus exacerbating an already tense situation
between Lord Baltimore, the proprietor, and the Crown.

Neither murder

was connected to the other, but in the minds of Virginians and Mary
landers alike, the actions appeared part of a general conspiracy on the
part of the Calverts, the proprietary family of Maryland.

In Virginia,

that perception would be exploited in 1689 in Parson Waugh's Tumult in
Stafford County.®

But the point that the General Court had become an

integral part of the official violence of Virginia after 1677, giving
shape to the dimensions of crime and punishment in those years, should
not be obscured.
Violence, however, assumed broader proportions than just the crime
and related activities in which the General Court participated.

Settlers

were uneasy and discontented during the last decades of the seventeenth
century for a multiplicity of reasons.

Tobacco prices and policy, con

tinued class conflict, and the threat of the Catholicization of the
English Empire brought resistance and violence in the colony.

Along

with those problems, settlers were also disturbed by the continued high
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levels of taxation necessary to fight for colonial interests in England.
The rise of black population in the colony sparked apprehension especi
ally when signs of black rebelliousness appeared in 1687 and after.^
On the morrow of Bacon's Rebellion, unrest declined as tobacco
prices rose sufficiently to mollify planter discontent over their live
lihood.

However, by 1680, tobacco crops had reached such a level that

they once again glutted the English domestic market.

Since no Chesa

peake tobacco could legally go to any market save English, supply quickly
exceeded demand and planters once again found prices dropping.

Com

pounding the unrest generated by tobacco price was the continued pres
ence of royal troops in Virginia.

Sir Henry Chicheley, a longtime resi

dent of the colony, having arrived in 1650, commanded the two companies
of troops which remained after 1677.

However, neither the home nor

colonial government would agree to pay and supply the soldiers.

They

had become quite unruly and disorderly, several times threatening open
rebellion and mutiny.
From 1677 until 1682 the problem of the soldiers created friction
between the colonial and the English government.

Many Virginians came

to see the companies as symbols of a standing army, an entity Englishmen
dreaded and despised, for such represented a means to the destruction
of English liberties and freedoms.

In June 1678, Colonel Jeffreys wrote

Secretary of State Sir Joseph Williamson that portions of the soldiers
had threatened a mutiny.

The troops had planned to seize the magazines

and to join with the "old party" (the Baconians) to disturb the peace.
Jeffreys had no direct evidence with which to try the plotters them
selves but he complained to Williamson that the men were unpaid, having
•o

last received money and provisions in May 1677.

Jeffreys had ordered
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the companies quartered among the inhabitants at the rate of 8s a week
per man.
Two years later a second soldiers' revolt took place and the royal
companies were desperate for food and pay.

On July 22, 1680, the Council

debated the rebellion and ''extravagant mutiny" among the company of
soldiers commanded by Sir Henry Chicheley.
days before.

The riot had occurred two

Two officers of the company had personal differences ex

acerbating the situation.

Sir Henry Chicheley, acting governor and

commander of the troops, summoned them before the Council and himself to
reprimand them.

The reproof did little good, for on August 3 the Council

wrote Lord Culpeper pleading with him to intercede with the King to re
call the troops.

By August 20, even more stringent measures had had to

be taken, for Nicholas Spencer, Secretary of the Colony, wrote Secre
tary of State Coventry informing him that the soldiers were even more
mutinous and that thirty-two of the most rebellious troops had been
garrisoned among settlers.

Whether the Virginians feared that those

men might "contaminate" the other troops was not mentioned, but when the
tobacco-cutting riots did break out, officials placed partial blame on
the dissident soldiers.

12

Accompanying the difficulties with the soldiers came constant turn
over in the governorship between 1677 and 1681.

Lord Culpeper eventual

ly arrived in Virginia to assume his gubernatorial duties, but before he
came Berkeley governed until spring 1677, then Jeffreys until the sum
mer of 1678, and Sir Henry Chicheley from then until the arrival of
Culpeper.

Moreover, Culpeper inspired little confidence on the part of

Virginians since he left the colony only months after his first arrival,
to return following the Tobacco-Cutters1 Riots of 1682.

Tobacco prices
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remained low into the early 1680s and the constant tension generated
by lack of direction from the political leadership of the colony coupled
with the continued presence of the soldiers recreated discontent and
disorder reminiscent of 1675 and 1676.
Tobacco prices represented a third problem.

At least two years

before the 1682 uprisings, colonial leaders were writing to England com
plaining of the low prices.

Secretary Spencer wrote Secretary of State

Covington in July 1680 that tobacco prices were so low that the planters
would not have sufficient income to clothe themselves.

Tobacco may have

brought % penny per pound, scarcely enough to feed and shelter a small
planter and his family for a year.

A year later the problem remained,

for the Assembly wrote the still-absent Lord Culpeper asking for a
cessation of tobacco-planting.

Only the removal of the tobacco glut

from the English market could end the price depression.

The Council, in

May 1681, wrote Culpeper much the same complaint, adding, however, that
the soldiers ought to be recalled.or paid, for they had become great
nuisances.^
But these requests went unheeded for the next several months.

On

the date that the Council wrote its letter to Culpeper seeking his aid,
Chicheley issued a proclamation proroguing the Assembly from February 15,
1682, until April 18, 1682.

Six months later, word was received from

England ordering Chicheley to do what he had already done, prorogue the
Assembly until April 1682.

Chicheley made plans for that session, fully

expecting to introduce legislation calling for a cessation of tobacco
planting in early June.

But one week before the session began, a letter

from the King arrived, ordering Chicheley to prorogue the Assembly until
November 1682.

Moreover, only maintenance of the soldiers could be con
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sidered at that session, for the King instructed Chicheley to ask the
Assembly whether the colony would assume pay and provisions for the
troops.

The King had decided that he would disband the companies un

less Virginia assumed their support.

Chicheley realized that it was

too late to prorogue the Assembly again, for many members were already
in Jamestown and most others were on their way.

He allowed the session

to begin, but in his opening address he informed the Burgesses of the
King's letter and its contents.

He therefore instructed that session

to consider only the question of what to do about the soldiers.
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It ought perhaps to be noted here that Charles II had more than
just his income in mind when he ordered Chicheley to prorogue the
Assembly until November 1682.

The King had been trying repeatedly to

get Culpeper out of England and into Virginia.

He did not want Virgin

ians meeting in Assembly until their governor was in attendance.

Charles

was concerned about centralization of the English Empire, and he feared
a rebirth of the disorder and rebellion of the mid-1670s if a firm hand
was not in control.

English officials and Virginia leaders alike con

sidered Chicheley too old and feeble for effective leadership.

Chicheley

appears to have behaved more as an administrator than an executive,
although in conjunction with Nicholas Spencer he could order quick
action. ^
The House of Burgesses met on April 18, 1682, fully expecting to
enact a cessation of planting.

Previous attempts had failed, due largely

to lack of cooperation from Maryland and North Carolina.

Neither of

those colonies was able to cut its tobacco production because its pro
prietor as well as the King would not countenance such.

But that April,

Virginians were convinced that cooperation could be effected and that a
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halt to planting ordered until tobacco prices had risen.

The Burgesses
i
were astounded to learn from Chicheley's opening address that they weire
forbidden to consider any proposition other than one concerning the
royal troops.

The Assembly spent the next week debating the Acting

Governor's instructions while it searched for a legal way to circumvent
his orders and prepare for a cessation.

The Burgesses feared an immed

iate revolt if they returned home to their constituents to inform them
that they had taken no action.

To defend themselves, they ordered the

journals for that session prepared for public reading within their home
counties, accomplishing this before Chicheley prorogued them on April
27.17
Between April 27 and May 1, many burgesses from counties surround
ing Jamestown reached their homes and reported to their constituents
the results of the session.

On May 1 riots began and on May 3 first

word of the violence reached Jamestown.

The outbreaks had begun in

Gloucester County when some planters cut up their own tobacco.
then attacked plantations whose owners refused to cooperate.

They
By May 3

planters were moving at will through the county cutting down the young
tobacco.

Chicheley and the Council ordered Colonel Mathew Kemp, com

mander of the Gloucester County militia, to summon the train-band to
help suppress the mutineers.
force.

Those who resisted were to be met with

Although Kemp arrested some cutters, he was unable to quell the

disturbances in his county.
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By mid-May the riots had spread into New Kent and Middlesex
Counties and threatened to become colony-wide.

Two colonial leaders

busily wrote letters to England explaining the situation and pointing
up the poverty in the colony as the basic cause of the discontent.
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Chicheley informed the King on May 8 that the crops on approximately
two hundred plantations had already been destroyed and that more would
soon meet the same fate.

While he could not yet fully explain the

violence, he averred that the fact that the Assembly had not enacted a
cessation had "blown this coal which has inflamed the people."

In

another letter of the same date to Sir Lyonel Jenkins, Chicheley pro
vided more details about the violence.

After the initial raids had been

made, the rioters split into small groups of approximately twenty men
each.

Colonel Kemp had caught one such party, had arrested its two

leaders, and had pardoned the rest on promise of good behavior.

Once

again, Chicheley took advantage of the opportunity to tell Jenkins that
the lack of a cessation had brought the outbreaks.

He wrote that the

Assembly's determination to inform the settlers of the results of that
Ifl
meeting had set off the demonstrations. *
In letters of the same date Secretary of the Colony Spencer more
fully informed Jenkins about the riots.

He asserted that those who

resisted the rioters were threatened with force and that many then
joined the demonstrators.

Spencer implicated Major Robert Beverley,

father of the historian and Clerk of the Assembly at that time.

He

charged Beverley with stirring up the rebellion after the prorogation,
declaring:
by which prorogation the selfish purposes of some persons were
frustrated, most particularly the Clerk of the House of Burgesses
who to accomplish his designs of no Tobacco this year to be planted,
to advance those great quantities of Tobacco now on his hands,
hath instilled into the multitude (as it is vehemently suspected)
to justify the right of making a Cessation by cutting up of Plants,
so that the ground and rise of our present troubles and disorders
is from the ill times Assembly.
Beverley was generally considered the man responsible for inciting the
riots, yet as Clerk of the Assembly it was his duty to carry out its
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instructions, which were to prepare the journals for publication.

But

he did possess enormous crops to tobacco, yet so did many other prominent men in the colony.
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The riots lasted until the end of May.

The cutters broke up into

small groups as mentioned above and began cutting at night when militia
patrols became too numerous to continue in the day.

As men left the

demonstrations, their positions were taken by women and many women
participated well into June in sporadic attacks on plantations.
deal of damage to that season's tobacco crop was done.

A great

Estimates of

destruction ranged up to ten thousand hogsheads, although a more approp
riate figure might be six to seven thousand hogsheads lost.

Even after

the disappearance of the tobacco-cutters, officials remained apprehensive.
They feared that when the apple crops were harvested, rioting, perhaps
even outright rebellion, would begin anew.

Although large quantities of

that fruit were produced in the colony, they were not sold as market
commodities but were converted into alcoholic beverages and consumed
almost immediately.

Officials feared that the constant state of ineb

riation induced by the continual consumption of the alcohol would produce
by late August renewed violence.

There were scattered incidents through

out July and August, but nothing of the order of the May and early June
cuttings.

By the fall of the year the colony had subsided into an

uneasy tension threatening new violence if a new stimulus was applied.^
Culpeper finally returned to the colony in December 1682 to find
only a handful of commoners in jail charged with leading the riots.
Chicheley had pardoned several leaders and most of the rank-and-file of
the cutters.

John Sackler, Somerset Davis, John Cockin, Bartholomew

Austin, and Richard Bayley had already been convicted on charges of
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treason in connection with their leading the rioters.

Culpeper pardon

ed Bayley and reprieved Sackler on the condition that he finance the
construction and maintenance of a bridge through the Dragon Swamp, a
condition rather suspicious in its nature since that bridge ran re
markably close to Chicheley's plantation.^
The Tobacco-Cutters' Riots represented a violent step in a set of
subtle shifts taking place in Virginia's economy and society.

A certain

amount of agricultural diversification was taking place, but only at the
level of subsistence production.

Since most planters remained per

petually in debt during the 1670s and 1680s, only those possessing
large acreages and labor forces could afford to continue tobacco produc
tion.

High prices for indentured servants, English attempts at halting

emigration from the homeland to the New World colonies, low prices for
tobacco engendered by the tobacco depression, and poverty generated by
the depression produced economic conditions in Virginia conducive to the
development of a large-scale planter class which could hold out against
such adverse economic conditions.

Even the great planters wished higher

prices and many of them held back their extensive c r o p s T h e y willingly
encouraged violent solutions to the economic problems if cessations of
planting could not be effected, for they wanted to force up prices to
make greater profits.

The very violence of the society itself contrib

uted to more social unrest and discontent and, at the same time, wrenched
fundamental changes within the society.

Between 1675 and 1682 the Negro

slave population increased by approximately one thousand.

Planters were

finding a new, cheap source of labor, one upon which they could rely for
a continual supply of workers in the future.

But slaves cost more

initially than did an indentured servant, thus raising labor costs which
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further cut the small-holder out of the tobacco market.

The inability

of Berkeley, his successors, and the Council to solve these tobacco
problems moved planters both great and small to take matters into their
own hands.

Unable to make a living, worried about English attempts to

centralize the Empire, pressured by constant immigration until 1675,
beset with Indian problems and wide distribution of firearms and other
weapons in what was still a frontier, rough, "wild" society, Virginians
saw no solutions to their troubles other than violence.
The level of violence may have dropped substantially between 1682
and 1689, but the threat of rebellion and the unrest associated with
the tobacco problems still remained.

Imperial attacks on colonial

autonomy began in Virginia during the 1680s, and improving communications
within England's colonial empire evoked expanded responses to English
domestic activity.

The movement toward consolidation of the colonies,

exemplified by the Dominion of New England and attacks on other colonial
charters, frightened colonial leaders.

Of equal importance were rumors

coming from England convincing many Virginians that the monarchy was
planning to reconvert the Empire to Catholicism.

Reports of Charles

II's secret Catholicism and then James II's open conversion alarmed
those in the colonies committed to a dissenting form of Protestantism
or to Low Anglican Church forms of worship.

Finally, rumors of plots

between the monarchy and the French government to raise a combined force
of ten thousand Catholics and Indians to conquer and reduce the colonies
OC

completed the picture of the imminent restoration of the Old Faith.
In Virginia events such as the Rye House Plot or the Exclusion
Crisis were followed closely and c a r e f u l l y . During the decade rumors
of a Catholic-Indian conspiracy were bred in colonial America and had
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impacts in both Maryland and Virginia.

Protestant Virginians and Mary

landers feared that the Maryland leadership, primarily Catholic, was
conspiring with the French government in Canada and the Iroquois Con
federation in New York to crush Protestantism in the Chesapeake Bay
region and then to turn on the northern colonies to reduce them to
Catholicism.

The political murders of Rousby and Paine in Maryland

convinced many Virginians that Catholics were plotting the overthrow
of Protestantism in North America.

They also perceived the continued

raids by Seneca Indians on the Virginia frontier as further evidence of
the plot.

These Indian raids took many lives and destroyed a great deal

of property, but the most pronounced effect was the continued disturb
ance of local Indians. ^
Charles II died in 1685 and many believed that revolt to remove
James II from the throne was imminent.

Not, however, until November

1688 did Protestant Whigs succeed in forging an invasion force with
William of Orange at its head.

The force landed in England in that n

month and quickly overthrew James.

Parliament then offered Mary and

her husband the throne, which they accepted.

OR

t

Although several colonial agents were in England at that time,
they could not get accurate word of the revolt to their constituencies.
First rumors of William's invasion reached colonial America in late
winter and early spring 1688-1689, and they were garbled, unofficial,
and completely erroneous.

These rumors mentioned possible Catholic

uprisings and Indian attacks and prompted an outbreak of violence in
Stafford County and its adjoining regions in 1689.
First rumors of James' overthrow reaching Virginia indicated a
full-scale Catholic plot had overthrown Parliament and established
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James II as an. absolute monarch in the fashion of Louis XIV.

The re

volt had supposedly ended and the Catholics were allegedly crushing
what was left of the resistance.

In the confusion of the reports and of

the allegations of Catholic conspiracy in the colonies, zealous Protes
tants in northern Virginia attempted an overthrow of that colony's gov
ernment.

Following the leadership of John Coode's rebellion in Mary

land, the heads of the northern Virginia violence asserted that no gov
ernment in England meant no government in the colony.

The leadership

claimed that Maryland and Virginia Catholics had conspired to raise a
force of French Catholics from Canada, supplemented by ten thousand
Iroquois Indians in order to destroy all Protestant resistance in the
two colonies.

The leadership of the movement consisted of the Reverend

John Waugh, Anglican priest of Potomac parish, Stafford County, and a
number of laymen of that parish:

Burr Harrison, John West, William
OQ

Gannock, William Heather, Timothy Davis, and George Lambert.
A few Maryland Indians crossed into Virginia to hunt in the Staf
ford backcountry and the irrational fears generated by the news from
England convinced Virginia residents that they were about to be destroy
ed by the Catholic-Indian conspiracy.

Waugh played successfully upon

the fears of his own parishioners, citing the unrest and disorder assoc
iated with Coode's Rebellion in Maryland as further proof of his alle
gations.

Waugh convinced his followers that the King had lost his throne

in England; thus, no government existed in Virginia.

He roused Staf

ford's residents to attack those they suspected of participating in the
Catholic plot. Rappahannock County residents were brought into the up
rising, for Waugh argued that magistrates of both Stafford and Rappahannock
were secret Catholics.

He also accused members of Virginia's Council

of being Catholics.

Armed bands of Protestants roamed northern regions

of Virginia, robbing and plundering the suspected.

Burr Harrison and

John West commanded large numbers of men in support of Waugh.

The out

breaks, beginning in March and lasting into April, died out rapidly
when the Virginia government formally proclaimed William and Mary the
new English monarchs and clarified the situation in England.

Colonel

Nicholas Spencer, president of the Council and chief executive of the
colony in the absence of the royal governor, acted with alacrity and
authority to handle the situation.

By mid-May the uprising was sup

pressed and the ringleaders were in Jamestown for trial.

During the

rest of the spring and summer, other leaders were likewise arrested and
tried.

However, they were generally pardoned on promise of good be

havior and agreement to restore the property of those whom they had
despoiled.

Sporadic outbursts continued during the late spring; how-

ever, they did not approach the levels of Parson Waugh's Tumult.
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In the aftermath of The Tumult and Coode's Revolt in Maryland, the
Virginia Council found it necessary to arrest other mutinous and sedi
tious participants in the disorderly series of uprisings and tumults
characterizing the Chesapeake's reaction to the Glorious Revolution.
On August 16, 1690, the Council entertained a request from Maryland1s
government to detain Richard Hill and return him to that colony to stand
trial for treason.

The Council, however, decided that since Hill was

in fleet bound for England, he should be summoned to provide bond that
he would answer the charges in England.

The bond was to be transmitted

to the Secretary of State in order to assure Hill's trial.
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The minor

violence and charges of treason did not halt with Hill's trial, however.
Mutinies and threats of treason, occurred during the 1690s, all
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suggesting that the unrest and disorder characterizing the previous two
decades still had not disappeared.
aftershocks from an earthquake.

But these uprisings were more like

These few uprisings revealed the fact

that fears and tensions continued in the 1690s but were at the same
time considerably allayed.
In 1691 the commodore of the tobacco fleet, Captain Jonathan
Jennings, Captain, HMS Experiment, led a squad of his crewmen into a
courtroom to assault and to kidnap Jonathan Porter, Jr.

The circum

stances of the case began when the Lower Norfolk County Court tried
Porter on charges brought by Christopher Thurston, Master of the Little
John.

As Porter argued his case, Jennings and his men broke into the

courtroom, seized Porter, and carried him back to the Experiment, where
he was clapped in irons.

On May 9, 1691, the House of Burgesses heard

the case against Jennings and referred it to the Council.

That body

decided on May 20 that, since Jennings was commodore of the fleet, he
should be tried in England so that the fleet's sailing would not be
delayed.

A trial in the colony would have meant too extended a delay

for the fleet, for economic conditions remained bad and war between
on

England and France had just begun.

The price of tobacco continued

low and, in spite of the fact that the fleet did leave, few ships
arrived from England that summer or fall bringing fresh supplies.'
Moreover, the Glorious Revolution had yet done little to alleviate the
grievances left from the Stuart period.

Petitions submitted to William

and Mary by the Assembly had not yet been acted upon and Governor Sir
Francis Nicholson pleaded with the Lords of Trade and Plantation not
to reject them outright for fear that the "mob" might immediately take
OO

matters into its hands again.
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Apprehensions of social violence remained high during the decade
and another minor rebellion occurred in 1699 when several prominent
citizens of Nansemond County acted in a "seditious and illegal" manner.
The men, all of Nansemond, were ordered bound over for indictment.

The

Attorney-General recommended on May 30, that Major Thomas Godwin, Cap
tain Edmund Godwin, Captain Thomas Jordan, Captain Thomas Godwin,
Andrew Ross, and John Gourdon, a cleric, should be tried for several
high crimes and misdemeanors, including the "uttering and publishing a
scandalous Libell against His Majfcy and His G o v e m m fc here."

Between

the May and October sittings of the Council, the six men confessed their
crimes and the Governor pardoned t h e m . ^

This type of minor insurrec

tionary activity continued through the early eighteenth century.
William Byrd I allegedly fomented insurrection in King and Queen
County in 1702 by demanding that a new tax enacted by Virginia's col
onial government be repealed.

The tax, for the use of the College of

William and Mary, amounted to«s(-17,000 per year and Byrd protested having
to pay his share.

Nathaniel Harrison and George Marable were jailed

for offering the Speaker of the House ten thousand pounds of tobacco
as a bribe.

The Council and House agreed that Byrd should lose his

office of justice of the peace in King and Queen, that he should appear
at the next sitting of King and Queen County court to answer for his
offense, and that he should make public acknowledgment of his offense.
But Byrd appealed and on April 24, 1703, he informed the Council that
he had repeated what he had been told, not inciting resistance or
violence.

The Council absolved h i m . ^

While the governing elite dealt with these threatened mutinies,
it also was deluged with cases of assault and battery.

The problem
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arose from the presence of several naval ships in Virginia waters.

War

broke out between England and France in 1689 and, with exception of a
short breathing space between 1697 and 1701, continued until 1713.
There were numbers of royal naval vessels in Virginia waters before
1713 and privateers and pirates abounded.

The pirates were products

of the wars and the provincial integration of colonial America.

HMS

Southampton*s Captain, James Moodie, and his crew repeatedly committed
assaults on residents of Virginia.
in the Chesapeake.

The Southampton was on guard duty

In early 1703 Moodie and several of his men threat

ened to beat and maim Colonel William Wilson, Colonel Miles Cary and
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Ballard as the three sat as a quorum for
Elizabeth City County's court.

Similar complaints were registered

against Moodie, who evidently believed that as captain of a Royal Navy
frigate he had the same rights of command on shore as he did at sea.^®
Seamen discharged from their duty were also a nuisance to the
government.

In February 1705, the Council instructed the sheriffs of

York and Gloucester Counties to impress eleven seamen just released
from the Coddrington Galley, a merchantman lying in the York River.
The seamen had been "straggling about" on the shore, committing minor
crimes and assaults.

Council wished the men placed on board HMS

Strombulo, Captain Matthew Teate, to bring that ship's complement to
full strength.

Governor Nicholson had already written Teate informing

him that he might impress the men, but that he must do it quietly and
quickly or they would escape and the county residents would protest
the press both vocally and violently.

Nicholson suggested that Teate

seize the men after midnight, making little disturbance.
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Other seamen committed violence requiring Council action.

The

Council asserted jurisdiction over merchant ships within Virginia wat
ers, claiming it could legally try crewmen accused of crimes.

Ships'

captains refused to recognize any authority but their own on board ship,
even when at anchor in Virginia's territorial waters.

Jonathan Yates,

carpenter on board the Thomas and John, a slaver at anchor in the York
River, accused the captain, Robert Ranson, of beating to death Valentine
Arrison, one of the ship's complement.

Governor Nott ordered examina

tions of the crew, but when these were delivered to the Council, they
said little about the case other than that Ranson had beaten Arrison
severely.

No other crew members accused the captain of killing their

fellow crewman, but the examinations revealed Ranson's cruel temper.
Arrison had taken some fresh water to the slaves in order that they might
have a drink and for that the captain had beaten him.

The Council, how

ever, decided to send the case to the Privy Council with the recommenda
tion that Yates' charge be viewed only as a malicious accusation.

But

Ranson did have a vicious temper, for six months later he was back in
the colony and was charged with assaulting the under-sheriff of York
County.

William Barber, York County's sheriff, sent depositions to the

Council requesting an investigation of the incident.

Ranson had assault

ed Barrentine Howies, the under-sheriff, when he served Ranson with
several writs, relating both to the Arrison killing and other instances
of Ranson's violent temper.

The Council instructed the Attorney-General

to prosecute the case.®®
Coincident with the violence of ships' masters and their crews
came a wave of piracy in Virginia waters.

The pirate problem allowed

Virginia's government the opportunity to expand its influence and
prestige, for it alone took seriously its royal charge to pirates from
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local waters.

During the first two decades of the eighteenth century,

pirates abounded in North American waters, including the West Indies.
Names such as William Kidd, Stede Bonnett, or Edward Teach (Blackbeard)
appeared in those decades.
On the other hand, the absence of hard currency and the opportunity
to trade for luxury items with pirates afforded colonial societies
chances to expand their commerce and -acquire finer things which normal,
legitimate courses of trade denied them.

In some colonies, close ties

between notorious pirates and the colonial governments provided pro
tection and haven to the illegitimate activities of the pirate crews.
The pirate population of North America concentrated in the West Indies,
but in 1718 the English Navy scattered it to the mainland North American coasts.
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Pirate violence first appeared in the 1660s and 1670s, but became
especially acute after 1700.^

Prior to that year, however, pirates

broke into the homes of Mrs. Rebecca Leake and Mr. Jonathan Williams,
both of Tindall's Point, in June 1682, carrying off goods, monies, and
silver plate.

Colonel William Cole captured several, with another five

taken in Rhode Island and extradited to Virginia, by December.

Although

several hanged by order of the Council, two others, William Harrison and
John Manly, escaped only to return voluntarily by December 10.

Several

prominent residents of the colony petitioned the Governor to reprieve
them, which he did, a gesture future governors would not duplicate.

/1

Between 1682 and 1699 pirates occasionally plagued the colony.
Roger Meekeel, himself a Virginian, raised a band of pirates in the mid1680s and became locally notorious.

Meekeel and his band were captured,

and hanged, but only after involved trials and several appeals-
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In July and September of 1699 a pirate ship, the Providence, thirty
guns and 150 men, seized two vessels clearing for England.

In doing so,

she successfully fought off the guardship HMS Essex, sixteen guns and
sixty men.

Captain John Aired, commander of the Essex, told the Council

his vessel was too small to protect adequately the colony's trade.

The

Council petitioned the Crown for a larger warship and erected a system
of bonfire signals along the coasts to warn of pirates approaching the
Capes and did the same for Lynnhaven Bay, poorly protected but with many
sheltering coves and inlets, provided excellent cover for pirates.^
In the meantime, Nicholson issued a pair of proclamations calling
for the capture of several pirates as the wave of piracy sweeping the
colony crested in May 1700 when HMS Shoreham captured the French pirate
vessel La Paix in Lynnhaven Bay.

The La Paix. commanded by Lewis Guitar,

had been taken with all hands on board.

The crew of the pirate numbered

at least 122, and probably many more, although that point is not clear.
On April 28, Captain Passenger, commander of the Shoreham. received word
that the La Paix had entered Lynnhaven Bay that afternoon.

He immedi

ately set sail, anchoring within three leagues of the pirate that night.
At 10 p.m. Governor Nicholson boarded the Shoreham and at 4 a.m. the
next morning the English naval vessel tacked to within one-half league
of the pirate.

Although the pirate tried to escape, he had his rigging

and masts shot away in the course of several hours of fighting.

When

the pirate ran ashore, Guitar threatened to blow up the ship, and he had
sufficient English prisoners from other ships aboard to make the threat
a real one.

Nicholson agreed to send the pirates to England to stand

trial and to ask for His Majesty's mercy.

Despite his agreement, Nich

olson still tried three pirates in the colony and had them executed and
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at least eleven other pirates died before they sailed for England.
Nicholson was not satisfied that the removal of the La Paix ended the
pirate threat.

He ordered HMS Essex Prize to escort the tobacco convoy

that summer fifty leagues into the Atlantic and then to return to con
tinue guard duty in the Chesapeake.^
One year later the War of the Spanish Succession began and French
privateers once again appeared in Virginia waters.

During the next

decade those privateers threatened seriously Virginia's tobacco trade,
but the colonial government maintained its vigilance and continually
warned England that the Chesapeake tobacco fleet was in danger from the
threat.

Not until late in that decade did the threat of privateering

become a reality, for several French vessels appeared off Virginia's
coasts.

By that time, however, the colony had sufficient defenses to

cope. 45
The impact of piracy and privateering on violence in Virginia is
difficult to assess, but threats to the stability of the colony could not
have been great.

The government's intransigent resistance to pirate

incursions discouraged cooperation between pirates and colonists noted
in other colonies.

But the growth of piracy appears to be a clear

indication of economic progress colonial societies were making.

The

advance of wealth and sophistication of Virginia attracted those bent
upon making quick and illicit profits.

Yet if piracy played any role

in the level of mass violence in Virginia society, it was a minor one,
for there was no connection between domestic violence and piracy.
If piracy suggests prosperity, reduction of mass violence suggests
the appearance of stability.

What probably encouraged the decline of

turmoil within the white society was a combination of the revival of a
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racial threat and certain economic and social factors which, taken to
gether, helped to bind the society.^

However, the rapid expansion of

slavery ought to have generated greater instability, since quick growth
of any institution within a society generally brought on instability.
Instead, fears of Negroes probably added another binding force.

The

need for vigilance regarding slave rebelliousness helped cement slave
holders and non-slaveholders into a union of common interest against the
Negro.
Indian-white violence, however, had become little more than a
frontier phenomenon.

Indians no longer posed any significant threat to

stability, but frontier violence probably accelerated the disregard for
human life suggested for the years between 1622 and 1677.

Indian-white

violence, in this context, then assumes greater importance than if it
were just a manifestation of frontier expansion.

Colonial Virginians,

by the early eighteenth century, had come to regard Indians simply as
obstacles to be moved at will and into whatever cultural milieu the
whites desired.

Only a few Virginians had come to perceive Indian cul

ture as having intrinsic value of its o w n . ^

In the late seventeenth

and early eighteenth centuries Virginians commonly treated Indians much
as they pleased.

Fears generated by frontier Indian-white violence did

little more, however, than force retreats of frontiersmen into the
center of Virginia.

By 1700 Tributary Indian nations in Virginia were

reduced to no more than one to three hundred in population each, a com
bined population of perhaps fifteen hundred to two thousand.

They lived

on small reservations scattered throughout the colony delivering their
annual tribute to the governor.

They were inoffensive and passive.^®

Not only were they fully subordinate to the whites in the colony,
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but they were constantly subject to raids and threats of raids by their
far more powerful adversaries, the Iroquois.

Iroquois raids account

for much of the frontier violence in the last quarter of the seventeenth
century in Virginia.

The Iroquois route to the south lay along the

eastern side of the Blue Ridge mountains and, as whites pushed into that
territory, they encountered Iroquois hostiles.

All during the 1680s

and 1690s colonial leaders made preparations to resist a full-scale
attack of the Iroquois Confederation.^

While Virginia Tributary Indians remained passive, Nansiatticoes
allegedly provoked many violent incidents in the colony.
however, could never be proven guilty of the charges.

This nation,

Their activity

(they lived in Richmond County in the Northern Neck) was confined to
the northern regions of Virginia.

The Nansiatticoes were a small group,

numbering about one hundred men, women, and children, but they remained
a center of Indian-white violence during the late seventeenth century.
In 1681 Maryland accused Nehemin, a Nanslattico chief, of murder.

The

Maryland government asked Virginia's Council to investigate the alleged
murder of a Maryland colonist by Nehemin, but no proof could be found of
his participation in the c r i m e . A t t a c k s and raids in northern Virgin
ia were generally attributed to the Nansiatticoes or the Piscataways,
a Maryland tribe living along the falls of the Potomac, however, those
attacks were actually launched by marauding bands of Senecas.
A wave of murders occurred in Stafford and neighboring counties
Cl

beginning in the late 1690s.

Stafford County had long been prime

hunting grounds for Virginia and Maryland Indians living along the
Potomac River.

The extent of Stafford was much greater then than today,

but white Virginians continued to settle within its environs despite the
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Indian violence.

Indians occasionally protested the trespass on what

they considered their best hunting lands, but the protests drew little
CO

response.

The murders continued despite repeated trials and execu

tions of alleged murderers, until in 1705 Virginia's government made
provision for the sale of the Nansiatticoes.
In the late summer of 1704, a small band of Indians, numbering ten
at most, attacked the family of John Rowley, living in Richmond County.
Five of the six residents of the Rowley house were killed in the attack,
and Colonel William Tayloe, commander of the Richmond County militia,
captured and interrogated seven Nansiatticoes who revealed that they
had taken part in the attack.

By October 30, the General Court had

tried and convicted all seven, condemning them to death.

Only five were

executed and one was sold as a slave in one of the West Indies colonies.
A letter written by Governor Nicholson to the Board of Trade suggests
that colonial officials now considered the case closed.
However, a special session of the Assembly met in the spring of
1705 for the express purpose of selling the one-hundred-member Nansiattico tribe, allegedly for its continual participation in murders and
attacks on frontier plantations and settlements.

The Assembly relied

upon a 1662 law making Indian villages nearest the scene of a murder
responsible for finding the murderer.

However, whether through mis

understanding of its own law or for some other reason, the Assembly
interpreted it to mean that the village became liable for the murder,
if no murderer were foun d . ^

Even so, the murderers of the Rowleys had

been caught and executed for their crime.

A possible clue to the treat

ment of the Nansiatticoes was an event which occurred the previous
spring, when the tribe protested to the Council that it was being de~
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prived of its lands.

Its chiefs complained in 1704 to the Council that

Thomas Kendal, acting as agent for Dr. Lomax, had broken their fences,
had seized some of their property, and had driven them off their lands.
The murders committed by the tribe that summer may have constituted the
act needed by Lomax and others hungry for lands in the Northern Neck.
The doctor and his compatriots may have convinced several key figures in
the Assembly to interpret the 1662 law in a manner necessary to clear
the Indians from the reservation.
The sale to the West Indies of the Nansiattico Indians halted any
more racial violence from northern Indians.

No longer were efforts

made to keep whites from lands, but the violence of the Indians of that
region may have been broken not by the sale of the Nansiatticoes but by
the capture and execution of those guilty of the Rowley murders.
Indians of the west and southwest, however, took somewhat longer
to quiet.

Not until the Tuscarora War in North Carolina, 1711-1713, did

western and southwestern Virginia Indians cease their attacks and raids
in that region.

In the meantime, however, whites in Virginia had an

entirely new racial threat.

By 1700, approximately one-half of the

labor force in the colony was comprised by Negro slaves.

By 1708 about

two-fifths of all the tithables in the colony were Negroes and their
population was increasing quite rapidly.

Colonel Edmund Jenings, pres

ident of the Council in those years, estimated that the Negro population
had risen by over three thousand between 1705 and 1708. D

The appear

ance of a new racial threat is well-documented, but the violence generated
by growing conflict between Negroes and whites is not.

The arrogant

treatment of Indians by the whites paralleled the growth of the dehum
anization of Negroes in Virginia.

«

From 1646 until 1705, whites
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conferred upon themselves the powers and prerogatives of tribal govern
ment that had been the Indians prior to 1646.

At the same time, the

whites institutionalized slavery and made Negroes the victims of that
process.

Although slavery had existed since the dawn of civilization,

it had seldom taken on the dehumanizing form it did in colonial America.
Especially in those regions In which Negro slavery became the principal
labor system did the institution dehumanize its victims. ^
Although Negroes inhabited Virginia from at least 1619, their
status was not fixed in slavery until late in the seventeenth century.
The evidence is quite scanty for the first half of that century about
the process of enslavement, but it would appear that English prejudices
about Negroes inaugurated conditions by which blacks in the colony were
set apart and considered suitable for life-time servitude.

Moreover,

English knowledge of and participation in the slave trade in Latin
America established precedents upon which Englishmen in the New World
could rely for labor.

By the late seventeenth century, conditions in

Virginia were such that some alternative labor source was necessary.
Indentured servitude, relying upon English, Irish or Scots, was helping
create the chaotic social conditions and violence characterizing the
last quarter of that century.

58

Some alternative labor form was neces

sary to alleviate the great tensions and violence generated by the class
conflicts associated with the tobacco gluts, land grabs by prominent
citizens, and servile system.

By the late seventeenth century Negro

life-time servitude was already a common practice through the institu
tionalization of slavery, and violence in many forms was generated by
slavery.
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NOTES
TENSION, VIOLENCE AND THE TRANSITION
TO PROVINCIAL SOCIETY:

1677-1705

^William Byrd I and William Fitzhugh provide examples of the proc
ess by which the tobacco families began. Byrd was an Indian trader and
merchant before he entered the tobacco trade. Fitzhugh, of Stafford
County, also participated in general merchandising and other economic
endeavors. See Allen Johnson, et al., Dictionary of American Biography
(25 volumes, New York, 1928-1974), Vol. Ill (1929), 383, Vol. VI (1931),
438-439.
^Rankin, Criminal Trial Proceedings in the General Court, Chapter
1, esp. p. 15; Hening, ed., Statutes-at-Large, III (1682-1710), 10-11.
•^Sometime about 1680 the General Assembly divided into its two
constituent bodies, the Council and House of Burgesses. Thus, Council
records came to be preserved separately from the Burgess collections.
EJC, I (1680-1699), 490. Perhaps the Council had ordered that county
court to try the felon since the General Court was not in session and
could not be summoned until the next spring. The colony found a
solution to this problem in the 1690s. Colonial governments usually
could not afford to expend monies necessary to keep criminals incarcer
ated for long periods of time, especially when facilities for retaining
prisoners would have to have been improved considerably in order to
make them liveable for prisoners and jailers alike.
4ibid., 496; see William Byrd, The Secret Diary of William Byrd of
Westover, 1709-1712, ed. by Louis B. Wright and Marion Tinling (Rich
mond, 1941), 452-453 for the "pleading her belly" defense.
5EJC. I, 67-68, 504-506, 72-73; II, 331.
^Rankin, Criminal Trial Proceedings in the General Court, 24-37;
EJC, I (1680-1699), 171-172.
^For Negro Oyer and Terminer trials, see above, p. 183.
®EJC, I (1680-1699), 397. Although England had sent several ship
loads of convicts to Virginia in the early 1660s, Virginia's government
soon concluded that it had to discourage such practices. But Virginia
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had not used transportation.

See Chapter IV, pp. 127-129.

^Carr and Jordan, Maryland *s Revolution of Government, 152-153;
Lovejoy, Glorious Revolution in America, 93-96, 308-310, 327. The
incidents were generated in part by feuds between Baltimore and William
Penn over Penn's charters to lands claimed by Baltimore and in part by
Baltimore's resistance to attempts by the royal government to weaken
Maryland's charter. For Virginia's participation, see EJC, IV, 67-68,
72-73, 109-110, 162-163, 504-506; Calendar of State Papers, Colonial,
1681-1685, Doc. 1952, 731; Docs. 1963 and 1963 I-VI, 734-37.
•'■^For the rise of black-white violence, see Chapter VII, 217-219.
Negro population began to burgeon between 1670 and 1680. By 1715,
approximately twenty-three thousand Negroes inhabited Virginia. By
1705 the total tithable population of the colony was twenty-seven
thousand and fifty-three, which, if a conversion factor of three is
applied, represents a total population of about eighty-one thousand
people, black and white. For these figures, see Greene and Harrington,
American Population, 138, 139, 145nb, 149-150.
■^Colonel Herbert Jeffreys, Governor of Virginia, to Sir Joseph
Williamson, Secretary of State, June 8, 1678, VMHB, 5 (1897), 50-53;
Lovejoy, Glorious Revolution in America, 54, for the point about the
standing arny.
l^EJC, I, 10-11; Calendar of State Papers. Colonial, 1677-1680,
588-589.
■^Although the considerations in this paragraph do not bear
directly on violence in Virginia society, they do set the background
and suggest the deep-rooted disorder prevalent in the colony at that
time. By the spring of 1682 only an "incident" was necessary to set
off mass riots again.
^ E J C , I, 485; Secretary Nicholas Spencer to Secretary of State
Covington, July 9, 1680, VMHB, 25 (1919), 143-144; Calendar of State
Papers. Colonial, 1677-1680. 569; Lovejoy, Glorious Revolution in Amer
ica, 133-134; VMHB, 8 (1900-1901), 188-189. By 1682, one man's
tobacco crop may have meant 7 for the Crown, Calendar of State Papers,
Colonial, 1681-1685, Doc, 768, p.
15Ibid.. 17-18; CSPC, 1681-1685, 221-222, 274-275; JHB, 1659/601693.
■^Estimates suggest that Charles received as much as 100,000 per
year income from revenues raised by the tobacco trade. That figure
matched the size of the secret subsidy sent him yearly by French King
Louis XIV. For that reason Charles may have been reluctant to allow
a cessation of planting. But he had been fighting with Lord Culpeper,
appointed governor of Virginia in 1675, to get him out to the colony.
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Chicheley, Acting Governor, had arrived in Virginia some thirty years
earlier and had served the growing colony ever since. But he was old,
67, by the time the Tobacco-Cutters' Riots erupted. Whether a firmer
hand could have prevented the violence is questionable, for it appears
that only a severe curtailment of that season's tobacco crop could have
staved off the cutting. With the deterioration of tobacco prices Cul
peper and other officials attempted to push diversity and urbanization
of the economy, an effort which for many reasons failed but was revived
periodically and met resistance, sometimes violent. For Charles1 con
siderations of Culpeper, see Hartwell, Blair, and Chilton, Present State
of Virginia. 32-33; Lovejoy, Glorious Revolution in America. 55, 58.
The late seventeenth century attempts at economic diversification are
detailed in Rainbolt, From Prescription to Persuasion, passim.
l^Sir Henry Chicheley to Sir Lyonel Jenkins, May 8, 1682, C05/
1356, 66-69, Reel M-227, VCRMP, CWRL.
18EJC, I (1680-1699), 17-18.
■^Sir Henry Chicheley to King Charles IX, May 8, 1682, C05/1356,
65-66, Reel M-227, VCRMP, CWRL; Chicheley to Jenkins, May 8, 1682,
66-69, Ibid.
28Spencer to Jenkins, May 8, 1682, C05/1356, 69-74, Reel M-227,
VCRMP, CWRL.
21a long controversy arose over Beverley's participation in and
leadership of the tobacco-cutters. For several years he was under
official censure. Although never tried for riot or treason, he was
convicted of tampering with public documents for refusing to surrender
the Assembly's Journals to the Governor and Council. Beverley, a
staunch supporter of Berkeley in Bacon's Rebellion, became an enemy of
royal government when Berkeley left the colony under royal command and
reproof. Beverley had used his influence to help strengthen Berkeley's
control of the Assembly. When Jeffreys assumed the governorship,
Beverley was stripped of his offices in the House as part of the new
governor's attack on the "Green Spring" faction. By the time of the
tobacco-cutters, Beverley had little influence within the Council, but
he retained the allegiance of many Burgesses.
See Hartwell, Blair, and
Chilton, Present State of Virginia, 21-26; Calendar of State Papers,
Colonial, 1677-1680, #453, #821; VMHB, 22 (1914), 365; 23 (1915), 152;
24 (1916), 77-79; 18 (1910), 6-20; EJC, I (1680-1699), 489, 490-491,
494-495; CSPC, 1681-1685, 228-229, 233, 237-238, 240-241, 243-244,
274-275.
22EJC, I (1680-1699), 23-24; CSPC, 1681-1685, 275-276; Lovejoy,
Glorious Revolution in America, 58-59.
23EJC, I (1680-1699), 20-22; 24-30, 36, 40-41; Thomas Lord Cul
peper, "Culpeper's Report on Virginia in 1683," VMHB, III (1895-1896),
226, 229-230.
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24CSP. Colonial. 1681-1685. 157.
23Lovejoy, Glorious Revolution in America. 53-69, 220-235. Love
joy points out that during the early 1680s, some dissenting Protestants
and staunch Whigs in England fomented attempts to prevent James, the
Duke of York, from ascending the throne. Revolts and rumors of revolts
arrived in America from England, spurring speculation and fears of
Catholic intentions. Such events as the Exclusion Crisis, Rye House
Plot, or Shaftesbury's release from the Tower of London had profound
effects in colonial America, effects startling to both English and
colonial officials. The rumors kept alive colonial fears of overthrow
of the Empire or a Catholicization of it, an option almost as distaste
ful as the Empire's overthrow.
26ibid.. 164-166.
2?For fears generated by Indian raids, see EJC. I (1680-1699),
205-207, 216-217, 254-255, 262, 266; JKB. 1659/60-1693. 426. The
Iroquois raids may be found on pp. 194-195.
23Lovejoy, Glorious Revolution in America. 220-228, for the back
ground and actual revolt itself.
29EJC, I (1680-1699), 104-106, 519, 522; Carr and Jordan, Mary
land 's Revolution of Government. 48, Parson Waugh had a history of
obstreperous activity in the Northern Neck. Some ten years after his
"Tumult" he was charged with conduct unbecoming his office when he
secretly married a daughter of Kenelm Chiseldine to some stranger from
Maryland. Waugh allegedly had sneaked the maid across the Potomac into
Maryland and performed the ceremony there. Chiseldine accused him of
illegally performing the ceremony, for Waugh had neither published the
banns nor had he issued a license. Although Chiseldine wanted Waugh
punished for his effrontery, the Council asked Commissary Blair and
Attorney-General Bartholomew Fowler to investigate the matter, a means
of burying the incident, EJ C . II (1699-1705), 31-32.
30e j C , I (1680-1699), 104-106; Fairfax Harrison, Landmarks of Old
Prince William: A Study of Origins in Northern Virginia (Berryville,
Virginia, 1964), 127-143.
31EJC. I (1680-1699), 523-524.
32Ibid.. 177-178; JHB. 1659/60-1693. 355-356, 367-368.
1689-1692, 473.

CSPC.

33CSPC. 1689-1692. 473.
34EJC, I (1680-1699), 438-439; II (1699-1705), 11-12.
35EJC, II (1699-1705), 259; LJC, I (1680-1714), 347-348.

A similar
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incident had occurred in 1699 when Lieutenant Colonel Bridger requested
that the Council prosecute Richard Reynolds for fomenting a riot. At
the October sitting the Council instructed the Attorney-General to in
vestigate and to initiate trial proceedings. EJC, II (1699-1705), 19.
36Ibid., 283-285.
3?Ibid., 431-432; Colonel Francis Nicholson to Captain Matthew
Teate, HMS Strombulo, February 1, 1704/5, PRO, C05/1214, f289, Reel
M-237, VCRMP, CWRL.
38EJC, II (1699-1705), 42, 44, 65, III (1705-1721), 104; "Copy of
the Depositions of the Seamen belonging to the ship Thomas and John,
taken upon Complaint ag^ Captain Ranson, Master of the said Ship--conc e m i n g the death of Valentine Arrison, October 23, 1705, PRO, C05/1315,
Pt, 1, ff 34-37, Reel M-238, VCRMP, CWRL; Governor Edward Nott to the
Board of Trade, December 24, 1705, PRO, C05/1315, Pt. 1, ff 26-29,
Reel M-238, VCRMP, CWRL.
38See Rankin, Golden Age of Piracy, 18-21.
48See ChapterIV, pp.

138-139.

41EJC, I (1680-1699), 26; CSPC, 1681-1685. 356-357.
42EJC, I (1680-1699), 68; LJC. I (1680-1714), 89. The most famous
pirate case was that in which Edward Davis, Lionell Delawayfer, and
Jonathan Hinson contributed a « ^ 0 0 sterling bribe to Commissary James
Blair to obtain their freedom. They were alleged to be pirates, but
they proclaimed themselves innocent of the charges. However, the use
of the bribe suggests that they were actually pirates. Their bribe was
used by Blair to help finance the foundation of the College of William
and Mary. EJC, I (1680-1699), 107-109.
43Ibid., II (1699-1705), 4-6, 19-20.
44Ibid., 21, 38-39, 65-66, 70; CSPC, 1700, 230-231, 239-240, 262263, 300-301, 307-308, 311-313. Governor Francis Nicholson to the Board
of Trade, June 10, 1700, PRO, C05/1360, 1-14, Reel M-228, VCBMP, CWRL;
Captain Passenger to [?], April 29, 1700, PRO, C05/1311, 29-30, Reel
M-235, VCRMP, CWRL; List of Masters, Ships' Names, Port, Prisoners'
Names and Number of Prisoners, June 8, 1700, PRO, C05/1311, 28, Reel
M-235, VCRMP, CWRL.
45EJC, III (1705-1721), 190, 205-206, 208-210, 212-213, 216,
217-219.
48A number of historians have analyzed the appearance of stability
in Virginia in the early eighteenth century, but Williams' "Political
Alignments in Colonial Virginia," 339-340, 349-354, is the most compre

214
hensive treatment with respect to those binding factors. He does not
take into account the rapid development of slavery, but explores the
homogeneity of the population, common economic endeavors, geographic
proximity of the population, and system of local government, citing
these and a common outlook as the keys to the arrival of stability.
^ B e v e r l e y ' s History and Present State of Virginia is an excellent
example of that new perception. Yet he did not represent the attitude
of his fellows to any great degree. Not until later in the century do
Virginia whites come to view Indians as white men with copper skins, to
paraphrase Kenneth M. Stampp. Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson both
advocated increased recognition of Indian humanity.

48see Francis Nicholson to [?], April 29, 1699, CO5/1310, pp.
Reel M-235, VCRMP, CWRL, for a survey of Virginia tributary Indians at
the end of the seventeenth century.
^ Attacks launched in Virginia are mentioned in LJC, I (1680-1714),
304-305; EJC, II (1699-1705), 269-270, 322-323, 331, 359, 364, 366-368;
JHB, 1702/3-1712. 76.
50EJC, I (1680-1699), 13-14; CSPC. 1681-1685, 92-93.
■^Murders and raids began in Stafford in 1697 and depredations in
that region continued until the sale of the Nansiatticoes.
See EJC, I
(1680-1699), 370, 456, 466; II (1699-1705), 96-99, 104; JHB, 1695-1702,
105-106, 158, 159, 163, 193, 194; LJC, I (1680-1714), 262, 264-272;
CSPC, 1700, 407, 448-457; Governor Francis Nicholson to the Right Hon
ourable the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, August 1,
1700, C05/1360, 31-47, Reel M-228, VCRMP, CWRL.
^^The Nansiatticoes themselves complained of trespasses on their
lands. See p. 207.
53e JC, II (1699-1705), 383-386, 396-398; Richmond County Order Book,
No. 3, 1699-1704, September 6, 1704, 361-364, Reel M-117-17, VCRMP,
CWRL; Colonel Francis Nicholson to the Lords of Trade, October 30,
1704, C05/1361, pp. 233-235, Reel M-228, VCRMP, CWRL; CSPC, 1704-1705,
298.
■^The original law is in Hening, ed., Statutes-at-Large, II
(1660-1682), 193-194, and its revision in ibid., 218-222.
55EJC. II (1699-1705), 359, III (1705-1721), 50; JHB, 1702/3-1712,
xxv, 49, 74, 88, 96-98, 103, 104, 108, 109, 113-114, 119, 122-123;
LJC, I (1680-1714), 4, 14, 417, 419, 420-423; Waverly R. Winfree, comp.,
The Laws of Virginia: Being A Supplement to Hening's The Statutes at
Large, 1700-1750 (Richmond, 1971), 41-45. Governor Nicholson described
this tributary tribe in 1699 as "small and weak" and averred that he
had lowered their annual tribute from ten to eight beaver skins due to
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their poverty. Governor Francis Nicholson to [?], April 29, 1699,
C05/1310, pp. 139-140, Reel M-235, VCRMP, CWRL.
•^This is Edmund S. Morgan's estimate in American Slavery. American
Freedom. Tithing estimates may be found in Greene and Harrington,
American Population, 138-139.
“^Examples of laws controlling Indians may be found in Hening, ed.,
Statutes-at-Large. II (1660-1682), 193-194, 218-222. For those who
argue that slavery was most dehumanizing where it was most profitable,
see Herbert S. Klein, Slavery in the Americas: A Comparative Study of
Virginia and Cuba (Chicago, 1967).
^Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom. Chap. 14.

CHAPTER
SLAVERY AND PIRACY:

VII
VIOLENCE IN THE

EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY:

1705-1720

In the early eighteenth century a racial threat once again arose
in Virginia, one reflecting increased importation of and reliance upon
Negroes as slave labor.

Blacks were never to challenge the very exist

ence of the colony as Indians had done in 1622 or 1644 nor did Negroes
threaten security and stability as had indentured servants in the late
seventeenth century, but their growing numbers alarmed whites whose
anti-Negro prejudices were already firmly rooted.

Slavery did, however,

create a class of discontented, restless Negroes who used violence to
resist their condition and upon whom whites used extensive violence to
keep subjugated.

Although the piecemeal process of enslavement was well

under way by 1705, Virginia's Assembly enacted a formal slave code that
year, thus symbolically marking 1705 as the year in which slavery re
placed indentured servitude as the prime labor system.

The code renewed

previous slave laws and defined slaves, whether Negro or other, as
chattel, personal property.

Colonial courts had encouraged that view of

slaves, allowing owners to treat them as property.

Negroes comprised

the bulk of slaves in 1705, but whites occasionally enslaved Indians
who had offended the colony in some manner.*1
The codification of slavery was occasioned by a twofold need, to
digest all Virginia's slave laws and to rationalize slave policy.

216

Slavery was expanding so rapidly by 1705 that a need existed for clear
ly defined statements of treatment, care, punishments and other issues.
The accelerated influx of slaves began in the late 1690s when large
numbers of "seasoned" blacks were brought from the West Indies.

By the

early 1700s, however, Royal African Company and "separate" traders were
importing slaves directly from West Africa and Virginians no longer
could depend on importation of "seasoned" blacks for slaves.^

Just as

in the 1660s when whites eagerly embraced the importation of convicts
from England only to discover that they bred violence and disorder,
Virginians responded eagerly to the imports of slaves in the early
eighteenth century only to find that blacks introduced new elements of
disorder and discontent into the society.3

As the slave population

mushroomed after 1700, Negro criminality and violence generated be
tween whites and blacks rose rapidly.

The violence accelerated after

1705 as blacks found means to resist slavery and as whites used blacks,
perhaps unconsciously, to cement formerly antagonistic class elements
of the white society.

Although 1705 marks an important date in which

whites recognized the increasing presence of blacks in Virginia,
slaves had participated in violent events long prior to that date.

But

their physical numbers and their levels of violence had not yet brought
disorder to the society, for late seventeenth-century white leaders
were more occupied with searching for means to suppress white lowerclass rebelliousness.
Between 1687 and 1735, slaves plotted at least five major insur
rections, one general, the others local.

Individuals and groups of

slaves ran off, some seeking to establish their own colonies in the
mountains.

In several instances, individual slaves threatened with
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capture committed suicide.

These methods of resistance represent var

ious levels of acculturation to slavery, but slave resistance, however,
comprises only half the story associated with black-white violence.
Whites used violence against their slaves in order to eradicate black
rebelliousness and to keep the slaves working.

During the first third

of the eighteenth century, then, the major thread of violence was racial
and reflected need for vigilance on the part of whites and extensive
exploration of ways and means to circumvent slavery on the part of
blacks.

Moreover, the racial threat posed by Negroes may have served

as a binding force, helping tie together a society which had for dec
ades been unstable, violent, and disorderly.^
Although scattered mentions of Negroes participating in criminal
activity or running off from their service appeared in the seventeenth
century, no major slave violence evidently occurred until Bacon's
Rebellion and that was part of the general pattern of lower-class re
sistance to upper-class exploitation rather than a racial pattern.
until 1687 did a major insurrectionary plot occur.

Not

In October 1687,

Lord Howard of Effingham, Virginia's royal governor, informed the
Council that Nicholas Spencer, himself a member of the Council and Secre
tary of the colony, had discovered a plot among Negro slaves in the
Northern Neck of the colony.

The plotters had intended to destroy their

own masters' plantations, to murder their masters and their masters'
families, and to spread their insurrection throughout the colony.

The

restive slaves had hoped to kill all whites in the Northern Neck.

The

Council ordered that the principals and advisers seized by Spencer be
tried at the next session of the General Court.

The Council then

issued suggestions to all slaveholders asking that they no longer allow
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their slaves to congregate in large numbers at funerals, church, or
other public meetings.

Moreover, masters were asked not to allow their
C

slaves to leave plantations on Saturdays or Sundays.

In this instance,

the government asked the cooperation of the masters; in the future, the
government ordered such through instructions or laws.
In the spring of 1688 two leaders of the plot were tried.

In one

instance, only a brief mention ordering the whipping of an unnamed
Negro appeared.
was revealed.

In the other instance, however, much more information
In May 1688 the Westmoreland County Court, the county in

which the plot occurred, ordered that the James City County sheriff
punish Sam, a slave belonging to Richard Metcalfe.

Sam had helped in

spire the recent plot, but he had fomented plots and conspiracies for
several years.

The sheriff was to whip Sam at a cart's tail, leading

him through Jamestown to the gallows and then back to the county's jail.
While Sam was being whipped and kept in prison, he was to wear a halter
around his neck, signifying his subordinate status.

Following his whip

ping in Jamestown, he was to be transported to Westmoreland County,
where once again he was to be whipped.

When those two punishments were

concluded, the county court instructed his master to fit him with an
iron collar to be worn around his neck for the rest of his life.

More

over, if he survived the whippings, he was to be permanently confined
to his master's plantation.

Sam's punishment was by no means unusual,

but at no time did whites who intended such activity receive that much
abuse.

They were either pardoned, as in the case of William Byrd I,

or executed, as in the case of the leaders of Bacon's Revellion.®
Moreover, the insurrection touched off a flurry of legislative
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activity in 1691, when the Assembly and Governor agreed to several new
laws respecting Negroes.

The legislature passed laws prohibiting

marriage between whites and blacks, defining and providing punishments
for Negro outlaws, and excluding Negro slaves from social activities
they had previously enjoyed.

At the same time the Council experimented

with a new means of trying accused Negro felons.

The General Court

needed an alternative method of handling special classes of cases, for
after 1691 Negroes were forbidden to testify in court.^
County courts had begun requesting writs of Oyer and Terminer in
order to hold special court sessions to try Negroes accused of capital
crimes, for county courts were acquiring trial powers over Negroes—
especially for criminal behavior.

The General Court traditionally tried

capital offenses, but in the aftermath of the uprising, new methods of
criminal prosecution for Negroes were evidently deemed necessary.

The

General Court hesitated in this instance, refusing to accord county
courts the rights of criminal prosecution it had maintained for so many
years, but it did not reject outright the idea of using Oyer and TerminO
er courts for such trials.
Thus, entirely different standards of punishment were being de
vised for Negro felons, standards to remind slaves of their powerless
ness.

Negro insurrectionists were drawn and quartered and their parts

prominently displayed as warnings to other Negroes not to attempt such
activity.

But the colony still had the problem of potential white

labor unrest with which to deal and kept its attention focused on that
violence.
Not until 1701 was the 1691 outlaw act tested.

John Tullett re

quested that year that the Assembly declare Billy, a slave of his, an
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outlaw.
fugitive.

Billy had run off sometime in 1698, living in the colony as a
While in hiding he had committed several robberies and other

felonies, Tullett’s petition alleged.

The bill outlawing the slave was

before the House of Burgesses when Billy
County sheriff.

surrendered to the James City

Although the question was raised as to the condition of

Billy vis-a-vis this bill, the House voted to pass Tullett's petition.

9
Governor Nicholson signed it and Billy was hanged.
Similar petitions submitted to the House over the next several
years reveal that the colony had accepted the principle of compensation
to slave owners whose slaves were killed either as outlaws or as fugi
tives from a crime they had committed.

Thus, even before 1705 the

Assembly had made the decision to complete the dehumanization of Negro
slaves by providing compensation to owners whose slaves were killed as
outlaws.

This compensation was not a reward, as in nineteenth-century

jurisprudence, but the assessed value ofthe slave based on
slave prices and the proven condition of
outlawry.

current

the slave upon his death or

With this decision, Virginia whites completed their assault

on the humanity of the Negro.
questionable.

Whether this assault was conscious is

The evidence certainly suggests that it was unconscious.

But petitions such as Henry Lawnd's, William Bressie's, or Anthony
Armistead's asking compensation for slaves who had run off or who had
been executed confirm the suspicion that whites in Virginia by 1705
had largely discarded humanitarian concern for their slaves.

Free

Negroes retained many rights and privileges of citizens, but as the
eighteenth century proceeded, they lost privileges when violence b e 
tween masters and slaves occurred in the colony, for free blacks were
usually accused of fomenting the plots.
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By 1705, then, colonial Virginians abandoned their heavy reliance
on indentured servants and turned to slavery for their labor force.
However, this choice was not without its consequences for white society,
because after 1705 whites became increasingly apprehensive and fearful
of their slaves.

Violence institutionalized in the slave code encour

aged racial violence prior to 1735.

Masters, applying force as they

pleased to their slaves, aroused blacks' antagonisms as they arrived in
the colony.

Those who had not experienced slavery in Africa most likely

were those who resisted it most fiercely in Virginia.

Thus, they may

have inspired many of the runaways and uprisings happening prior to
1735.11
In retaliation for repeated misbehavior, Virginia applied trans
portation to rid itself of black recalcitrants.

The practice was

frequently employed for slaves and free Negroes refusing to accept their
situation in Virginia.

On August 9, 1706, the Council ordered sold a

Negro bought for the use of the government.

He had been imprisoned for

general disobedience and "offering violence" to Mr. Cary.

The Council

ordered him sold in another English colony but did not specify which
one.

The councilors believed that he should be taken to the colony in

12

which he would bring the best price. ^
Moreover, by 1706 Virginia'had accepted the principle of Oyer and
Terminer courts for trials of Negroes.

In 1706 the Council once again

received a petition regarding Oyer and Terminer commissions.

The

commissioners of Oyer and Terminer for Westmoreland County had con
victed five Negroes for several felonies and burglaries committed in
that county.

The commissioners, however, felt that three of the blacks

deserved mercy, but the Council disagreed and all five were executed in
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September.

Once again, another innovation in criminal proceedings had

eased the burden placed upon the Council's responsibilities for controlling violent behavior in the colony.

13

By 1710, however, the Negro population had swelled to twelve
thousand.^

The treatment of Negroes had become even more inhuman

since the 1705 codification of the slave laws.
newly-imported Negroes was not quelled.

But rebelliousness of

In 1710 a major conspiracy

occurred in Surry and James City Counties.

On March 21 of that year

first reports of the plot indicated the conspiracy was designed to be
come colony-wide.

Many slaves, both Indian and Negro, had already been

arrested, including two leaders, Salvadore and Scipio.

Will, a Negro

slave belonging to Robert Ruffin, had revealed the plot, and he was
sent to the Northern Neck for his own protection, for word had circu
lated that the plotters would kill him.

The General Court, in the

meantime, tried and convicted the two leaders for high treason.

The

Court ordered them hanged, after which they were drawn and quartered
and their remains prominently displayed throughout the colony to warn
future conspirators of their fate should they elect to pursue the same
policy.

Many other slaves hanged along with Salvadore and Scipio, for

many petitions for compensation were presented to the Assembly.

As a

reward for his revelation, Will was ordered freed by the Assembly and
his master Ruffin received ^ 4 0 compensation for the loss of his
property.^
In the aftermath of the conspiracy, the Assembly enacted an im
port duty on slaves of ^5 per head.

The tax was intended mostly to

raise revenue for the colony rather than to discourage importation of
slaves into Virginia.

But there was some apprehension on the part of
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whites regarding their Negro population.

In the next several years,

slave imports dropped appreciably— averaging about five hundred per
year compared to the one thousand per year of the first decade.

The

slowing of the imports did help reduce white-black tensions temporarily,
but it also provided slaves time to acculturate.^
With the 1710 plot, major Negro resistance to slavery temporarily
quieted.

Some violence occurred between 1710 and 1720, but few hints

of the great restiveness of the 1720s appeared.

The violence between

whites and blacks that did happen was generally low-level, that is,
blacks committing crimes or individual whites and blacks assaulting
each other.

Governor Spotswood, immediately after his arrival in 1710

as governor, had to issue a proclamation calling for the capture of
two Negro escapees.

Imprisoned in the King and Queen County jail, on

felony charges, they had assaulted their jailer and fled.

17

Other

instances of violence between blacks and whites suggest how much the
unrest of the first decade had quieted.

Moreover, some ambiguities in

slaves' status still remained and the government had a hand in re
solving some of those problems.
In two instances, 1711 and 1717, Negroes petitioned the Council
for their freedom, both instances provoking violence between them and
their masters.

John Demerea, belonging to John Leaf of Nansemond

County, and John Coomee, belonging to Michael H e m e y
requested their freedom.

[Heamey], both

The General Court instructed Lear not to

abuse Demerea, but two months later Demerea protested to the Council
that Lear had severely beaten him whereupon the Council instructed
Demerea to remain out of Lear's service until Lear agreed to post bond
for his future good behavior.^-®

Coomee's petition alleged that H e m e y
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had illegally enslaved him.

When Coomee had presented his petition to

the Elizabeth County Court, H e m e y had taken him home and had beaten
him severely, Coomee informed the Council.

The Council ordered that

Coomee have a fair trial, just as it had done in the case of Demerea.^
Thus, ambiguities in the rights of Negroes remained in Virginia during
the decades after the codification of slavery, but at the same time
whites were tightening the system of slavery, for the privilege of com
pensation for deceased slaves was considerably expanded beyond its
original intent.
By 1720 the use of compensation was considerably altered from its
intent in 1691 when masters could request compensation for slaves killed
as outlaws.

Masters claimed compensation for slaves killed by a var

iety of means.

Susan Allen requested that the House of Burgesses in

demnify her for the death of one of her slaves.

David had killed the

slave in self-defense, clearly beyond the intent of the outlaw legis
lation, and she received the compensation.

Richard Richardson petition

ed in 1722 for ^25 current money awarded him by a jury which had tried
and convicted a slave of his for burglary and felony.

The slave's case

again did not fall within the definition of outlaw, but the House
granted his petition.^5 Consequently, by 1720 whites had translated
black slaves into property, carrying out the definition ascribed to
Negroes by the 1705 codification.
As that decade ended, moreover, black restiveness awakened again,
portending the 1720s as a period of major black unrest.

Some slaves

began running off, both singly and in groups, and that practice often
resulted in violence.

For instance, Governor Spotswood had used oppor

tunities opened to him in Virginia to acquire extensive plantations in
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the newly-found county which came to bear his name.

The principal

labor force for these new plantations was slave and a group of Spotswood's blacks ran off.

The slaves, described as mutinous before their

flight, fled toward the Blue Ridge mountains, intending perhaps to
establish their own colony, suggesting that they were newly-arrived
Africans.

Spotswood was so concerned about the runaways that he offer

ed a reward and wrote to the governors of Maryland, New York, and
Pennsylvania asking them to send out their tributary Indians to try to
find the blacks.^
Whites had come to realize by 1720 that a new racial threat, one
by no means so great as the Indian threat of the era 1607-1646, had
appeared in Virginia.

Negroes might threaten the stability and secur

ity of the society, but their violence was disruptive, not only of the
society but the economy.

White reaction to Negro unrest was usually

swift and calculated to repress black discontent, but at the same time
white violence against blacks might have relieved tensions and unrest
within white society.

The shift from reliance upon white to reliance

upon black labor relieved many tensions associated with the late seven
teenth century.

Those whites who had come to Virginia as servants

after 1660 had had no future to look forward to when they earned their
freedom, but whites after 1700 who came to Virginia had a much brighter
set of opportunities, for they were not condemned to perpetual poverty.
Slaves, as a permanent laboring class, were deprived of opportunity,
either for personal freedom or for economic improvement.

But whites

of all classes in the colony had access to both personal freedom and
economic gain, not all to the same degree certainly, but that access
did provide some new ties within the society.

Moreover, as the first

in
two decades of the eighteenth century ended, whites perceived blacks
as a threat to their concept of order and stability, a threat requiring
violent repression whenever necessary.22
The black-white dimension of violence in the early eighteenth
century represented only one element of violent activity.

Virginia's

economic maturity, coupled with Governor Spotswood's imperial outlook,
brought participation in violence crossing colonial boundaries.

The

Hyde-Cary civil war in North Carolina, the Tuscarora Indian War in
that colony, and the Yamassee war in South Carolina all affected Vir
ginia.

Virginia's participation in the violence of those events sug

gests that southern colonial integration on political and military
levels was beginning.

Spotswood, himself a member of the English Army

and accustomed to an imperial viewpoint, encouraged a more imperial
outlook on the part of his advisers in Virginia.

Virginia's wealth

and maturity were already well established and it was natural that
colonies less wealthy could look to Virginia for aid when threatened
by Indian or civil menaces.

Although these three violent events were

tangential to violence in Virginia between 1710 and 1720, they directed
the government's attention away from domestic tensions.23

Spotswood

himself pointed out why Virginia needed to help the two Carolinas, for
he feared that both the civil war and the Indian uprisings would spread
northward to engulf the Virginia frontier and settled regions.

Perhaps

his fears were groundless, but nevertheless he and the rest of the
Council, with the cooperation of the House of Burgesses, committed
large-scale military forces and financial funds to the distressed
provinces south of Virginia. 24
While participation in regional violence suggests colonial
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integration and incipient Negro unrest suggests social violence during
the pre-1720 period, piracy continued sweeping North America after the
1713 conclusion of the War of Spanish Succession.

During the war it

self, Virginia had had repeated warnings of foreign pirate or privateer
incursions, but following 1700 none of those threats had actually mater
ialized.

When the war ended, however, English and foreign privateers

eagerly converted to outright piracy, ranging colonial waters in quest
of prey.

Although pirates and privateers were officially tolerated,

sometimes welcomed, in most colonies prior to 1713, Virginia was an
exception.

Her government had refused to sanction pirates, whether

English or foreign, hanging or sending to England for trial those
caught.25
On July 3, 1716, Governor Spotswood wrote the Board of Trade
warning it that New Providence Island in the West Indies had become a
notorious nest of pirates.

He commented that the pirates infesting

those waters posed a clear threat to the trade of Virginia and other
English colonies in North America.

The pirate nest was international

and cosmopolitan in makeup, comprising not only Europeans from all sea
faring nations, but American Indians, Negroes, North Africans, and even
some Asians.

Among the clearest threats, however, were those priva

teering Englishmen who had gone "a pirating" after 1713, for they knew
well the waters of the North American mainland coasts and had many con
tacts upon whom they could rely for aid.

Spotswood mentioned in his

letter that several months previously a man named Forbes and three com
panions had entered the colony boasting of their piratical exploits in
Spanish Florida.^
Nine months later Spotswood addressed a letter to the Board of Trade

informed it that pirates were lying off the Virginia Gapes and that
they had seized several English merchantmen.

He asked that English

warships be dispatched to Virginia, for merchant ships were too weak
to resist the pirates.
place,

By 1718 pirate raids and trials were common

On May 12 Captain Richard Smith, master of the sloop Anne of

Maryland, complained to the Council that Richard Tucker, Edward Wells,
John Jackson, James Carr, Barthena Leeds, Edward Lee, and Peter Oliver
had "inveigled away" Edward Linibry, the Anne's mate, and had threatened
to seize his ship.

The Council issued orders to capture the seven if

they still remained in the colony. ^

Pirates already knew Virginia's

government as one of their most powerful institutional enemies, and,
by 1719, Spotswood feared pirates' revenge, not only on Virginia, but
on his person, for he was one of their most powerful and intransigent
nQ

enemies.
Spotswood*s animus toward pirates appeared most transparently in
1718 when he ordered the trial of William Howard and the attack on
Blackbeard.

Howard, former quartermaster for Edward Teach, Blackbeard,

came to Virginia after subscribing to the King's royal pardon of
January 1718.

During his stay in the colony, however, it appeared

to Spotswood and the Council that he intended to raise a new pirate
crew and "go on account."

Spotswood was determined to try Howard, but

his political enemies, including John Holloway, a judge of the local
vice admiralty court and a future mayor of Williamsburg, succeeded in
thwarting Howard's execution.

At his trial, however, the colony proved

he had participated in plundering twelve English vessels since the
closing date of the King's pardon, January 5, 1718.

Yet, before his

execution, word of an extension of the royal pardon until August 18
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reached the colony and Holloway and others of Spotswood's political
enemies quickly informed Howard, who of course took advantage of it.
Howard was ordered by the government, however, to ship out on board HMS
Lyme, Captain Ellis Brand, as a common seaman.

29

Howard's trial also proved conclusively that Teach and his men
were by no means abiding by the royal pardon, but rather "like Dogs to
9A

their Vomits they have returned to their old detestable way of living."-3
Spotswood and Captain Brand kept spies in North Carolina watching Teach
and his crews, and the two men began planning a furtive attack upon
that nest of pirates.

Teach and his men could operate with impunity in

North Carolina waters because, as with Howard and Holloway in Virginia,
Teach had forged an alliance with North Carolina Governor Eden and
Secretary Tobias Knight.^
In November 1718, Spotswood requested from the Assembly funds for
the planned expedition, justifying the attack because Teach intended to
revenge pirates for the many executions in Virginia.

The House of

Burgesses consented to the bill and on November 24 Spotswood signed it.
Within two and one-half months following that legislative action,
Spotswood and Brand had destroyed Teach and his pirate nest. c

The

crushing of those pirate crews removed a major threat to the trade of
Virginia, and, at the same time, dealt a severe psychological blow to
pirates all along the Atlantic coast of North America.

Teach was one

of the most feared, insolent, and powerful pirate leaders in his day.
His death and the destruction of the nest not only removed a direct
threat to trade but also eliminated a powerful influence on behalf of
the pirates.
In 1718, other trials were held, these for participation in a
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raid on the merchant ship Providence in September.

Three members of

Charles Vane's crew--Henry Mann, William Stoke, and Aure Van Pelt-were caught and tried in the colony but were reprieved, for they
claimed the King's pardon.

Vane, a pirate ranging South Carolina

waters, was almost as notorious as Teach and had spawned almost as many
crews as had the infamous Blackbeard.33

When caught, they apparently

were bound in the Providence for Charleston, South Carolina, where they
wished to claim the King's mercy.

Not until just before their execu

tion was this fact discovered in Virginia, and the pirates were then
reprieved and placed on board an under-manned royal naval guardship in
the Chesapeake.
By 1720 the gravest threats to Virginia's waters had pretty well
passed, although pirates still left on the high seas were becoming even
more desperate and cruel in their depredations.

Their numbers dwin

dling rapidly, those still "on the account" attempted to gain revenge
for their fallen comrades.

But vigilance in Virginia and circumstances

on the high seas prevented major attacks on Virginia shipping until the
mid-1720s, when renewed threats appeared from the West Indies.

By 1727,

however, piracy had almost disappeared from Virginia's waters.3^

Thus,

Virginia's trade after 1720 was largely secure from marauding pirates,
but internal security and stability withered somewhat as the Negro
population's restiveness increased and as lower-class whites began a
series of violent episodes protesting tobacco policy.

■
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NOTES
SLAVERY AND PIRACY:

VIOLENCE IN THE

EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY:

1705-1720

1-The slave codification is found in Hening, ed., Statutes-at-Large.
III (1684-1710), 447-462, especially 447-448, 451, 456-462. Slaves are
defined as chattel on pages 333-335 of that codification. Jordan, White
Over Black, Chap. 1, describes the conceptions Englishmen had of Negroes
by 1700. The correlation between acculturation and resistance to slavery
by Negroes is explored by Gerald W. Mullin, Flight and Rebellion: Slave
Resistance in Eighteenth-Century Virginia (New York, 1972).
2According to estimates of the tithable population in the 1690s,
there were probably six thousand Negroes in the colony by 1700. By 1705
that number had most likely swelled to nine thousand. Greene and Har
rington, American Population, 137-139. The shift in the character of the
slave trade is detailed in Elizabeth Suttell, "The British Slave Trade to
Virginia, 1698-1728," unpublished M.A. thesis, College of William and
Mary, 1965), Chapter 2. "Separate" traders were those who did not belong
to the Royal African Company.
^See Chap. IV, pp. 127-129, for the convicts.
^Legalization of slavery in 1662 in Virginia complemented the piece
meal process of enslavement begun with common law decisions, but con
tinued through legislation into the eighteenth century. Before the
decision to legalize slavery, the courts had sentenced blacks to service
for life rather than specific periods of time as they did for whites,
asserted the immorality of sexual intercourse between whites and blacks,
and ordered more severe punishments for blacks than whites. Minutes of
the Council and General Court, 467, 479; Hening, ed., Statutes-at-Large,
I (1619-1660), 146; "Virginia Council and General Court Records," VMHB.
V (1898-1899), 238. In 1705 Virginia drafted a slave code as part of a
general codification of the laws. The slave code legalized a slave’s
murder if done while correcting him, banned marriages between blacks and
whites, and continued the definition of certain classes of "outlying"
slaves as outlaws. Hening, ed., Statutes-at-Large. Ill (1682-1710),
455-462. Mullin, Flight and Rebellion, concentrates attention on the
years 1735-1801, overlooking much of the racial violence which occurred
prior to 1735.
-’EJC, I (1680-1699), 86-87.

Vague hints of plots appeared In
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1694 and 1703.

Ibid.t 317; II (1699-1705), 311-312.

^Ibid., 523; Lyon G. Tyler, ed., "Punishment for a Negro Rebel,"
W M Q , 1st Ser., X (1901-1902), 177-178.
^Hening, ed., Statutes-at-Large, III (1684-1710), 102-103; JHB,
1659/60-1693. 396, 397, 399, 401, 404, 472, 476.
®0yer and Terminer courts were special criminal courts summoned by
writs issued by the Governor and the Council. The requests for writs
came from Warwick and New Kent County courts in 1694.
In both instances
the Council rejected the requests, encouraging the county courts, how
ever, to punish the accused Negroes for whatever they had done. EJC.
I (1680-1699), 309, 310.
9JHB, 1695/6-1703, 278, 287, 322, 384, 388. The next year Tullett
petitioned the Assembly for the 4,000 lbs. of tobacco provided by the
law for an outlaw's execution and the legislature granted him his
request.
*-9For the petitions, see LJC, I (1680-1714), 334, for Lownd's
petitions. His Negro male's rape of a white woman is one of the few
recorded instances of such occurrence in Virginia prior to 1755. For
Bressie's and Armistead's petitions, see JHB, 1695/6-1706, 351, and
EJ C , II (1699-1705), 305. Regarding free Negroes, such laws as the 1691
legislation banning inter-marriage applied to free Negroes as much as
to slaves.
U p o r general considerations of the African slave trade, see Philip
D. Curtin, The African Slave Trade: A Census (Madison, Wisconsin,
1964); Basil Davidson, Black Mother: The Years of the African Slave
Trade (Boston, 1961); and Daniel P. Mannix in collaboration with
Malcolm Cowley, Black Cargoes: A History of the African Slave Trade
(New York, 1962). For considerations of Africans' reactions in Virginia,
see Mullin, Flight and Rebellion. 34-38.
12EJC, III (1705-1721), 118.
13Ibid., 128.
14creene and Harrington, American Population. 139.
15e j c , h i (1705-1721), 234-235, 236, 242-243, 246; LJC, I (16801714), 492-493; JHB, 1702/3-1712, 270, 276; Hening, ed., Statutes-atLarge, III (1684-1710), 537-538; CSPC. 1710-1711, 83, 113-115; Colonel
Edmund Jenings to the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations,
April 24, 1710, C05/1363, 189-191, Reel M-229, VCRMP, CWRL.
^ F o r the o^5 head tax, see JHB, 1702/3-1712, 271, 273, 276, 281,
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286-287, 290, 298; Hening, ed,, Statutes-at-Large, III (1684-1710),
482; Waverly K. Winfree, compiler, The Laws of Virginia: Being a
Supplement to Henings1 The Statutes At Large, 1700-1750 (Richmond,
Virginia, 1971), 50. For analysis of the role the slave duty played
in the economy and society of colonial Virginia, see Suttell, ,rBritish
Slave Trade to Virginia,,f 32-34; Darold D. Wax, "Negro Import Duties
in Colonial Virginia: A Study of British Commercial Policy and Local
Public Policy,1' VMHB, Vol. 79 (1971), 29-45. Wax points to four reasons
Virginians enacted such a high import duty: raise revenue, keep blacks
out for fear of new insurrections, slow the import of slaves to allow
time for the colony's credit to recover, and raise money to aid the
Carolinas in turmoil and Indian wars. Thus, the fear of insurrection
was part of the calculations which entered the Assembly's conclusion to
enact a duty which appeared on paper to be prohibitive. Actually, it
just slowed the rate of import.
i

17&JC, III (1705-1721), 264. Spotswood arrived in Virginia that
fall to assume his duties. Note that the Council had handled the 1710
plot, giving more reassurance to Virginians of their abilities not only
to govern themselves, but to shape their society.
I

19Ibid., 442.
20EJC, II (1715-1754), 618; JHB, 1712-1726, 342.
21EJC, III (1705-1721), 549-550; Mullin, Flight and Rebellion.
42-44.
22por analysis of the improved economic position of whites in the
early eighteenth century, see Morgan, American Slavery, American Free
dom, Chap. 15. Negroes were imported into Virginia in great numbers
during the first three decades of the eighteenth century. They came
largely from Africa, although Barbados supplied, at certain times,
great numbers also. During the eight years of the 3^5 duty per head
(1710-1718), traders brought Negroes from Africa and Barbados about
equally, that is, 1907 from Africa and 2185 from Barbados.
In other
periods for which records survive for both Africa and Barbados, however,
African imports outnumbered Barbadian imports by at least ten to one.
Between 1699 and 1708, 6371 Africans were imported and 236 Barbadians.
Between 1727 and 1755, 25409 Africans and 2404 Barbadians were imported.
The masters of the seventeenth century had frequently preferred West
Indian slaves, believing that they were already "seasoned" and could
withstand the rigors of work and climate in Virginia. The figures for
total imports were compiled from the naval officers' returns printed
in Elizabeth Donnan, ed., Documents Illustrative of the History of the
Slave Trade to America (4 volumes, Washington, D. C., 1930-1935), IV
(1935), 175-224.
2^For the Hyde-Cary civil war in North Carolina, see EJC, III
(1705-1721), 277, 279-283; Alexander Spotswood, The Official Letters of
Alexander Spotswood, ed. by R. A. Brock (2 vols., Richmond, Virginia,
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1882), I, 81-86, 91-95, 100-102, 105-106. For the Tuscarora War, see
Hugh T. Lefler and Albert Ray Newsome, North Carolina: The History of
a Southern State (revised edition, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1963),
57; Spotswood, Letters, ed., Brock, I, 115-120, 146-150, 169-172, II,
2-4; EJC, III (1705-1721), 284-287, 291-304, 310-311, 315, 320, 329,
331-332, 324, 347, 483. For the Yamassee War, see Spotswood, Letters,
ed., Brock, II, 112, 118, 119, 127-128, 135-136, 141, 240; Governor
Alexander Spotswood to the Board of Trade, June 4, 1715, C05/1364,
345-346, Reel M-229, VCEMP, CWRL. A great deal of other Indian violence
accompanied these two wars, most of which appeared in Virginia sources,
but was of peripheral importance to violence in the colony. Spotswood's
imperial view is explained in Leonidas Dodson, Alexander Spotswood:
Governor of Colonial Virginia, 1710-1722 (Philadelphia, 1932), Waverly
K. Winfree, The Laws of Virginia: Being a Supplement to Hening1s The
Statutes At Large, 1700-1750 (Richmond, Virginia, 1971), 50.
^There is documentation of Tuscarora plans to enlist Nottoway and
Meherrin Indians, two Iroquois-speaking peoples living south of the
James and who had not been much bothered by whites until the early
eighteenth century. But as settlement was inaugurated in the Southside,
the two Indian nations came under pressure for their lands and the
Tuscaroras were evidently playing on those fears. However, neither the
Meherrin nor the Nottoway peoples accepted the Tuscarora proposals.
See EJC. Ill (1705-1721), 296-297, 303-304. Less direct connections
can be made between the Yamassee and Virginia Indians, but rumors that
the Yamassees were seeking allies in Virginia reached Governor Spots
wood, who passed them on to the Board of Trade. Spotswood to Board of
Trade, June 4, 1715, C05/1364, 345-346, Reel M-229, VCRMP, CWRL.
25see Chapter VI, pp. 202-203, for Governor Nicholson's handling
of pirates.
2^Spotswood, Letters, ed. Brock, II, 170-171, EJC III (1705-1721),
443-444.
27Spotswood, Letters, ed. Brock, II, 249-250; EJC, III (17051721), 469.
28ibid., 481-482; Rankin, Golden Age of Piracy, 118, 128-129, 132,
133, 135, 136-137, 138. In 1718 the Council received word from North
Carolina that two pirate vessels had run aground on the Outer Banks.
The two crews had surrendered to North Carolina's government, receiving
certificates of pardon in return. Spotswood, fearing that members of
those crews might come to Virginia, asked the Council to prepare a
proclamation requiring any of those pirates who came to Virginia to
surrender their arms and to travel in groups no larger than three.
Spotswood may also have feared some personal attack upon himself if
those crews arrived in Virginia.
2^The phrase "go on account" was a euphemism for pirating.

The
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trial of Howard and its implications for Virginia's official position
on pirates is in Rankin, Golden Age of Piracy, 116, 117-118; EJC, III
(1705-1721), 484, 490.
^Rankin, Golden Age of Piracy, 118,
3lThe general point that pirates could not have operated in North
America without the aid of many prominent merchants and officials is
the central theme of Rankin's Golden Age of Piracy. Not all colonials
worked with the pirate crews, and, as the commerce raiders became more
voracious and insolent, fewer colonials were willing to put up with
them. By 1718, for instance, Virginia's "Trading People" along with
many other prominent citizens had sickened of the pirates in their midst
and requested their removal by the government. More importantly, close
parallels exist between the pirate-general society ties and many other
types of violent behavior within a society. For instance, tobaccocutters in 1682 operated with the aid of prominent members of the gen
eral society. M o d e m guerillas carrying on warfare against an "aggres
sor" power can do so only with the toleration and aid of the people on
behalf of whom they are fighting. Vigilante movements in nineteenthcentury America existed because society tolerated, accepted, and some
times even encouraged them. Finally, what amounted to an outlaw gang
developed in Virginia several decades after these pirate incursions,
but it functioned with the toleration of prominent and important parts
of Virginia's society. The examples of such connections are so many
and so varied that they almost suggest a general law of violence; that
is, mass outlaw violence can exist only where a society or even just
controlling groups within a society condone it. This point is made in
E. J. Hobsbawm, Social Bandits and Primitive Rebels; Studies in
Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Glen
coe, 111., 1959).
^^The royal government had not furnished Captain Brand, the com
mander of a guardship stationed in the Chesapeake, with supplies for
such a mission.
Spotswood was so concerned about Teach1s crews that
he used his own monies to procure not only the supplies but the small
ships necessary to work the coastal waters of North Carolina. The
governor rented two sloops, fitted them out, and hired two pilots
familiar with North Carolina's Outer Banks to direct the ships. On
November 22, 1718, the sloops caught Teach near Ocracoke Inlet in the
Outer Banks. After a hard, but brief, fight, Teach*s two sloops were
destroyed and the surviving members of his crew captured. Teach and
nine of his crewmen died while twelve of the attackers were killed.
The pirates who surrendered, Including six Negroes, were brought to
Williamsburg, were tried, and were executed. JHB. 1712-1726. 223-225;
Winfree, comp., The Laws of Virginia . . . Supplement. 175-177; Rankin,
Golden Age of Piracy. 115, 118-127; Spotswood, Letters, ed. Brock, II,
273-274; EJC. Ill (1705-1721), 495-496, for the trials of six Negroes
belonging to Teach's crew.
33e j C , III (1705-1721), 495-497. For other trials and acts of
piracy, see ibid., 501, 522, 523; Spotswood, Letters, ed. Brock, II,
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321, 337-338.
■^Hugh Drysdale to the Board of Trade, July 10, 1724, C05/1319,
ff 208-211, Reel M-240, VCBMP, CWRL; EJC, IV (1721-1736), 144-149;
Robert Carter, President of the Council, to the Board of Trade, 1727,
C05/1321, ff 2-4, Reel M-241, VCRMP, CWRL.

CHAPTER

VIII

SLAVERY, TOBACCO POLICY, AND VIOLENCE, 1720-1735

Between 1720 and 1735 the threat of violence implicit in the major
racial changes taking place in Virginia earlier became explicit.

The

tension within white society dissipated with the exception of discontnet
over tobacco policy, but anxieties and fears of black insurrectionary
activity increased as the black population grew.

Following the demise

of the ^ 5 duty on slaves in 1718, there were no subsequent duty laws
until 1732, although the assembly enacted laws in 1723 and 1728 which
were disallowed by the Crown.

There apparently is a tie between tobac

co policy and slave rebelliousness in the colony during the 1720s, a
connection difficult to establish and tenuous at best.

As tobacco

prices moderated after 1720, the number of slave imports from Africa
rose dramatically and their reaction to their new status suggests not
a demoralized people but one rebellious, discontented, and occasionally
contemptuous of their masters.
By no means was Virginia society of the 1720s and early 1730s as
violent or disorderly as during the late seventeenth century, but ugly
undertones of racism and class unrest did exist.

By 1735, however,

class and racial unrest had quieted considerably and the possibility of
a repeat of the late seventeenth century had ended.

After 1735 econ

omic conditions enabled most whites to make a life of comfort for them
selves with a minimum of labor. ^

To a large degree that prosperity was

a function not only of tobacco prices, but to agricultural diversifi238
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cation through the introduction of general grain crops and some differ
ent commercial crops such as hemp.
To control their slaves, Virginians fashioned instruments and
means during the 1720s which essentially completed the policing aspects
of slave policy.

The uses of militia patrols to detect or to prevent

mass slave meetings and the application of entirely different standards
of punishment against slave malefactors helped perfect the methods of
control.

Moreover, by 1736 many white males could participate in the

political organization of the colonial government.

Property qualifi

cations for the franchise had been introduced in the 1670 franchise law
and were retained in the 1736 revision, but its provisions, designed in
England to be restrictive, were in Virginia quite liberal.

It is diffi

cult to estimate the number of free, white males over the age of twentyone who could vote according to the 1736 law, but perhaps seventy-five
to eighty-five percent could vote.^

Furthermore, a liberal interpre

tation of that franchise frequently allowed those technically deprived
of the vote the opportunity to do so.

Thus, by 1735, systems of slave

control and liberalization of political and economic opportunity had
stifled the undercurrents of social unrest evident in the 1720s and
early 1730s.^
The Negro restiveness prior to 1720 blossomed into significant
)
turbulence and unrest during the fifteen years following that date.
Slave plots, a major riot, and a high level of criminality indicate
great discontent within the black population of the colony.

Whites

became increasingly apprehensive of that population as the decade
passed.

The black population swelled rapidly during the decade be

cause the duty on slaves had been dropped and, more importantly, the
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price of tobacco rose increasing the demand for new slaves.

Although

tobacco prices fluctuated somewhat during the 1720s, they did not drop
so low as to discourage a high level of imports.

The rebelliousness,

expressed in a number of ways, of Negroes in the colony suggests that
new arrivals quickly acculturated, requiring only a few years to learn
enough of white society to rebel against it or, at least, to resist
slavery.^
Slaves resisted their masters in a variety of ways:

work slow

downs, running-off and becoming outlaws, assaulting their masters or
overseers, fleeing in numbers to establish their own colonies, or
plotting insurrections.

It is possible to measure the level of accul

turation of slaves by analyzing the means by which they resisted slav
ery; some attempted methods described as self-destructive, others tried
to destroy the institution or its agents.'*

The years between 1690 and

1730 mark an era of slavery in Virginia in which Negroes sought means
to circumvent their masters while whites endeavored to close off oppor
tunities for slave resistance.

Only with 1735 did the unrest which

characterized relations between blacks and whites quiet.
Between 1710 and 1720 the total black and white population of Vir
ginia rose by an estimated nine thousand and five hundred, of which
roughly three thousand and four hundred were Negroes.**

Slave imports

totaled about four thousand and eight hundred in that same decade.

Be

tween 1720 and 1730 Virginia's population reportedly increased at least
twenty-six thousand and five hundred, of which approximately three
thousand and five hundred were Negroes.^

These figures do not appear

to correlate, for between 1718 and 1727 at least eleven thousand slaves
were imported and sold in Virginia and between 1727 and 1732 another
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two thousand slaves were brought in.®

Unless some catastrophic disease

killed many thousand slaves, leaving whites relatively untouched, the
black population must have risen more than the eleven thousand, for
measuring black population increase against slave imports for every
decade surrounding the 1720s shows a population increase greater than
the number of slave imports.

Moreover, no mention of an epidemic

affecting slaves appeared in sources, thus the estimate of the number
of blacks inhabiting Virginia in 1730 appears far below what the figure
ought to be, perhaps forty thousand would be a more accurate estimate.
The effect of the rapid growth of black population in the colony is
difficult to assess, but the instability represented by that increase
suggests that violence between slaves and masters became inevitable.
When Major Hugh Drysdale arrived in Virginia in the fall of 1722 to
replace the recently-dismissed Alexander Spotswood, he was confronted
immediately with a Negro Insurrectionary plot in Gloucester and Middle
sex Counties.

There is probably no correlation, but of the five naval

districts of Virginia, York River district (adjacent to Gloucester and
Middlesex Counties) received the most slaves by a factor of three to
two over all other naval districts combined, this in the years 17101718.9

But between 1718 and 1727, slaves brought into York River

district outnumbered other districts combined by almost four to one.
Certainly not all those slaves were sold In the immediate vicinity of
York River District (some were reshipped elsewhere for sale in the
colony and others were bought for transport to other regions of Vir
ginia) , but the bulk of the almost eleven thousand slaves imported for
sale in the York River district probably were sold locally.

Moreover,

almost nine thousand of those slaves were brought directly from Africa.
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The African character of the slaves may not have had a significant im
pact on the threat of violence in the Gloucester-Middlesex conspiracy,
but the fact that over six thousand African slaves were brought into
Virginia in the decade before the 1710 James City-Surry County con
spiracy and the African character of the pre-1722 immigration suggests
some connection."^
The description of the 1722 conspiracy fits the general pattern
of slave insurrection plots for the years 1687-1730, that is, the blacks
intended to rise against their own masters, and kill them, then attack
other whites, and conclude by possessing "themselves of the Country."

11

Drysdale suggests a number of conclusions about this conspiracy in his
expression of black intent.

First, he implies that whites suspected

their slaves of intending to overthrow the white-dominated social struc
ture, reversing it in fact, making whites the slaves.

This may say more

about white fears than black intentions, but since similar allegations
were made in the 1710 conspiracy and would be made in the 1729-1730
unrest and disturbances, the whites may have had some grounds upon which
to rest their fears.

Second, one infers from Drysdale's comments upon

the situation in 1722 that the blacks had a rather well-thought-out plan
for their conspiracy.

Whether the blacks leading the plot were native-

born Africans or already-acculturated slaves either b o m in Virginia or
bought from some other English plantation is not known, but if the York
River district supplied the bulk of fresh slaves for Gloucester and
Middlesex Counties, the slave leaders may have been West Indian, for
between 1710 and 1718 about an equal number of African and West Indian
slaves were imported into the York River district.^
The aftermath of the plot also suggests that whites believed that
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the blacks were actually conspiring.

Drysdale surmised that, because

blacks could not testify in court, the ringleaders would be transported
to the West Indies to be sold, with appropriate compensation to their
owners.

At the spring 1723 session of the Assembly, the blacks were

ordered transported and sold, but the Assembly went further by depriving
free blacks of the franchise, for several free blacks allegedly inspired
and encouraged the conspiracy.

Moreover, the Assembly restored, on a

limited basis, the right of Negroes to testify in court, providing that
they could give testimony only if against other Negroes.^
The law enacted providing for transportation of the plot's ring
leaders to the West Indies included eight blacks.
the principal ringleaders:

These slaves were

Dick, belonging to Mathew Kemp; Tom (alias

Bambeo Tom), belonging to Thomas Smith; Sanco, Isaac, and Jeffrey,
slaves of Armisted Churchill; Robin, belonging to John Rhodes; Sam,
belonging to Elizabeth Burwell; and Sam, a slave of Elizabeth Robinson.
Moreover, the law provided that the slaves could never return to Vir
ginia under penalty of death.

Colonial officials once again used trans

portation as a method of removing alleged wrongdoers from the colony.
In this fashion the legislature tried to close opportunities for re
bellious blacks, whether slave or free, to mount rebellion against the
white society.
If these measures, plus all other regulations and punishments
designed to keep Negroes quiescent, were at all successful in suppres
sing black unrest, they were such only for a short period of time.
Negro criminality in the 1720s revealed a heightened level of Negro
unrest.

Moreover, Increased Negro criminality reflects not only the

appreciable rise in Negro population, but that the blacks were accul-
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turating.

However, until the founding of the Virginia Gazette in 1736,

criminality occurring in the colony can be found in sources which do
not reveal the full extent of illegal behavior.

For instance, Negroes

convicted of crimes for which they were executed or lost their lives in
showed up in petitions to the House of Burgesses as
requests for compensation.

But materials revealing the nature and

method of trial of Negroes or any other criminals have largely been
lost.
Among petitions submitted in the 1720s that of Baldwin Matthews in
1726 suggests the extent of Negro awareness of wealth and goods and one
method of resistance to slavery.

On May 18 Matthews asked compensation

from the public treasury in the sum of the evaluated worth of a slave
of his.

The slave, jailed on charges of burglary and felony, had died

before he could be tried.

The House referred the petition to the Com-

mittee of Public Claims, which approved the request.

15

Considering the

nature of public jails during the early eighteenth century, the slave's
death before his trial was not an unusual circumstance, thus the approv
al of the request.
In similar circumstances the government likewise compensated
masters for slaves killed.

For instance, Hannah, a slave belonging to

George Walker of Elizabeth City County, had been convicted of firstdegree murder and sentenced to death.

The trial court had set the date

for her hanging, but the county sheriff had died the day before her
scheduled execution.

The Council instructed its president, Robert

Carter, to sign Hannah's death warrant and to forward an evaluation of
her worth to the Assembly so that it might provide compensation to her
master.^

In other instances, whites petitioned for and received rewards
for capturing escaped slaves wanted for crimes.

These petitions dem

onstrate that few Negroes tried to escape from the colony after com
mitting violence in defiance of their master or some other white.
Henry Embry, William Wynne, and Richard Burch submitted such a docu
ment to the House of Burgesses in 1728.

The petition, submitted

Thursday, February 8, claimed that they had been at great personal
expense to recapture two Negroes accused of murdering their master,
Henry Maynard.

The blacks had murdered their master as an act of de

fiance and then fled the colony to escape slavery.
captured and jailed, but they had escaped.

The blacks had been

They fled for another col

ony, but the three petitioners had caught them and returned them for
trial.

The House referred the petition to the Committee of Public

Claims which accepted the request and incorporated it into that year's
budget.^
In a similar situation in 1730 John Grimes petitioned the House
for pensions for the widows and children of Jacob Rice and Christopher
Chaffin.

Two of Grimes' Negroes had murdered the two whites when the

whites had gone to Maryland to return the blacks to Virginia.

The

blacks had escaped from their bondage to Grimes, and some Maryland
citizens had captured them.

Grimes had commissioned Chaffin and Rice

to bring the slaves from Maryland.

On the way back the Negroes had

disarmed the whites and had murdered them.

Upon receiving word of the

murders, Grimes himself had gone to Maryland to bring his slaves to
justice.

His petition requested not only pensions for the relicts and

orphans of Chaffin and Rice, but compensation for his slaves and ex
penses in returning the Negroes.^®
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In the meantime, a group of fifteen slaves ran away from their
plantation,

a new one locatedat the head of the James River.

They

had planned

their flight very carefully, stealing many tools, weapons,

provisions,

bedding, clothing, and seeds with them.

Governor Gooch

wrote the Board of Trade that the slaves had intended to found their
own plantation in the mountains well beyond the limit of white settle
ment.

Their master and a posse pursued and caught them at the site of

their plantation where construction of several cabins had begun and
land clearing for planting had been inaugurated.

They may have been

newly-arrived Africans which would explain their running off in the
group.

The event, occurring in the spring of 1729, provides further

evidence of Negroes' belief that they could establish settlements
approximating Maroon settlements in the West Indies or those of the
Cimarrons in Central America.^

The posse catching the blacks helped

discourage a pattern for escaped slaves in Virginia.
The level of unrest of Negroes as measured by incidents such as
running off to establish independent settlements or stealing goods from
their masters had risen to high levels by the last five years of the
1720s.

Although whites seldom aided Negroes in their attempts at re

sisting slavery, one such Incident did occur in 1729, suggesting that
the racist nature of black-white relations had not fully hardened.
On April 19, 1729, charges that Christopher Brooke and Elizabeth
Whiting had conspired to prevent trial of Negroes who had broken into
Brooke's storehouse were presented to the Council.

Brooke, master of

the Cambridge of London, had his storehouse in Gloucester County, and
the slaves belonged to the Whiting woman.

The report alleged that

Brooke and Whiting had suppressed the incident in order to protect the
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slaves from trial and execution.

Their loss meant deprivation of

property for the Whiting woman, a loss she might not have been able to
sustain.

An explanation might be that she and Brooke were romantically

tied to each other and he agreed not to prosecute on grounds of his
affection for her.

Whatever the explanation for their behavior, they

still faced prosecution, for the Council ordered that not only should
the Negroes be tried, but charges be prepared against Brooke "that
others may be deterred from the like practices for the f u t u r e , T h e
colony was agitated in those years and slaves' resistance to white
domination lay at the heart of much of that agitation.
not accept the Brooke-Whiting explanation.

The Council did

The prospect of two whites

protecting Negro criminals in those years must have seriously alarmed
the Council.
Peak Negro restiveness occurred in the years 1729-1730, with major
incidents of Negro violence threatening to erupt.

Negroes were dis

orderly all over the colony, with the highest level of unrest being the
Northern Neck and the southeastern regions, areas already experiencing
considerable discontent from other lower-class white restiveness.

Al

though historians might minimize the rebelliousness of Negroes, the fact
that it existed and expressed itself in numerous violent means suggests
that slaves threatened whites in a manner masters could ill afford to
o v e r l o o k . 22

Although slavery allowed whites to increase significantly

their profits from tobacco growing, that institution was not without its
costs in terms of violence and disorder in Virginia.

Slaves were unable

to destroy completely the society, but then the freemen and servants who
comprised Bacon's followers in 1676-1677 were unable to subvert the society which was so clearly victimizing them.
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Virginians by 1725 had clearly come to regard Negroes as inferior
to themselves and were not hesitant about expressing their beliefs.
Hugh Jones, visiting Virginia in the 1720s, wrote a tract about the
colony in which he described Negroes and their role in the society.
Although his view does not suggest the blatant racism of other commen
tators in the colony, his analysis of blacks is characteristic of Vir
ginians:

"and when they are free, they know not how to provide so well

for themselves generally; neither did they live so plentifully nor
(many of them) so easily in their own country, where they are made
slaves by one another, or taken captives by their enemies."

Doubtless

Jones was unaware of the suppression and exploitation of white laborers
and even freemen in seventeenth-century Virginia, for they did not
"live so plentifully nor so easily" during that century. ^
In 1729 and 1730 slave unrest reached a height to which it would
not return until 1800. J

During the decade Negroes were becoming in

creasingly insolent and they refused to perform their assigned tasks.
Repeatedly, imprisoned black criminals expressed their contempt for
whites.

Governor Drysdale wrote to the Board of Trade in 1723 that

Negroes accused of fomenting the 1722 insurrection responded "insolently"
when interrogated about their role In the plot.

26

During the rest of

the decade Negro "insolence" and recalcitrance increased until in 1729,
the Governor and Council felt it necessary to pardon Andrew Bourne for
the murder of a Negro slave.
In early 1729 a Court of Oyer and Terminer had found Andrew Bourne
guilty of murdering a slave.

Bourne, the slave's overseer, had whipped

the black to death for repeatedly running away.

At his trial Bourne
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defended himself with the plea that he had not meant to kill the slave,
just correct him so severely that he would stop running off.

He appeal

ed his conviction to the Council which decided to recommend pardon, not
on the merits of his appeal, but out of fear of the results his execution
would produce.

In a letter to the Board of Trade, Governor Gooch said

that to execute the man would heighten already existing contempt Negroes
had for whites.

Gooch emphasized that to punish him for killing the

Negro would raise Negro restiveness even more and encourage black con
tempt and insolence.27
While the Bourne trial and appeal was proceeding, the Council re
ceived a report confirming the high level of Negro restiveness.

William

Harrison, a justice of the peace for Prince George County, reported to
the Council in early 1729 that an unidentified group of Negroes had
burned one of his tobacco b a m s to the ground, destroying not only the
b a m but its contents.

A year later he petitioned the Assembly for

recovery of the losses.

The Negroes had burned the b a m to retaliate

for his having dispersed a band of illegally gathered slaves the night
prior.

He had lost approximately six thousand pounds of tobacco in the

fire.28
While the level of unrest in the colony was heightened by contin
ued importation of Negroes directly from Africa's slave coasts, treat
ment and care for Negroes in the colony also played a significant role in
determining unrest.

William Byrd of Westover wrote the Earl of Egremont

in 1736 expressing his fear that slaves would eventually erupt into a
massive insurrection.

He realized that slavery harmed both slaves and

masters and he wished that Parliament would "put an end to this un
christian traffic, of making merchandise of our fellow creatures.2^
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Parliament did not consider ending slavery in Virginia, because Virgin
ians never made an effort to shift their reliance on slavery to some
other labor system.
Attempts by Virginians to slow or halt slave importations did
little to lessen Negro restiveness.

In 1730 two distinct major con

spiracies occurred marking the high tide of Negro rebelliousness for
the next seventy years in the colony.

Taken in conjunction with white

lower-class restiveness and growing smallholder resistance to tobacco
policy, the rebellions demonstrate that unrest and discontent had re
turned to Virginia.
The two plots happened almost simultaneously.

When Alexander

Spotswood left the governorship in 1722, he elected to remain in the
colony.

Later in the 1720s he returned to England to settle some per

sonal business, coming back to Virginia in early 1730.

When Spotswood

returned he supposedly brought with him a copy of a royal proclamation
which freed all slaves who converted to Christianity.

But when the

summer of 1730 passed and the colonial government did not issue such a
document, slaves became restive.

Slaves were convinced that Spotswood

had brought the document with him and word via the slaves' "grape
vine" quickly spread that the prominent planters and officials in the
colony had suppressed the document.
colony in small and large groups.

Negroes roamed at will through the
Although the blacks committed no

violence during their restlessness, the colonial government issued
emergency orders to suppress the blacks.

Governor Gooch instructed the

militia to prevent Negroes from meeting.

When Negroes remained dis

orderly, the Governor instructed the county militias to whip Negroes
who appeared most prominent in leading the restiveness.

Suppression of
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the Negroes continued during the summer to prevent spontaneous re
bellion from occurring.

If the royal proclamation was ever issued, no

evidence has been found of such issuance in England or in any of the
colonies.88

The extent of Negro knowledge of the alleged document

indicates that by 1730 blacks had fabricated a widespread and extensive
system of communication, a system suggesting that Negroes quickly acculturated in an institution ostensibly removing all opportunity for per
sonal and cultural expression.

Moreover, the extent of Negro communi

cations is a clue to the extent of white control of slaves.

Although

Virginians ; -.sessed theoretically absolute power over their blacks,
they could riot^control their slaves to prevent blatant disruption of
their chores and duties on the plantations.
Scarcely had this disturbance quieted when slaves in Princess Anne
and Norfolk Counties plotted an insurrection.

Six weeks had passed

since the last of the Negroes had been suppressed for their disturbances
when the planning in those southeastern counties began.

On a Sunday in

September, roughly two hundred Negroes were observed gathered while
their masters were attending church.

A militia patrol was immediately

summoned and it arrested four ringleaders who were transported to
Williamsburg to be tried.

They were hanged and others severely whipped

for their participation in the attempted insurrection.8^At this point, the colonial government questioned the role Dr.
Bray's Associates, a division of the Society for the Propagation of the
Gospel in Foreign Parts charged with the responsibility for converting
Negro slaves to Anglican Christianity, played in the uprisings in 1729
and 1730.
discontent.

Virginia believed that Dr. Bray's Associates had fomented the
However, the association denied emphatically any responsi
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bility for the uprisings, asserting that in neither Virginia nor Ja
maica had it done anything but attempt the conversion of Negroes.

How

ever, the organization made no mention of the rumor which had fomented
the uprising, that is that Christianized Negro slaves would be freed
from their servitude.82
The aftermath of the insurrections must have brought several trials
and executions of Negroes, for compensation requests flooded the Assem
bly after 1730.

Moreover, Virginia's government now began using the

militia as an armed police force to control Negro unrest, gatherings,
and discontent.

Militia patrols became a common feature of slave con

trol after 1730 and in times of threatened black insurrection, militia
patrols roamed their respective counties to insure suppression of blacks
leaving their plantations.

This might have been the key to the sudden

disappearance of slave insurrections, conspiracies, and revolts.

On

the other hand, Negroes in Virginia might have been so disheartened by
the suppression of their attempts at revolt that they turned to other
means of expressing their dissatisfaction with slavery.
The numbers of petitions to the House of Burgesses for compen
sation for slaves in the early 1730s suggests how repressive the Vir
ginia society had become for those blacks caught in rebellion or crim
inal acts.

But, at the same time, Negroes apparently engaged in higher

numbers of criminal acts.

Their activity suggests that the rebellious

slaves shifted their resistance from large-scale insurrectionary
activity to small-scale crime.
In 1733, six slaves, five men and a woman, murdered Robert Allen
of Goochland County.

This was one of the first reported instances in

which slaves murdered their master.

The six were tried on June 25 and
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three men were exonerated.

The woman was convicted of being an acces

sory after the fact and the court of Oyer and Terminer ordered twenty
lashes "well laid on" her back.

The two convicted of the killing,

Champion and Valentine, were sentenced to death by hanging.

Their bod

ies were ordered drawn and quartered and the parts prominently displayed throughout Goochland. J
For another instance, William Cox petitioned the Assembly in Aug
ust of 1736 asking compensation not only for a dead slave but for all
the lives she had taken and property she had destroyed.

The woman, a

slave of his, had broken into his house and had stolen a few goods be
longing to him.
him.

When his son discovered her, she attacked and wounded

She then burned his tobacco house to the ground and murdered

three other of his slaves.
and drowned herself.
slaves lost.

Following that, she killed her own children

The House voted himc)^60 as compensation for the

But the woman's rampage must have ruined him.

Perhaps

he was a severe and harsh master or, perhaps, she had gone berserk.
Whatever the explanation, this type of behavior by slaves would rise
rather than decline as the decades passed in Virginia.^
In fact, in the same session of the House in which Cox's petition
was presented, four other requests for compensation revealed the extent
to which rebellious slaves were willing to go in seeking release from
slavery.

In each Instance, the slave had either resisted capture after

flight or had committed suicide when threatened with seizure.

In three

of the four instances, the slave had violently assaulted another slave
or a w h i t e . B l a c k s were using violent methods to resist their masters.
Whatever the triggering incidents were is difficult to say, but rebel
slaves certainly refused to abide by the strictures and laws by which
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they were bound.
While rebellious slaves sought to change their condition through
violence, lower-class whites fomented disorder against their lot in
Virginia society.

During the 1720s and early 1730s the English govern

ment once again sent to Virginia and Maryland large numbers of convicts
to enter servitude.

This group was responsible for much of the violence

and crime in the late 1720s.

Other lower-class whites participated in

the general restlessness, however, causing alarm and concern among Vir
ginia's leadership.

The lower classes resisted violently implementation

of new tobacco warehousing laws.

Most Virginians had never accepted

the need for such laws, believing that their society operated on an
individualistic rather than communal basis.

Tobacco warehousing and

town construction laws usually had a common purpose, bringing together
sufficient numbers of colonists to warrant the development of perma
nent towns and cities in the Old Dominion.
development had met little success.

By 1730, however, such

In the 1720s the colonial legis

lature repeatedly legislated centrally-located tobacco warehouses to
which planters brought their crop each season.

Not only would ware

houses collect people at central locations in the colony, but they
would also provide inspectors and customs collectors the opportunities
to grade and to evaluate Virginia tobacco far more accurately than in
the past.

Such policies would eliminate much of poor quality tobacco

transmitted to England in the past, insuring that good quality, topgrade tobacco would be exported.

Small planters and freemen just trying

to get a start in the colony were, however, those hardest hit by such
policy reorientation.

Their livelihood depended on getting as high a

volume of tobacco as they could produce to English markets, no matter
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the quality, each year.

If each man working tobacco could produce

twelve to eighteen hundred pounds of the weed annually, then in good
years he could make some profit and at least break even in poor years.
The convict servants and smallholders comprising the bulk of the
rioters and crowds protesting the new tobacco laws began their activi
ties in the late 1720s.

In early 1729 convict servants burned down

Colonel Thomas Lee's house and outbuildings.

At the same time, they

robbed Lee's Westmoreland County estate of a considerable quantity of
goods and silver plate.

The fire spread through his house at an alarm

ing rate, the roof collapsing in just a few minutes after the fire's
outbreak.

Lee, his wife, and three children escaped, but a white ser

vant girl never made it out of her bed.

The servants set the fire be

cause, just as with the Negroes at the Harrison tobacco b a m , he had
broken up an illegal servants', meeting and issued warrants for the
arrest of several servants on a variety of charges.

In early April

1729, Governor Gooch offered a ^ 5 0 sterling reward for the capture of
those involved in burning Lee's house.

By early 1730, however, Gooch

despaired of finding any guilty servants because he believed that they
had escaped to another colony and had sold their illicitly gained goods
there.37
Although the Northern Neck remained the center of unrest and gen
eral unruliness during the 1720s and early 1730s, other regions of the
colony experienced white lower class unrest and discontent.

The fron

tier of the colony, whether western or Southside areas, received sub
stantial numbers of convicts who contributed to unrest in the decade
after 1730.

One of those frontier counties, Prince William, formed in

1731, was the scene of an uprising in 1732, when a group of the "meaner
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sort" of people banded together to destroy public tobacco warehouses in
that county and counties adjacent to it.

Colonel Thomas Harrison re

ported to the Council that about fifty people had gathered, hoping that
rioters from counties located in more settled regions, notably the
Northern Neck, would join the uprising.

The Council ordered that all

access to Prince William be closed by militia units.

Council members

were particularly worried that residents from south of the Rappahannock
River would cross to join the insurgents.

Six weeks later, three lead

ers of the insurrectionists— James Bland, John Schumach, and Thomas
Furr— begged the Council's pardon for their participation in the affair.
The Council, however, ordered them and several other leaders to appear
before the next Court of Oyer and Terminer to answer questions about
the matter.3®
So quick was the violent response to the new tobacco laws that the
Assembly enacted a new law covering public warehouse burnings.

The law,

passed in 1730, listed punishments for such offenses and removed the
right of benefit of clergy.3®
The legislation did little good, however, for warehouse burnings
continued.

In 1732 several warehouses were burned.

No ships engaged

in the tobacco trade had arrived in January or February 1732, the
normal time for tobacco vessels to appear in Virginia waters.

Rumors

soon flew throughout the colony that London merchants had ordered a
boycott of Virginia tobacco until the colony repealed its tobacco
legislation.

But no one pointed out that no ships had arrived in

Maryland, a colony which did not have an inspection law.

The problem

was one which soon corrected itself, for the first ships began arriving
in late February and early March.

By mid-March, however, burnings of
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public warehouses had begun, and incidents of arson continued sporad
ically for the next year.^0
In his first report on warehouse burnings, Governor Gooch informed
the Council that public buildings at Deep Creek in Lancaster County
were burned the previous week.

The Council recommended that of100

rewards be offered for information leading to the capture of any of
those responsible for the burnings.

By the May session of the Assembly

the uprisings had supposedly been suppressed.

Governor Gooch addressed

the House of Burgesses on the subject, saying:
The late Tumults, which have been raised by an inconsiderable
Number of ignorant deluded People, who have dared to threaten the
Government with open Violence, is to us a Subject of Contempt, as
well as Abhorrence, and cannot turn us from our just Purposes, nor
discourage us to hope for the Continuance of His Majesty's good
opinion of our Proceedings. Yet we cannot but acknowledge and
approve your Prudence and Lenity, after suppressing those Dis
orders by singular Diligence and Management, in suffering the
Offenders to attone for their Boldness by a peaceable and sub
missive Deportment, without undergoing any other Punishment than
the Shame and Reproach of their own Misdoings.
But the Governor's optimism was shortlived, for within one month more
arsons had been reported.
Not only were more warehouses destroyed, but two churches were
burned in the summer of 1732.

In June the Council offered new rewards

for those who had burned tobacco warehouses at Falmouth, King George
County.

The arsonists had burned the buildings to the ground and the

Council offered ol^lOO reward for information leading to the solution of
the crimes.
ed.

Three months later the two churches were reported destroy

The Parish churches of St. Mark's and St. George's in Spotsylvania

County had been burned.
two churches destruction.

But no explanation was ever offered for the
However, the Governor and Council did offer

rewards for information which would reveal those responsible.^
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Evidently the arsonists stopped their destruction of public and
religious buildings in the fall of 1732, but those discontented with
tobacco policy continued to protest the centralization and rationaliza
tion of tobacco policy.

In 1735 the tobacco warehouses in Yeocomico

were robbed of their contents, some eight thousand pounds of transfer
tobacco and three hogsheads brought in by local farmers.

The Yeocomico

tobacco inspectors, Willoughby Newton and Samuel Eskridge, asked the
House of Burgesses to vote them compensation so that they might recover
the monies they had to pay to the owners of the tobacco stored in their
warehouse.^
The violent attacks on public warehousing policy represented just
one facet of white unrest in the early 1730s.
came a consequent increase in crime.

With the rise in violence

But governmental officials, sit

ting as justices, had clearly begun to use their prerogative to reduce
punishments for convictions which in the seventeenth century would have
brought either the death penalty or serious corporal punishments.

Through

out the decades after 1720, high-ranking judicial officers in the colony
either meted out lesser sentences or pardoned felons for crimes for which
they had been convicted.

Felons convicted before even the General Court

had better chances of pardon or reprieve for their crimes than they had
in 1700 or earlier.
Although the General Court no longer heard minor felony or social
control cases, it remained the court of original jurisdiction for cap
ital crimes and the last appeals court for all other instances.

Re

duced sentences and instances in which prisoners received fines or jail
sentences in lieu of corporal punishment suggest that the Virginia
penal system was clearly altering its concepts of criminal treatment.

259
In. fact, in no instance of reported felony was the convicted crim
inal sentenced to the full punishment provided by the statutes.

In

many instances between 1720 and 1735, the felon was either pardoned,
fined, or pardoned and then banished from the colony.

Even criminals

who took someone else's life could expect at least recommendation for
pardon from the Governor, even if the Crown did not accept the recom
mendation.

Thus, a trend discernible in the early eighteenth century

had begun to mature into a more humane form of criminal treatment.
By 1723 the trend was clearly identifiable.

On April 26, 1723,

the Council recommended that David Seal, Mason French, and Joseph King
be pardoned for the killing of Jonas Adams of King George County.

The

Governor ordered that the recommendation be carried out, despite the
fact that the General Court had tried and convicted the three men.

In

the seventeenth century manslaughter was interpreted by Virginia's
courts as a capital offense, second only to murder.

The punishment—

hanging— remained the same in the eighteenth century, yet the colonial
government was clearly reinterpreting the law.

A year later, the Council

recommended similar treatment for Edmund Sikes, convicted by the spring
1724 General Court of an unnamed felony.

The felony must have been

serious for the General Court to have tried it, but the Council's par
don suggests that it did not feel that Sikes' execution or whipping was
warranted.

The Council's decisions in these two cases is even more

remarkable considering that that body and the General Court were one
and the sam e . ^
By 1725 requests for pardon were granted almost automatically.

In

June a Court of Oyer and Terminer had found Archibald Richil guilty of
several burglaries and felonies (usually meaning related crimes such as
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larceny in this context^) and had sentenced him to death.

On the day

after his sentencing, the Council pardoned him on his request.

The case

of Andrew Bourne has already been detailed, but it was a special in
stance in which the Council felt a distinct threat from a potentially
dangerous group of people in the colony.^®

Yet in the 1730s the

Council, at times at the recommendation of the trial court, pardoned
convicted criminals without demurrer.
Even those of social and political prominence victimized by crim
inals could not expect to have those criminals executed.

In June 1731

the Council recommended that Matthew Inglish and John Fitzpatrick be
pardoned, but only if they were sold outside the colony for a sevenyear period of indenture.

The two boys, for such they were, had broken

into and robbed the storehouse of John Washington, a prominent planter
of the Northern Neck.

The judges of the Court of Oyer and Terminer who

had tried them recommended them for pardon due to their youth.
Council understandingly did so, but with the above stipulation.
the Council had merely imposed the equivalent of a fine.

The
Earlier,

In a procla

mation issued in 1723, the Council had called for the arrest of Henry
Irby, John Donnet, and Pallister Bowles.

The three had committed sev

eral robberies and other felonies for which their lives were forfeit.
Not until 1725 were any of the accused felons captured.

Donnet, tried

and convicted by the General Court for his participation in the felonies,
was sentenced to death, but he petitioned the Council for clemency.

On

November 5, 1725, the Governor recommended that Donnet go free if he and
three other men would post 3^.00 sterling bonds for a one-year period.
Thus, the Council was introducing the equivalent of remittable fines for
punishment for criminals convicted of capital offenses.^
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By the early 1730s, officials in the colony were talking of a crime
wave; yet convicted criminals continued to appeal for and receive p a r 
dons for their crimes, John Clayton, the colony's Attorney-General,

itself the right of a court of final appeals, a prerogative of the Gen
eral Court,
Perhaps the Council and General Court were adopting this leniency

petitioned the government for a salary increase, alleging that his w o r k

as a means of binding white society together, The humanity of those

load necessitated such, O ne y e a r later, M a t t h e w Kemp, c l e r k of the

courts seems difficult to comprehend when a high level of Negro and

General Court, petitioned the Council for more pay on the same grounds

lower-class white unrest disrupted Virginia's society, requiring the

as C l a y t o n a nd in 173 7 th e A s s e m b l y v o t e d to i n c r e a s e t he salary of

mustering of militia patrols to repress the discontent within the col

Reverend W i l i a m Dawson for his attendance to convicted criminals,^

ony. The adoption of lenient treatment for convicted criminals may have

Thus, while the Council reduced punishments, other officials reported

been an unconscious signal to lower class whites that their behavior,

a high level of criminality.

while not fully condoned, was at least more acceptable than that of

Thus, by 1735 the colonial government w a s offering a degree of

blacks, Slaves convicted in the court system for crimes or rebellion

clemency to convicted wrongdoers in Virginia, Several robbers and oth e r

were by no means accorded such privileged treatment as William Major

felons, some killers, and a girl convicted of concealing the death of

or the sixteen-year old girl, Consequently, the impression exists that

her illegitimate child had all been recommended for pardon, While

the leaders of Virginia were attempting to cement lower-class whites

surviving evidence of criminal behavior is scanty due to the loss of the

w i t h i n the society and using r a c i s m to d o so,

records of the General Court, in earlier decades the Council had never

all white criminals were accorded lenient treatment, A cursory exam

so onesidedly befriended the criminal, In many of the cases detailed

ination of the Virginia Gazette after 1736 reveals that a great many

above, there existed extenuating circumstances militating against the

convicted criminals received full sentences for their crimes, and the

full implementation of the prescribed punishment, Almost certainly, had

results of those trials may be read back into the earlier 1730s, H ow

the General Court records survived in full for that period, they would

ever, the fact that the Council had seldom interfered in the decisions

reveal clearly another side to the official Virginia position on crim

of the General Court, even with a recommendation for an altered sentence

inal behavior, However, in no earlier times had the Council so fre

from that body, suggests that Virginia's leadership needed some means of

quently overridden the decision of the General Court, In the years

demonstrating its concern for the lower classes at the precise time

1720-1735 the Council reversed the General Court's decision, sometimes

that leadership was attacking the livelihood of those people, For while

w i t h t h a t b o d y ' s own r e c o m m e n d a t i o n , M o r e o v e r , t h e C o u n c i l and the

the Council was recommending clemency and mercy for so many convicted

General Court were composed of the same people, making the occurrence

criminals, the government as a w h o l e was enacting and enforcing tobacco

even m ore striking, Finally, the Council appears to have assumed to

collection laws,

49

This is not to say that
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The racism Virginians exhibited by the early 1730s was symptomatic
of North American colonials in general.

By 1730 racism infused re

lations between whites and blacks in Virginia. Violence had become one
common denominator of behavior between the two peoples.

The colony

found that it needed a new mechanism for repressing the rapidly-ex
panding slave population of the 1720s.

The rebelliousness and rest

lessness of those slaves peaked in 1730, but new methods of control,
principally the militia patrol, were introduced while, at the same time,
the leadership adopted other measures to quell lower-class insurrectionism.

By 1735, though, much of the Negro rebelliousness was gone,

the society was settling into its familiar eighteenth-century pattern
of tranquility, and prosperity was appearing in the economy.
the major pattern of violence in Virginia had ended.

By 1735,

No longer did

Virginia's leaders have to use the racial issue to assure white sol
idarity.
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NOTES
SLAVERY, TOBACCO POLICY, AND VIOLENCE, 1720-1735

^Sometime between 1730 and 1740 Virginia's prosperity returned.
Between 1740 and 1765 the level of personal debt in the colony increased
tenfold by some estimates. Tobacco prices had dropped to 10s the hun
dredweight by the 1670s (approximately 0.8d per pound) and, with
temporary fluctuations, remained there into the 1720s. Morgan, American
Slavery, American Freedom, 301-302. As Morgan emphasized, only the
larger planters could possibly make any profits from the growth of the
weed. By 1735, however, tobacco prices began rising to a point at which
small and large planters alike could profit. Prices remained sub
stantial into the Revolutionary era. However, by 1735 Virginia's econ
omy was much more diversified than it had been in the last quarter of
the seventeenth century, and the colony's social structure had substi
tuted a slave labor force which could be much more easily controlled
than the white servant and tenant force which had characterized the
earlier era. For tobacco prices in the eighteenth century, see L. C.
Gray, "The Market Surplus Problems of Colonial Tobacco," WM Q , 2nd Series,
VII (1927), 231-245, VIII (1928), 1-16.
2until 1670 any freeman in the colony could vote. In that year the
Assembly tied the franchise to ownership of land, which might have cut
the number of eligible to vote by fifty per cent. Hening, ed., Statutesat-Large, II (1660-1682), 280. The 1736 election remained the basic
franchise law until the Revolution and it continued to require a "stake
in society," that is, possession of real property. However, the cost of
obtaining that land had clearly diminished between 1670 and 1735. More
over, the social conditions under which freemen operated in the 1670s
had altered so significantly that a young man just released from his
indenture in the 1730s could expect, with some hard work, to accumulate
sufficient cash to buy a plot of land large enough to qualify for the
franchise. Unfortunately little is known of the smallholder's view of
eighteenth century politics. He may have cared neither for the vote
nor for politics, for turnouts at elections were generally poor. For the
1736 election law, see Hening, ed., Statutes-at-Large, IV (1711-1736),
475-478.
^During the seventeenth century, Negroes and whites intermingled
and mixed far more openly than in later centuries.
In two instances,
Negro and white servants ran off together to escape the colony; however,
they were all caught and whipped at the order of the General Court.
Minutes of the Council and General Court, 382, 467. Occasionally a white
and black engaging in illicit sexual relations were discovered by the
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government.
"Virginia Council and General Court Records, 1640-1641,"
281. Blacks and lower-class whites also mingled in eighteenth-century
Williamsburg.
See Thad W. Tate, Jr., The Negro in Eighteenth-Century
Williamsburg (Charlottesville, 1966).
^Mullin, Flight and Rebellion, Chap. 2, 89-94, discusses accultur
ation, but suggests that that process required considerable time,
decades, to complete.
5Ibid., 34-38.
^Statistical History of the United States, Series Z 14, 756.
^Ibid.; Donnan, ed., Documents Illustrative of the History of the
Slave Trade, 182ff.
8Ibid.
9Ibid.
lOlbid., 175-176.
^ W i t h the exception of the 1730 general uprising, whites accused
all Negro plotters of intent to destroy white society. Whether officials
asserted that point as a suspicion or as a result of interrogation of
Negro rebels is seldom revealed, but the evidence suggests the latter.
Drysdale to the Board of Trade, June 19, 1723, C05/1319, ff 111-117,
Reel M-240, VCRMP, CWRL.
^Donnan, ed., Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave
Trade. 179-180.
13For these laws, see JHB, 1712-1726, 360, 367, 368, 395, 403, 405,
407; Hening, ed., Statutes-at-Large, IV (1711-1736), 126; Winfree, comp.,
The Laws of Virginia . . . Supplement, 257-259.
^Ibid.
15JHB, 1712-1726, 407.
16EJC, IV (1721-1739), 141.
*7JHB, 1727-1740, 16; LJC, II (1715-1754), 728.
18JHB, 1727-1740, 65.
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■^The Maroons were described extensively by several of Jamaica’s
governors in the eighteenth century. Their way-of-life was remarkably
similar to that intended by this party. See Orlando Patterson, The
Sociology of Slavery: An Analysis of the Origins, Development and
Structure of Negro Slave Society in Jamaica (Rutherford, New Jersey,
1967), 266-273. The Cimarrons of sixteenth-century Central America
lived much the same, with intent to raid white settlements for supplies
and additional members.
Ironically, sixteenth-century English sea
captains bent on raiding Spanish mainland settlements offered partner
ships and aid to the Cimarrons.
See Morgan, American Slavery, American
Freedom, 10-20.
^Governor William Gooch to the Board of Trade, June 29, 1729,
C05/1322, ff 10-13, Reel M-241, VCRMP, CWKL.
21EJC, IV (1721-1739), 198.
22norgan, American Slavery. American Freedom, 308-309, plays down
the Negro discontent in the late 1720s, asserting, however, that the
introduction and expansion of slavery brought social stability to Vir
ginia. It seems, on the other hand, that the threat of Negro rebel
liousness served as a catalyst to fuse white classes into a stable
society. The catalytic effect of slavery was not only the removal of
freemen and indentured servants from the labor force, but the threat
that rebelliousness Negroes threatened whites ought not be minimized.
23Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom, 235-270, argues
clearly and persuasively the class nature of Bacon's Rebellion and
suggests that Baconians were unable to overcome the plundering, ex
ploitative characteristics of Virginia's society. Many freemen willing
ly joined Bacon when he let loose his followers to plunder. See ibid..
265, 267.
2^Hugh Jones, The Present State of Virginia: From Whence Is In
ferred a Short View of Maryland and North Carolina, ed. with an Intro
duction by Richard L. Morton (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1956), 76.
Jones compared Negroes and Indians to the detriment of the former,
commenting "Several of them (Negroes) are taught to be sawyers, carpen
ters, smiths, coopers, etc. and though for the most they be none of the
aptest or nicest; yet they are by nature cut out for hard labour and
fatigue, and will perform tolerably well; though they fall much short
of an Indian, that has learned and seen the same things." Ibid. Jones'
view of the two peoples was characteristic of eighteenth-century Vir
ginians. Thomas Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia, ed. with
an Introduction by William Peden (Chapel Hill, 1954), 138-143, follows
Jones' sentiment very closely. Morgan, American Slavery, American
Freedom, Chap. 12, documents the miserable living conditions for white
laborers, servants, and freemen in late seventeenth century Virginia.
25Between 1736 and 1800, there were no major slave insurrections
and few plots.
See Mullin, Flight and Rebellion, 59-60.
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^^Drysdale to the Board of Trade, December 20, 1722, C05/1319,
ff 82-84, Reel M-240, VCRMP, CWRL.
27e j c , IV (1721-1739), 206; Governor William Gooch to Secretary of
State Alured Popple, June 29, 1729, C05/1337, ff 132-133, Reel M-246,
VCRMP, CWRL.
28JHB, 1727-1740, 63; LJC, II (1715-1754), 757; Gooch to the Board
of Trade, March 26, 1729, C05/1321, ff 110-111, Reel M-241, VCRMP, CWRL.
The recommended pardon for Bourne adds one more piece of evidence to the
accumulated total suggesting the use of racism to bind white society.
29Byrd to the Earl of Egremont, July 17, 1736, VMHB, XXXVI (1928),
219-222.
30e JC, IV (1721-1739), 228; Governor Gooch to the Board of Trade,
September 14, 1730, C05/1322, ff 158-159, Reel M-241, VCRMP, CWRL.
3^Gooch to the Board of Trade, February 12, 1730/1, C05/1322, ff
161-163, Reel M-241, VCRMP, CWRL: William Gooch, "The Virginia Colonial
Clergy, Governor Gooch's Letters to the Bishop of London, 1727-1749,"
ed. by G. M. Brydon, VMHB, XXXII (1924), 322-323. Gerald Mullin makes
only cursory mention in Flight and Rebellion of these insurrections,
plots, or disturbances conducted by Negroes. Mullin confined his work
to the period from the foundation of the Virginia Gazette in 1736 until
1801, the end of Gabriel's Revolt, a period remarkably free of insur
rectionary disturbances.
32**Minutes of Dr. Bray's Associates," SPG, London, October 2 and
November 2, 1730, Vol. I, pp. 13 & 15, D0137, Reel M-297, VCRMP, CWRL.
330nce again, a colonial court used a system of punishment which
clearly differentiated blacks from whites. Philip A. Bruce, "rebuttal
of a book review," VMHB, I (1893-1894), 328-330.
34JHB, 1727-1740. 254.
33For the four cases, see the petitions of Edmund Scarborough,
William Morris, Joseph Peace, and Benjamin Morris in JHB, 1727-1740,
257, 262, 263. In all four cases, the slave in question had either
committed suicide or had so challenged his pursuers that they killed
him.
3% o r g a n estimated that a good hand could produce a minimum of
twelve hundred pounds of tobacco per year. However, if one-fifth to
one-quarter of that product was waste or trash, then the individual
planter lost just that much of his yearly income. Another provision of
the law prohibited sending tobacco still attached to the stalk, a piece
of the tobacco plant unfit for smoking but still sold by London tobacco
merchants to England's lower classes. Morgan, American Slavery,
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American Freedom, 142, 302; Morton, Colonial Virginia, II, 511-517.
The colony's attempts at tobacco warehousing laws during the eighteenth
century began in 1713 when Governor Spotswood won passage of such a law.
The law provided for collection and inspection of tobacco at several
points in the colony and it became the model for later legislative
attempts. That law was disallowed by the Crown in 1717, as were
attempts at similar legislation in 1723 and 1728. Morton, Colonial Vir
ginia, II, 512; Hening, ed., Statutes-at-Large, IV (1711-1736), 182;
Winfree, comp., The Laws of Virginia . . . Supplement, 285-291. The
1730 inspection and warehouse law relied on the 1713 legislation but
provided that all packing would be done in hogsheads rather than shipping
in bulk (the latter an opportunity for anyone to steal what he wanted).
Trash tobacco was to be burned on the spot. The Crown approved it in
early 1731. Hening, ed., Statutes-at-Large, IV (1711-1736), 247-271;
Calendar of State Papers, Colonial, 1731, 47-50, 101.
3^When Governor Gooch wrote the Board of Trade asking that Lee be
granted a seat on the Council as compensation for the losses he sustained,
the governor informed the Board that the Northern Neck was "remote from
the seat of government, where the common people are generally of a more
turbulent and unruly disposition than anywhere else, and are not likely
to become better by being the place of all this Dominion where most of
the transported convicts are sold and settled." Gooch to the Board of
Trade, October 5, 1732, Calendar of State Papers, Colonial. 1732, 236.
For other evidence associated with this incident, see EJC, IV (1721-1739),
196, 307; Gooch to the Board of Trade, March 26, 1729, C05/1321, Reel
M-241, VCRMP, CWRL; Gooch to the Board of Trade, January 9, 1729/30,
C05/1322, ff 137-139, Reel M-241, VCRMP, CWRL.
38EJC, IV (1721-1739), 263-264, 269.
39Hening, ed., Statutes-at-Large, IV (1711-1736), 271-273.
In 1713,
as in 1730 and 1731, the tobacco warehouse law was greeted with resis
tance, the violence of which took the form of public warehouse burnings.
4®Morton, Colonial Virginia, II, 512-513.
4lEJC, IV (1721-1739), 259; JHB. 1727-1740, 120, for Gooch's
speech.
42EJC, IV (1721-1739), 281; LJC, II (1715-1754), 806, 812; JHB,
1727-1740, 123, 151-152, 154, 156, 197; Gooch to the Board of Trade,
July 18, 1732, C05/1323, ff. 44-49, Reel M-241, VCRMP, CWRL.
43JHB, 1727-1740, 253. The Committee for Public Claims, however,
rejected their petition on the grounds that too little evidence had been
presented to support the petition.
44EJC, IV (1721-1739), 31, 70.
43Rankin, Criminal Trial Proceedings, 148, 158.

» i

4 8EJC, IV (1721-1739), 88-89.
trial.
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See above, p. 249, for Bourne's

^ I b i d ., 88, 92, 249; Governor Drysdale to the Secretary of State,
July 5, 1723, C05/1343, ff 72-74, Reel M-247, VCRMP, CWRL.
48EJC, IV (1721-1739), 281-282, 375, 398, 399. For further evi
dence of the Council's leniency, see the trials of William Major and an
unidentified, sixteen year old girl. Major was convicted of the murder
of John Crochford, a sailor, and the girl was convicted of concealing
the death of her stillborn,•illegitimate child.
In both cases the
Council overrode the sentence of the General Court and recommended
pardons for both individuals. The Council did not even suggest reduced
sentences, but rather submitted the cases to the Crown with recommenda
tions that the Crown extend mercy to both people. Ibid., 341; Gooch to
the Secretary of State, July 13, 1733, C05/1337, ff 159-160, Reel M-246,
VCRMP, CWRL; Gooch to the Secretary of State, June 29, 1729, C05/1337,
ff 132-133, Reel M-246, VCRMP, CWRL.
4^See Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, p. 344, for this
suggestion.

CHAPTER

IX

POLITICS AND OUTLAW GANGS:
VIOLENCE IN MID-EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY VIRGINIA

With the disappearance of a perceived racial threat to white secur
ity in the years following 1735, violence in the colony assumed two
characteristics setting off those years from the previous one hundred
and thirty of the colony's history.

Until the outbreak of the French

and Indian War in 1754, colonials felt neither exterior nor interior
threats to their security.

The new characteristics were the presence

of political turbulence and outlaw gangs.

The rise of a wave of elec

tion riots, contested elections, and assaults on families and servant
personnel belonging to burgesses suggests that violence had assumed a
political coloration unknown even in the late seventeenth century.
This violence was not economically motivated, as was that of the seven
teenth century, nor was there a high level of class consciousness.

But

the political nature of the rioting and related violence can be neither
overlooked nor underemphasized.
Second, by 1750 a clearly established outlaw gang tradition was
rooted in Virginia.

A closely related pair of horse thief and counter

feiting gangs operated on and just inside the frontier of the colony,
near Amelia County.

The evidence identifying these two gangs suggests

they might really have been one.

Their operations took them beyond the

Virginia borders, as will be seen below, but the bulk of their activity
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was confined within the colony.

Although revelations about the gangs

sparked a major investigation and an important series of trials, the
gangs apparently were not broken up, for reports of counterfeited cur
rency and stolen horses continued to come to Williamsburg by 1755.
After 1735, discontented Negroes remained restive, using individ
ual violence to assert their resistance to slavery, but by no means
were they as willing to organize into large groups for conspiracies or
of insurrections.

Their individual acts of violence suggest, however,
t

how desperate some became while confined within the slave system.
Furthermore, if those acts of violence are taken in context with all
non-violent evidence of black resistance, a picture emerges of slaves
seeking some means to "get back" at their masters.

This picture expands

what is known of Negro rebelliousness, suggesting that in colonial Virginia many blacks had little intention of accepting slavery.
Efforts at reforming criminal punishments continued during the mid
eighteenth century.

The founding of the Virginia Gazette provided a

guide to criminal trials occurring before the General Court and regular
Courts of Oyer and Terminer.

The Gazette1s reports suggested that the

Council continued to ameliorate punishments through recommendations for
pardons and reduced sentences.

Incarceration for periods of time and

fines, if the criminal could pay, appeared somewhat infrequently be
tween 1735 and 1755, indicating the Council's willingness to explore
other means of criminal punishment.

The middle third of the eighteenth

century witnessed the practical delineation in Europe of many of the
intellectual threads of the Enlightenment, one thread being penal re
form.

Suggestions for altering traditional methods of criminal punish

ment abounded in Europe and Virginians finishing their education in
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England may have become attuned to these reform suggestions.

Upon

their return to the colony, some were eventually appointed to the
Council, an institution already sympathetic to reform efforts as evidenced by its operations in the 1720s.
Efforts at penal reform did not meet with overnight success, but
they had some effect, as the evidence demonstrates.

The Virginia Ga

zette makes it possible to compare more accurately criminals actually
receiving the full sentence for their misdeeds with those receiving
reduced sentences.

In many cases reported in the Gazette, the criminal

was hanged or was whipped, but occasionally the Council, or even the
General Court, recommended clemency.

In some Instances these recom

mendations arose from special circumstances of the case itself; in other
situations the Council was apparently trying to reduce the punishment
generally for a specific crime.
The Gazette reported April and October General Court and June and
December Oyer and Terminer court sessions in the late 1730s and 1740s,
providing, however, few details of the cases.

Charges against the

criminals were often reported only as "felonies," which could mean any
thing from highway or armed robbery to petty thievery to breaking and
entering.

On Wednesday, November 3, 1736, nine criminals were tried

before the General Court on a variety of charges.

By the end of the

month, sentences imposed on the convicted felons had been carried out,
although one man, a Simon Malpas was pardoned by the General Court, the
grounds unfortunately not being stated.

The other eight were either

hanged or pleaded their benefit of clergy.

The two hanged, James

Matthews and Elizabeth Greenley, had stolen horses and committed murder,
respectively.

John Freelove, William Sharp, John Strickland, James
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Tool, John Donahoe, and Elizabeth Blair, all convicted of felonies,
asked for benefit of clergy and were ordered branded in the hand.

The

possibility exists that the colonial government had begun using luke
warm or cool irons for the branding, irons which would leave no marks
and inflict no pain on the recipient.^

Thus, the government was al

ready carrying further a trend discerned in the 1720s and early 1730s.
In May 1737, three young men were tried and convicted of robbing
the house of the Reverend Mortland.

The three young men received sen

tence of death because they had long records, not for the robbery it
self, implying that the General Court would have ordered lesser punish
ment for the offense had it been the convicts' first.

At the same

session the Court found Mary Thornton guilty of concealing the death of
her illegitimate infant.

The young woman had pleaded before the court

that the baby was stillborn and the justices believed her.

Governor

Gooch wrote Peter Leheup, Virginia's agent in London at that time,
asking him to plead for His Majesty's pardon for the Thornton woman.^
Again, the leading officials of Virginia were expressing their concern
for a convicted criminal and seeking a means of alleviating the harsh
laws of Anglo-America.

Furthermore, the practice of executing women

who concealed deaths of their illegitimate infants was one offense
Virginia officials seemed bent on abolishing.
Moreover, as suggested above, the government seemed to apply
more moderate corrections dependent on the number as well as the nature
of the offense.

If a criminal were arrested for robbery or burglary

and that was his first offense, he received benefit of clergy and
was branded.

For instance, Nathaniel Morgan pleaded his clergy at

the June 1737 session of the regular Court of Oyer and Terminer.

He
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had admitted to committing a robbery.

For stealing a silver spoon,

William Jackson asked for his clergy and so did Elizabeth Danielson,
John Holmes, Elizabeth Herbert, and Samuel MacHenly, their offenses
being felonies.

Even those convicted of manslaughter, a former capital

crime, were pleading clergy, as in the case of John Oldham.-*

In every

case these were probably first offenses.
By the early 1750s, the General Court was fining those who could
afford to pay and jailed many in lieu of corporal punishment.

A

tobacco-stealing ring was broken in 1750 and those convicted of partici
pation received fines or pleaded benefit of clergy.

Joseph Markham of

Northumberland County and John Birk of King George County were convicted
of stealing the tobacco and John Boah of selling it.

Markham and Birk

were ordered branded after asking for clergy, but Boah received a forty
shilling fine and six months in jail.

In late 1751 the General Court

ordered Robert Howies imprisoned for one extra year for an attempted
jallbreak, the inference being that Howies had already spent time in
jail for some felony.®
Each year in April, May, June, October, November, and December
sessions of the General Court and Court of Oyer and Terminer ordered
the execution of from one to nine felons.

Between 1735 and 1755 the

usual crime for which a convicted criminal received the death penalty
was murder, although in 1738 the General Court instructed the Council
to seek a pardon for John Davis, convicted of murder, and one year later
the General Court pardoned William Barbasore of York County for the
robbery of Philip Lightfoot's store.

But those convicted of murder

and those who had committed several crimes in their careers received
the death penalty from provincial courts.®

The numbers of executions
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during the twenty years 1735-1755 outnumbered those instances in which
courts reduced sentences or demonstrated some other form of clemency,
but the very fact that a trend toward penal reform had begun in Vir
ginia seems significant when compared to the traditional view of AngloQ

American eighteenth-century criminal behavior and punishment.
Eighteenth-century executions were public occasions, social outings
for those living close to the hanging sites.

The lower, middle, and

upper classes enjoyed the spectacle of the public hangings at Williams
burg every three or four months.

Executions and official holidays such

as the King's or Prince of Wales' birthdays, anniversaries of great
military or naval victories, times of public thanksgiving, or at the
gathering of public leaders during the spring and fall for legislative
activity, provided the citizenry with an opportunity for socializing.
These activities also had deeper meanings, too, for they encouraged a
sense of community and helped to cement Virginians into a society.
In most reports of crimes, whether in the Virginia Gazette or some
other source, only brief mention of the occurrence was made.

However,

occasionally the Virginia Gazette published the details of a felony,
especially, one suspects, if the case might serve as a warning and in
struction to potential criminals or possessed sensational ingredients
necessary to attract reader interest.

The few cases fully reported

indicate motive, method, and opportunity.

In 1737 William Marr, servant

of Colonel John Chiswell of Hanover County, confessed to Robert Lewis
and Richard Clough, members of the county commission for Orange County,
his role in the murder of Lifelet Larby.

Larby, a frontier hunter,

had welcomed Marr and three other men to his cabin on April 30.

The

four guests--Marr, Peter Heckie, Matthew O'Conner, and Bryan Conner—

had set off with Larby the next day, May 1, for the nearest settle
ments in Orange County so that the hunter could buy needed powder and
shot.

About two hundred and fifty yards from Larby*s cabin, Heckie

suddenly pulled his gun and shot Larby, following which he beat out his
brains.

Marr revealed to the two justices that Heckie, the two other

men, and he had planned the murder the night before so that they could
steal Larby*s furs.
crime began.

Marr had second thoughts, however, and fled when the

Once he reached the settled portions of Orange County, he

summoned his own master, Chiswell, and the master of the other three, a
Captain Avery of Prince William County, before he confessed to the jus
tices.

He had been having bad dreams about the affair and had even seen

apparitions of the dead man.

Although the other three fled the area,

they were captured, tried, convicted, and two were hanged in November
1737.^

The frightening apparitions Marr saw and the bad dreams he had

probably served to suggest the horrid results of such activity, even
though he was not directly responsible for the murder.

Moreover, the

fact that only servants participated in the crime reinforced Virginians1
suspicions about the nature of their white laborers.
The next year another murder on the colony's frontier repeated the
same lessons to the Gazette's readers.

The details, carefully printed

by the paper, revealed that a coachmaker named Evans, who had just
arrived in the colony and was journeying to his new home in Rappahannock
County, was murdered by a servant.

Evans had stopped overnight at a

house in Hanover County's backcountry.

Before he retired, he gave a

large sum of money tied in a handkerchief to the master of the house for
safekeeping.

The next morning, collecting his belongings including the

handkerchief, he continued his journey.

A convict-servant named
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Anthony-Francis Dittond must have seen the transaction, for he soon
disappeared from his master's house.

The servant was found in Spotsyl

vania County with a handkerchief containing a large sum of money.

A

check of the region in which Dittond's master lived revealed Evans'
body with his skull fractured.

Dittond was promptly bound over to the

October General Court where he was tried, convicted, and ordered hanged.
His execution took place in November.^

Once again, the Gazette had

published the full details of the crime, the sensationalism of which
provided an opportunity to obtain readers and the morality of which
served to instruct those readers.
The criminality occurring in Virginia in the years following 1735
was complicated by the growth of an outlaw gang tradition.

Although

many criminals operated alone or in small numbers, by 1750 a sizeable
gang had collected on the colony's frontier and was busy stealing horses
to be sold outside the colony's boundaries.

These horse thieves took

advantage of the terrain to escape capture and detection.

Consequently,

their numbers and the extent of their operations are known only in very
general terms.

However, the success of their organization indicates

that they were a constant problem to many frontier counties as well as
the more settled regions.

Furthermore, a possible association with

counterfeiters suggests a very high level of organization and an
effective range of operations throughout the entire Middle Atlantic
colonial region.
Horse stealing had become a serious activity in Virginia by 1750,
but Virginia's government had little idea of its extent until the late
1740s when members of the House of Burgesses presented a petition
protesting activity of horse thieves.

Horses stolen in Virginia were
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driven into other provinces where they were sold.

On other occasions

the thieves would simply drive the animals well away from the place at
which they were stolen and let them go.

Other members of the gangs

would then take them up as strays and sell them.

This effectively

screened the actual thieves from identification.

Moreover, by driving

the horses into other colonies fewer questions would be asked.

Finally,

the thieves sold in Virginia horses stolen in other provinces.

The

petition concluded by asking aid from the House in breaking up the
ring s . ^
Six months later Amelia County burgesses petitioned the House for
compensation to be paid to two men who had caught a notorious horse
thief named John Benton, alias Holloway.

The General Court had con

victed and ordered the execution of Holloway, an act already carried
out when the petition appeared before the House.

The burgesses who

presented the petition asked for compensation to Charles Anderson and
Joseph Morton, Junior, for their role in apprehending Holloway.

Al

though the Committee of Propositions and Grievances to which the
petition was referred recommended rejection of the memorial, the House
voted that J^IO each be paid the t w o . ^
These two petitions must have sparked a crackdown on horse thieves
in the colony, for along with the rewards Anderson and Morton received,
George McKeen also received ^ 1 0 as a reward for his capture of Reason
Rutledge and Anthony Wheeler as horse thieves.
executed, but Wheeler escaped before his trial.

Rutledge was tried and
In 1752 the General

Court outlawed George Smith and John Schockley as horse thieves.

Six

months later, at the October 1752 regular session, the General Court
found Moses Thomson and Thomas Aubery, alias Smith, guilty of horse
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stealing and sentenced them to death.

That December the Oyer and

Terminer Court acquitted Thomas Kelly of Fairfax County of the killing
of Thomas Davis because Davis had been a robber and horse thief.^
These horse thieves were all caught on the western and north
western frontiers of the country.

Moreover, Amelia and Albemarle Coun

ties abutted each other, so it is not unreasonable to assume that con
nections existed among Benton, Rutledge, and Wheeler, and the others.
The flurry of government activity related to horse thievery did not,
however, wipe out the menace.

By the mid-century, then, horse thievery

had become a permanent element of the criminal patterns of Virginia and
had stimulated the growth of an outlaw gang tradition, closely inter
twined, apparently, with a growing counterfeiting movement in the col
ony.
A central figure of the counterfeiting ring, Lowe Jackson, was
caught and tried before the General Court in April 1751.

Although con

victed and sentenced to hang, he was ordered reprieved until His Majes
ty's pleasure should be known in the case.

A possibility of influential

friends in the colony may explain the reprieve, for many counterfeiters
in later years in Virginia had powerful friends seeking to protect them
from prosecution.

At the same session the Court tried John Hill, alias

Seale, for horse stealing and sentenced him to hang.

However, just as

in the case of Jackson, the Court took mercy and pardoned him.

Whether

there existed any connection between the two men is difficult to say,
but apparently they both had influence in the colony preventing their
immediate executions, for Hill had been convicted three times previously
for felonies and the Court invariably ordered the execution of an in
dividual convicted of that many crimes.^®
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The beginnings of an outlaw gang tradition implicit in the trials
of these two men and the other horse thieves argue that many men in
Virginia had recognized the easiest way for them to make quick fortunes
was an extensively organized gang operating within and without the col
ony's borders.

Their boldness and techniques also argue that by 1750

the integration of the colonies had proceeded so far and their settle
ments become so close that those needing to transport their ill-gotten
goods rapidly and efficiently to neighboring provinces could do so.
The ability of outlaw gangs to operate with great skill on the
frontiers of Virginia and her neighbors indicates also that the crimin
als may have had protection from powerful or influential Virginians.
The outlaw gangs and the apparent relaxation of stringent enforcements
of punishments suggest that Virginia's society had grown to accept a
certain level of criminal behavior, thus expanding its toleration of
deviance.*-®

The establishment of white supremacy and systems of control

of slaves in the colony released some tensions binding white society and
constricting whites' behavior.

Furthermore, the disappearance of major

forms of rebellion among whites probably also encouraged some relaxation
by governmental officials of their enforcement of criminal punishment.
While such a trend toward permissiveness was occurring, a wave of
potentially major violence was building.

Although not destined to

approach the levels of the 1670s or 1680s, the new violence was political
and, to some degree, class in origin.
gether the various acts committed.

No identifiable leaders tied to

Although class divisions in Virginia

were more artificial than their European counterparts, this did not mean
that Virginians did not try to maintain such divisions.

The use of the

lash and other corporal punishments, both by masters and courts, helped

281
ingrain in servants, white or black, the idea of their "natural" in
feriority.

However, when slavery became the principal labor system in

the colony and most white servants were freed, their notions of "infer
iority" were certainly tempered by the presence of a servile class
knowing no hope of freedom and the liberty associated with that quality.
Thus, a race consciousness helped erase some elements of class consciousness. 19
The evidence of a growing political-class violence manifests itself
in the 1730s and 1740s, although signs of it were apparent as early as
the 1690s when Mr. Matthew Kemp, a burgess from Middlesex County, re
ported to the House in October 1693 that Thomas Rooke had physically and
verbally assaulted him.

The House instructed Kemp to prepare a memorial

of the incident and deliver it to the House, which he did.

The House

then ordered Rooke incarcerated and, on November 2, had him appear be
fore the House to beg its pardon and that of Kemp.^O

The only incident

of its kind to appear in the records of the seventeenth or early eight
eenth centuries, this type of occurrence became much more common after
1735 and the assault on Kemp may have been solely the result of drunk
enness on Rooke's part.

But more important suggestions of the coming

trend of violence began to appear in the 1720s as residents of Essex
County memorialized the House of Burgesses complaining that Colonel
Joseph Smith had exercised "great severities" in his dispensation of
fines under a court martial.21

Smith might have been trying to foster

his fortune, a common practice among the "great men" of the colony in
the seventeenth century, but one becoming increasingly reprehensible in
the eighteenth century as the need to exploit the labor of common
Virginians declined.

Thus, citizens of Essex County could obtain at
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least a hearing on their petition, when in the seventeenth century to
have even presented such a petition became tantamount to treason.
A year later, in 1724, the Council heard the appeal of Robert
Jourdan, Junior, of Nansemond County on his conviction of writing and
publishing "a scandalous libel on this Government and the established
Church," the twin pillars of deference in Virginia.

Whereas seven

teenth-century courts would have ordered him hanged, the Council re
scinded the General Court's sentence.

Significantly, Jourdan was

ordered imprisoned until he furnished security and a bond for his future
good behavior.

But Jourdan could not enter a bond because that required

an oath and he was a Quaker.

He offered the Council an alternative

which it readily accepted; that is, he would secure two members of the
Church of England as sureties to be bound for h i m . ^
Once again, a significant change in official attitudes to a group
formerly proscribed from the society is suggested.

Quakers had been

imprisoned for their faith in Virginia in the 1650s and 1660s to dis
courage more from coming to the colony.

Even as late as 1710, their

reputations were questionable, for they were blamed for inciting the
civil war in North Carolina in 1711, as Governor Spotswood remarked in
a letter to the Earl of Rochester.23

Yet by the mid-1720s they were no

longer proscribed and could expect some favorable treatment from the
Council.
In 1728 an election riot occurred serving as a harbinger of another
type of violence associated with this trend.

At the opening of the

1728 Assembly in February, Northumberland County residents petitioned
the House that their representatives had not been chosen properly.

The

House immediately referred the petition to the Committee of Elections

and Privileges which reported on February 9 that indeed the election
had been improperly conducted.
seats from the county:

Four candidates had stood for the two

Peter Presley and George Ball, the incumbents;

and Robert Carter and a Mr. Neal, the opponents.

When the voters had

assembled at the polling place, Presley asked for a general voice vote.
No voters objected, and Presley promptly received a large voice vote.
Then Carter demanded that the voters be polled individually.

As the

poll proceeded, many of Presley's voters cast their ballots for only
one candidate, a procedure at best questionable since voters in eight
eenth-century Virginia county elections were required to vote for two
candidates.

However, with the poll almost completed, the county sher

iff proclaimed Presley one winner.

A voter then demanded his two

ballots, which was his right, and he and the sheriff fell into a long
argument settled only when the voter won his point.

Other voters then

demanded their two ballots, but the sheriff refused adamantly.

Fighting

and tumults ensued and the voters of Northumberland protested to the
House the manner in which the sheriff had conducted the election.

While

the Committee of Privileges and Elections upheld the protest, the House
overrode the committee's recommendation for a new election and seated
the two incumbents.

During the fracas, nearly fifty voters had left

the county courthouse dissatisfied and many had threatened reprisals on
the sheriff.

The House had, however, overlooked these clear threats to

authority.^
This election illustrates the great power and privilege exerted by
the county sheriffs in eighteenth-century Virginia.

The sheriff was a

key figure in the manipulation and direction of elections in that
century, and, thus, a principal in the control and direction of the
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deferential society.

His favor during the administration of an election

often insured victory for a candidate. ^

But seldom did voters revolt

against an election decision until the 1720s and 1730s, suggesting that
provincial politics had now become important enough that serious com
petition, in many forms including violence, was warranted.

Moreover,

while county elites provided candidates for election to burgesses, the
fact of the increasing number of election riots and disputed elections
indicates that county elites were fighting within themselves for power
at the provincial level and exploiting incipient class unrest to gain
the means to win those struggles.
A good example of the riotous and tumultuous behavior of voters
occurred in Hanover County in 1736.

Sheriff Garland reported to the

House of Burgesses that he had been unable to poll the voters due to
their riotous and violent behavior.

The House considered the incident

so unusual and threatening that it asked Garland to appear before it to
explain the fracas.

He averred that he had opened the polls as usual,

but the voters had quickly become too tumultuous and he had had to stop
the procedure.

The Attorney-General, John Clayton, had been there, and

he confirmed the sheriff's report.

The three men accused of fomenting

the disorders were quickly sent for, but only Thomas Prosser and Pouncey
Anderson appeared.

Matthew Anderson was in the Hanover County jail and

could not be heard from.

The House authorized Governor Gooch to issue

writs for new elections in the county.

Again, the House had had to

deal with the fact of a contested election which bred violence.

Per

haps too many liquid "treats" had been dispensed prior to the polling
and that had launched the riots.

However, candidates' representatives

knew that custom demanded that "treats" be held until the polls closed.

285
Thus, they obviously intended to influence the election, or even to
prevent its conduct if enough of their voters had not yet appeared at
the polling place.
In the 1740s members of the House of Burgesses and county sheriffs
reported several assaults and election riots, taken together suggesting
a high level of competition and some decline of deference.

In 1740

Benjamin Harrison of Charles City County charged John Parker with
assault on one of Harrison's servants and with uttering "several rude
and abusive expressions" about Harrison himself.

The next day, June 7,

the House found Parker guilty of the acts alleged of him and ordered
that he be brought before its bar to beg forgiveness not only of the
House but of Harrison. 27
Two years later the House learned that Henry Downs, burgess from
Orange County, had been guilty of "many scandalous practices of which
he had been convicted and received punishment."

In 1721 as a lad in

Marlborough, Prince George County, Maryland, Downs had stolen several
sheep, for which that county's court had ordered fifteen lashes "well
laid on, . . . , so that the Blood appear."

Downs was then ordered

sold for one year and nine months as a servant.

In consequence, the

Virginia House of Burgesses refused to seat Downs. ^
His election to the House was contested anyway, and about one
month later Mr. Edwin Conway, chairman of the Committee of Privileges
and Elections, reported his committee's findings to the House.

Seven

men had stood for election in Orange County that year and reasonable
doubt existed about the seating of Robert Slaughter and Downs because
election irregularities had occurred.

The complaint was filed by

Thomas-Wright Belfield on behalf of himself and the other losing
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candidates:
Wood.

Thomas Chew, Zaccariah Taylor, William Russell, and James

As soon as the poll opened, tumults broke out lasting inter

mittently throughout the afternoon.

The county sheriff had posted

guards at the doors of the courthouse to keep the peace, but John
Tucker, campaigning for Slaughter, dispensed punch the whole afternoon.
When the sheriff dismissed the guards later that afternoon, the merry
makers and rioters returned to the courthouse to resume their brawling.
The House, on June 5, resolved that Slaughter's election was illegal
and, of course, Downs was already out.

29

Violence and mayhem respecting not only elections but individual
members of the House continued through the 1740s and into the 1750s.
No observable peak of activity was reached, nor did the election vio
lence seem to decline as the French and Indian War approached.

In 1752

Bertrand Ewell of Prince William County alleged that he had been de
frauded of election as a burgess.

He accused Thomas Harrison and Joseph

Blackwell of illegally obtaining their own elections as burgesses.

The

House, however, found that the actual violence and mayhem of that
county's election had been sponsored by Ewell.

He had hired Abraham

Farrow, Joseph Nevill, and Henry Peyton of the county to behave "riot
ously and unlawfully," and to "assault the sheriff."
violently intimidated voters as well.

The three had

The House rejected Ewell's

petition and ordered that the three hirelings be brought before it to
beg the forgiveness of that body and the sitting members from Prince
William.

They also had to pay all costs associated with the action. ^

In addition three other incidents in which families or servants of
members of the House had been assaulted or verbally abused had occurred.
James Levle, doorkeeper to the House, informed the members that William
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Nugent of James City County had assaulted and had beaten him severely.
The House immediately instructed the James City County sheriff to
arrest Nugent to bring him before the House.

On Saturday, October 13,

the House received Nugent's formal, written apology for the assault,
but it still demanded that he come before the House's bar to be repri
manded publicly and to beg forgiveness verbally.^
In 1752 Joshua Hurt and Charles Oaks, both of King William County,
were called before the House to answer for their assaults on a group of
servants traveling to Williamsburg on business for their masters, all
unidentified burgesses.

The House resolved that the two were guilty of

breaches of the privileges of the House and should be severely and pub
licly reprimanded.

On Tuesday, April 14, Hurt and Oaks acknowledged

their faults before the House and begged its forgiveness.

The Speaker

administered a public reprimand before fining them costs and dismissing
them. ^2
One year later, in November 1753, George Fox was summoned before
the House to answer for an assault on the wife and servants of an un
identified member of the House.

Once again, he was made to appear pub

licly for a reprimand by the Speaker and to pay all costs associated
with the incident.^
The assaults on families of members of the House were beginning
to have their effects on attitudes toward other representatives of
public authority.

In 1744 a Lieutenant Shenton of the Royal A n y

appeared before the House to charge William Harvey with insult and dis
respect to His Majesty's army.

Shenton, his sergeant, and other mem

bers were in Virginia recruiting for service in King George's War.
Harvey had insulted Shenton's sergeant and had challenged him to a duel.
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He had abused His Majesty's service in attempts to dissuade men from
enlisting, and he had even tried to convince some recruits for a Colonel
Trelawney's regiment that they should desert.

The Council ordered him

prosecuted for his activity.3^
This type of assault on public figures, especially those repre
senting public authority, evidently remained a form of low-level vio
lence throughout the pre-Revolutlonary period.

The presence of black

slaves in the colony contributed to a decline in deference by emphasiz
ing equality among all whites in Virginia.

That emphasis derived from

the transition to slavery made in the early portion of the eighteenth
century.

The decision to substitute Negro slaves for white indentured

servants, unconscious in nature, provided an opportunity for whites in
the colony to assert a unity of race versus a diversity of class.

How

ever, political considerations and class consciousness could not be com
pletely separated and a low-level of political unrest persisted.
Negro slave violence helped reinforce the dual, paradoxical nature
of the decision to enslave.

The repeated suicides by felonious or out

lawed blacks threatened with capture reminded Virginians, however, that
their slaves desired freedom and would resort to death as a release
from the "peculiar institution."

Although the advertisement section of

the Virginia Gazette contained about fifteen hundred mentions of runaway
slaves between 1736 and 1801, the records of violence in which slaves
participated imply that the conditions of slavery were so harsh on many
plantations that blacks retaliated with more than just running off.33
They resorted to a variety of violent attacks upon masters, masters'
families, and overseers to highlight their resistance to slavery.
Moreover, an increase in slave population from forty-five thousand

in 1730 to over one hundred thousand in 1750 provided more opportuni
ties for blacks to commit individual acts of crime, violence, and re
bellion.

Approximately twenty-six thousand slaves were imported be

tween 1732 and 1755, over twenty-three thousand of them directly from
Africa.

If the population of slaves increased roughly fifty-five

thousand in those same years, then imports accounted for about fifty
percent of the total, natural increase the other fifty percent.

The

transition to native-born from African-born slaves may explain the
sudden decline in collective violence because the comparative reduction
of formerly-free, adult Negroes in the colony's slave population
lessened the collective desire for freedom.

Additionally, masters and

courts practiced forms of correction and punishment far harsher than
used against whites at that time; for instance, in the late 1730s a
slave belonging to John Baylor of Orange County was sentenced to death
for stealing eighteen pence from Erasmus Taylor. °
In most instances of violence committed by slaves or done to slaves,
the blacks were clearly discriminated against as a special class.

Their

role in society was socially to remain objects of white disdain and
scorn and economically to perform the hard, arduous labor required to
clear land and to grow tobacco.

Their only recourse to resistance to

slavery was at the individual level after 1735, for no plots or in
surrections occurred between 1735 and 1800.

Although plotters and

fomenters of the period 1687 to 1730 never successfully raised a major
revolt, that fact never deterred them.

Five insurrectionary plots,

evidently more carefully planned than white uprisings of the 1670s and
1680s, suggest that blacks would not cease their major resistance
until the masters had taken sufficient means to quell any possible
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disturbance.

This was done through strict enforcement of slave control

laws such as forbidding them to meet in large numbers and requiring
their presence with their masters at church or funerals, times which
slaves had formerly used to plan their uprisings.

Unfortunately for

the plotters, their insurrections were usually discovered.3^
With the realization that white methods of mass control were too
strict and stringent for them, the blacks who wished to revolt against
slavery had to turn to other means.

Thus, the level of individual re

sistance rose in inverse proportion to the decline of mass rebellion.
Between 1735 and 1755 white masters entered before the House of Burgesses
thirty-nine petitions for compensation for slaves.

This class of

petitions revealed the means by which the slaves had died and explained
why they had been killed.

In addition to the petitions there were

fourteen court trials of slaves reported.

In most instances the trials

were conducted before special courts of Oyer and Terminer appointed by
the governor and charged for the express purpose of trying those blacks.
Although courts frequently ordered punishments far more inhumane com
pared to those given contemporary whites for similar offenses, compared
to punishments inflicted on white servants in the seventeenth century,
eighteenth-century slave punishments differed little.

Yet, court-

ordered punishments for slaves remained a means of distinguishing blacks
and setting them off from whites in Virginia; thus another symbol of the
90

pervasiveness of racism within the colony appeared. °
Among the trials suggesting this insight is that of Eve in Orange
County in 1746.

Eve's master had died December 27, 1745, and she was

accused of having administered a slow poison to him on the preceding
August 19th.

Her trial, occurring January 23, 1746, found her pleading
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not guilty and having to conduct her own defense as well as testify on
her own behalf.

However, several witnesses claimed that she had indeed

administered the poison.

The court sentenced her to death by burning

and directed that her execution take place on a high hill in the county
so that as many slaves as possible might be able to witness the execu
tion while at their labors.3^
In another trial, this one in 1737, a court of Oyer and Terminer
sentenced Peter to hanging for the murder of his master, Thomas Riddle.
Not only would Peter hang but his head was to be cut from his body and
prominently displayed near the Orange County courthouse as a warning to
other Negroes.

In a third instance, a slave woman was ordered burned

at the stake for the murder of her mistress, a Mrs. Prudden of Nansemond County.40
In addition to trials, their masters' petitions to the House of
Burgesses asking compensation, reveal black rebelliousness.

In many

instances the slaves had killed another slave or a white before fleeing
their plantations.

In consequence, their masters had had them outlawed

and they had been killed resisting capture or had committed suicide to
escape capture.

Joseph Hale asked compensation for a slave who had

murdered another slave and then hanged himself.

Moor Fantleroy re

quested compensation for a slave who had murdered his own wife, also
Fantleroy's slave, had run off and been outlawed, and had drowned him
self to escape capture.

In addition to these types of petitions

masters also requested compensation for slaves who had run off in the
classic outlaw slave tradition defined in 1691.

These slaves remained

in hiding, foraging for food and other necessities by robbing and
stealing throughout their environs.

Several of these petitions
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revealed that many slaves were doing such in the colony, signalling the
permissiveness to which Gerald Mullin pointed in his analysis of slave
resistance in eighteenth-century Virginia. ^
Thus, by 1755 blacks had fashioned several violent means of resist
ing slavery.

Combined with those non-violent means of resistance, such

as work slowdowns, abuse of farm animals and equipment, and frequent
"sickness," the impression arises of a people somewhat more rebellious
than many historians have recognized.^2

Moreover, the effects of this

rebelliousness is apparently of at least a two-fold, paradoxical nature.
On the one hand, the harsh punishments administered to miscreant blacks
reinforced notions of white supremacy and superiority in Virginia.

How

ever, the continued need to inflict such punishments reminded white
Virginians of the rebelliousness of blacks and, thus, of the threat to
the peace, security, and order of the colony posed by slaves.

If that

threat had any effect, however, on the reduction of violence within
white society itself, it was at best minimal, for the transition to a
slave society provided the opportunity needed to reduce tensions within
white classes.

By transferring laboring chores to blacks, the constant

exploitation of poor whites which had characterized the seventeenth
century ended.

All whites could feel not only a common bond in race,

but experience a more practical set of bonds erected from the decline
of exploitation and the rise of universal propertyholding.43

Thus, by

1755 white confidence in control and administration of the society in
Virginia, a control free from external racial threats, had reached
maturity.

White Virginians felt their new power, concentrated in the

House of Burgesses, and challenged the "prerogative" with increasing
s u c c e s s . H o w e v e r , while Virginians were exerting their newfound

political strength, within the white society challenges to the politi
cal leadership such as election day riots and assaults on families of
burgesses, were building, challenges reflecting not only awareness of
the House's position of prestige, but a jealousy of those who con
trolled it.
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NOTES
POLITICS AND OUTLAW GANGS:
VIOLENCE IN MID-EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY VIRGINIA

^Nonviolent means of resisting slavery have been detailed in a
number of secondary works.
See, for example, Kenneth M. Stampp, The
Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South (New York, 1956),
pp. 98-109, 124-127; Lawrence W. Levine, "Slave Songs and Slave Con
sciousness: An Exploration in Neglected Sources," in Tamara K. Hareven,
ed., Anonymous Americans: Explorations in Nineteenth-Century Social
History (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1971), 99-126. Mullin, Flight
and Rebellion, pp. 33-34, 53-56, provides insights into mid-eighteenth
century Virginia slaves' habits of resistance.
2The classic statement of eighteenth century penal reform is Cesare
Beccaria's An Essay on Crimes and Punishments (English translation,
Philadelphia, 1819) (1764), a statement attacking capital punishment and
advocating humanitarian treatment of criminals. Some young Virginians
finished their educations in English or colonial colleges and those
institutions introduced them to the enlightened ideas as well as classi
cal principles of equity and law. In their later years, some of these
Virginians sat on the Council and, thus, the General Court.
It Is
possible that they were influenced by considerations of penal reform.
^Parks' Virginia Gazette (Williamsburg), November 5, 1736; November
26, 1736. For burning in the hand, see Dalzell, Benefit of Clergy, 17,
25, where he suggests that branding with cold irons was practiced in
England before 1700. The Greenly woman had murdered a fellow-servant
and Matthews formed part of an expanding pattern of horse thievery.
^Parks' Virginia Gazette, May 6, 1737; May 27, 1737. For Gooch's
letter, see Gooch to Peter Leheup, June 22, 1737, C05/1337, ff 197-199,
Reel M-246, VCRMP, CWRL.
■’Parks' Virginia Gazette, June 17, 1737, for Morgan's case. A man
by the same name was ordered executed for horse stealing two years later,
however. Moreover, another man, Joseph Llghtbum, from Prince William
County the same county sll Morgan, was also ordered hanged for horse
stealing. The two men were probably operating together. See ibid.,
Nov. 2 and 23, 1739. For Jackson, see ibid., May 4, 1739; Nov. 23,
1739; Dec. 14, 1739.
^Hunter's Virginia Gazette, April 18, 1751; October 17, 1751.
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^Parks' Virginia Gazette, Dec. 15, 1738; Nov. 2, 1739.
^Fifteen felons were hanged for murder and thirty others hanged
for one of a variety of crimes ranging from horse stealing to pick
pocketing. Included in those capital crimes were a number of acts
which today would be punishable by jail sentences of short duration,
one to five years. But in some instances, the Gazette1s brief report
suggested that the felon had committed at least one other crime earlier
in his life. For some examples of "repeaters," see Parks' Virginia
Gazette. November 23, 1739.
^Rankin, Criminal Trial Proceedings, 121-123, suggests that
judicial penal reform was well along by 1750.
10Ibid., 116.
■^Parks' Virginia Gazette, June 10, 1737; Sept. 16, 1737; Nov.
18, 1737.
12lbid., Aug. 18, 1738; Aug. 25, 1738; Nov. 3, 1738; Nov. 24,
1738.
13JHB, 1742-1749, 274.
l^Ibid., 338-339, 345.
■*-3LJC, II (1715-1754), 1024; Hunter's Virginia Gazette, Apr. 30,
1752; Oct. 20, 1752; Dec. 15, 1752.
^-^Hunter's Virginia Gazette, Apr. 18, 1751; May 1, 1751; Aug. 8,
1751; Aug. 16, 1751.
■^The idea that a sense of community was developing in America
long before the Revolution is treated in Merritt, Symbols of American
Community; and Michael Kraus, Intercolonial Aspects of American Culture
on the Eve of the Revolution: With Special Reference to the Northern
Towns (New York, 1928).
ISgrikson, Wayward Puritans, 3-4, 6-7, 9-14, introduces the con
cept of deviance as a function of the limits of tolerable behavior in
a society.
In this context, a society may not permit certain behavior,
such as Quakerism, in one era, but allow such much later. Virginia
society rejected continued use of full punishment for many crimes in
the eighteenth century, yet apparently never relaxed its vigilance in
the seventeenth. Moreover, horse thieves were banished or executed in
the early portions of the eighteenth century; yet by 1750 horse
thievery had become impossible to eradicate.
•^Virginia's social structure derived from a white, middle-class
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English background.
In the colony, however, those with ambition and
means had little trouble forcing their way to the top, where, by a
number of stratagems, they succeeded in remaining and passing their
wealth and power to their sons who, in turn, passed control on to their
sons. By 1720, this system had fashioned itself into the Virginia
family-dominated structure and compared in miniature to the control
administered by the great, landed families of England. Moreover, the
substitution of black slave labor for the white, indentured servants
had profound effects on class and race in the Old Dominion.
See
Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom. 341-346, for the impact of
racism.
20JHB, 1658/60-1693. 426.
^Smith's abuses resembled methods of exploitation practiced
earlier, JHB. 1712-1726, 365.
22e JC,

iv

(1721-1739), 67.

23For treatment of Quakers in the 1650s and 1660s, see pp. 126127, above. For Spotswood's letter, see Spotswood, Letters, ed.
Dodson, I, 108.
24JHB, 1727-1740, 15-16.
23For ways sheriffs could manipulate eighteenth century elections,
see Sydnor, American Revolutionaries. 24-25, 27-33, 68-70, 78, 147.
26jHB, 1727-1740. 256-266, 278. For the liberal use of liquid
"treats," see Sydnor, American Revolutionaries, 53-58, 70.
27JHB, 1727-1740. 419-421.
28JHB, 1742-1749, 7, 11.
29Ibid., 50-51, 53.
30jHB, 1752-1758, 57-58, 73, 81. For examples of later riots and
tumults, see Sydnor, American Revolutionaries. 24-26, 29-31. Even
George Washington was personally involved in a brawl in the 1755
burgess election in Fairfax County.
31JHB. 1742-1749, 131, 132.
32JHB. 1752-1758. 84, 87.
33lbid., 125, 134.
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34e j c , V (1739-1754), 160. See also ibid., 279n 127, for a sim
ilar incident which did not result in violence.
35tiullin, Flight and Rebellion, 39-40.
36For the increase in slave importation, see Chapter VIII, pp. 240241, above, and Donnan, ed., Documents Illustrative of the History of
the Slave Trade, IV, 175 ff. The total black population increase may
be found in Statistical History of the United States, Series L 14, 756.
The case appears in A. G. Grinnan, "The Burning of Eve in Virginia,"
VMHB, III (1895-1896), 308.
3?This point contrasts with Morgan, American Slavery, American
Freedom. 308-309, where the author minimizes the extent of slave in
surrections and plots. For laws curtailing slave activities, see
Hening, ed., Statutes-at-Large, III (1684-1710), 459-462; IV (17111736), 126-127, 129-131.
38p*or representative petitions, see JHB, 1727-1740. 338, 339;
1742-1749, 27, 94, 95; 1752-1758, 27, 31. For the trials see the
Virginia Gazette. Dec. 9, 1737; August 21, 1752; October 27, 1755.
3^Grinnan, "Burning of Eve," 309-310.
40ibid., 308; Parks' Virginia Gazette, Aug. 26, 1737.
4 1JHB, 1742-1749, 108; 1752-1758, 111, 115. For some petitions
concerning outlaws, see ibid., 1742-1749, 273, 280. Mullin, Flight
and Rebellion, 124-130, introduces the idea about permissiveness.
42see note 1, this Chapter, p. 294, for references to non
violent means of slave resistance.
43j4organ, American Slavery, American Freedom, Chap. 16, emphasizes
the racist backdrop to the birth of white freedom.
44por the political attacks against the prerogative, see Morton,
Colonial Virginia, II, Chaps. 4, 18, 27-30.

CHAPTER

X

CONCLUSION

The evidence derived from study of the major surviving groups of
official, provincial-level documents between 1607 and 1754 indicates
that the violence in the colony of Virginia followed a general pattern
determined not by political but by social and racial issues.

Whenever

a racial group threatened the order and stability of the white popu
lation, that population struck back with organized forms of violence
designed to subordinate the racial threat.

In the absence of racial

threats, violence within white society generated by social and economic
issues erupted.

The general pattern may be divided into three signif

icant components:
white portion.

an Indian-white, and exclusively white, and a black-

Each component was dependent upon English notions of

order and social stability.

In the first epoch Indians and whites

struggled with each other, the first trying to resist the loss of their
lands and the destruction of their culture, the second wishing to ex
tend their controls over lands they considered unused and to force
Indians into a cultural pattern similar to their own.

The success of

English settlers derived from their technological strength and their
means of social organization.

More to the point, the English were able

to perceive the Indians as a unitary threat, one which had to be crushed,
whereas Indians were less able to regard the English as an enemy which
had to be destroyed.

Only Opechancanough perceived the whites as an
298
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enemy to be eliminated from Virginia.

In the years between 1622 and

1646, the Old Indian chief made two determined efforts at the de
struction of the Virginia colony.

Although no narratives or any other

documents have survived to present Indians' view of whites, one may
reasonably infer from white materials that at least Opechancanough
recognized that without destruction of the whites Indian culture and
land possession were doomed.
Although land remained the point of practical difference between
the two peoples, it was symbolic of the more fundamental cultural
differences separating Indian from white.

Official fears of "going

Indian" led to strict laws and harsh punishments for those who did do
so.

The imposition of those punishments inaugurated a trend of severe,

even inhuman, punishment for any type of deviant behavior in early
Virginia.

White officials regarded those trying to live with the

Indians as a threat to the concept of order and discipline they brought
with them from England and wished to recreate In the New World.

Indian

work habits particularly bothered English officials, for Indian males
appeared to do little, if any, work.

Work was not only a calling, that

is, a quality assuring an individual some station in life, but a means
of social order and discipline.

Those violating that order in Virginia

were severely punished, and, to the leadership of the colony, none of
their fellow whites violated more clearly the strictures about work and
discipline than those who deliberately ran off to live with Indians.
They were most severely punished; at least many observers alleged such.^
The competition for land and struggle for cultural survival dom
inating English-Indian existence in early Virginia inevitably bred
great violence which characterized relations between the two peoples
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not only after 1622 but during some periods prior to 1622.

With con

tinued violence came white disregard for the humanity of the Indian.
As the seventeenth century wore on, whites became increasingly callous
about the red men in Virginia.

It was symbolic that a guard shot

Opechancanough in the back after he was captured and jailed.

Even more

symbolic was the rumor that Governor Berkeley intended to send the
almost one-hundred-year-old man to England to be placed on view in an
iron

cage.^

Later treatment of Indians in the colony bears out the

impression of a callous disregard for the red man's humanity, a dis
regard generated by constant warfare and mistreatment during the first
forty years of Virginia's existence.^

Furthermore, that disregard was

easily transferred not only to slaves but lower-class whites, exploited
by both the Crown in England and the wealthy in the colony.
Following conclusion of the Indian phase of violence in 1646 came
a sixty-year period which freed whites from any major racial threat.
Although settlers continued to perceive an Indian threat, domination of
the Virginia natives was assured and complete by 1650.

Only Indians

living beyond Virginia's frontiers posed any problem to the security
and safety of whites, and those were largely frontier whites.4

But

Virginians were slow to recognize this fact, for Bacon and his follow
ers generated their violence in response to what they considered an
Indian uprising threatening the whole colony.

Yet social and economic

problems existed which clearly overrode the importance of the Indian
factor in Bacon's Rebellion.

The Indian uprising provided the event

necessary to launch the revolt, but that Indian threat was not a sig
nificant menace to Virginia's existence.
Many other factors prompted resort to massive violence in 1676.
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Among factors generating the turbulence, discontent, and major violence
of the last quarter of the seventeenth century were included England's
tobacco policy, her tougher administrative position, extensive land
grants to court favorites, and the harsh exploitation of white labor—
free or servant— by those controlling the lands.^

By the time the

eighteenth century had arrived, the colony's labor exploiters had
shifted from white indentured servants to black slaves.

Not only had

the choice for slavery been made but the colony had fashioned an ex
tensive slave code designed, in part, to use violence to prevent re
belliousness and resistance to the institution.^
However, the years between 1646 and 1705, generally free of racial
threat, were the years of highest turbulence among whites in Virginia.
The evidence of that violence suggests that not only did class warfare
appear but that English definitions of freedom and individual liberty
became subordinate to the economic interests of those controlling
society.^

Additionally, those leading Virginia remained intensely con

cerned with means of forging order and stability in a society not yet
susceptible to such qualities.
The immigrant nature of Virginia's population alone suggests that
some instability inhered in the society.

Moreover, the bulk of those

immigrants were white youths, probably in the age group sixteen to
twenty-five.

When they received their freedom from indentured servi

tude, they might have easily integrated with the rest of Virginia's
society, but the continued exploitation of them by their former masters
aroused grievances and resentments which fomented into turbulence, dis
order, and violence.

Not until the transition to slavery was made did

the tension represented by the presence of those exploited whites
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recede.

Furthermore, achievement of a modicum of balance between

natural and immigration population increase helped relieve that social
O

tension.
The prevalence of guns in the frontier society of Virginia further
contributed to violence, for easy access to guns allowed for a high
level of violent response to real or perceived insults and grievances.

g

Too many free, young white males in the colony, many of them possessing
firearms, encouraged demagogues such as Nathaniel Bacon, Jr., to ex
ploit their unrest.

Bacon's ability to exploit that unrest, however,

was rooted as much in his social position as in his demagogic powers.
His social standing in the colony was of the highest order, a member
of the Council, intimately connected by blood and marriage to other
very high-ranking Virginians such as the Governor and another Councilor,
and possessor of extensive lands and plantations in the colony.

His

high social standing helped him win a large following.^
The fact of extensive unrest in the colony is suggested by the
growing level of crime, most notably murders and other crimes against
the person.

By 1676 the colony's General Court, acting as court of

first instance in capital cases, was bearing a greater case-load.

Al

though simple population growth accounts for some of the increased case
load, the fact that so many young men, rootless and armed, lived in the
colony also helps explain the growth of criminality.
sorted to violence when quarreling or arguing.

These men re

Along with the rise of

murders and other crimes against the person came an apparent increase
in crimes against property, for the poverty of so many in the colony
encouraged "easy" solutions to the difficulties of earning a livelihood.
With no land and inability to earn a living pursuing some other calling,
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many young men turned to robbery or piracy to provide a quick and easy
income.

Thus, before pirates derived from the inter-colonial wars

appeared in Virginia, domestic crises had inaugurated a pattern of
piracy.

Although domestic problems declined after 1695 and, thus,

domestic forms of piracy disappeared, Virginia's location and the ex
tent of water associated with the colony attracted pirates.

Moreover,

by 1705 the wealth of the colony had so advanced that the opportunity
for quick riches provided another incentive to pirates.

Thus, the

colony, along with so many others, became a major attraction to pirates.
Piracy, then, was generated by social conditions in the colony prior to
1680, but its greatest impact on the history of violence in Virginia
occurred in the early eighteenth century.
The violence of the late seventeenth century reflected the im
maturity of the society as well as the economic and social ills afflict
ing the colony.

Neither the upper nor the lower classes was fixed;

that is, there existed no permanence in a generational sense.

The

scramble for riches continued unabated and some fluidity marked the
classes.

However, certain men had fastened onto the means to wealth

and the perquisites derived from wealth.

Men such as William Byrd I,

the early Wormeleys, first Fitzhughs, Major Robert Beverley and others
like them held high office in the colony.

12

Yet even many of them were

dissatisfied, for they had no access to the inner workings of the power
structure surrounding the governor, and they were jealous of that fact.
Hence, many encouraged and exploited the unrest within the colony prior
to and after 1676.

They used whatever means they possessed to secure

power to themselves for selfish, personal reasons as well as so they
might pass on to their progeny their status in the colony.

In order
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to do this, they contributed to unrest and discontent and challenged
those holding and wielding great power in the colony.

Their positions

in the colony were not enhanced by their activities on their own be
half, for those close to the wellsprings of power guarded jealously
their prerogatives and positions.

Giles Bland, the young customs

collector and critic of Governor Berkeley's role in the colony, lost
his life because he dared to criticize too openly the exploitations of
those at the top of the society.^

In this context, it is little won

der that the rest of the Virginia population remained discontented and
restless throughout the last quarter of the seventeenth century.
The violence of the late seventeenth century was in a narrow sense
motivated by economic factors and issues, but in a broader view those
economic issues mirrored the great social strains within the very
fabric of Virginia's society.

The social structure was unable to

withstand the continued shocks delivered by blows aimed at Virginia's
economy.

Whether any colonial society could have better withstood the

storm of economic issues afflicting Virginia in the seventeenth century
is questionable.

However, colonial Massachusetts underwent consider

able economic and political pressure from 1675 until 1700 and did not
dissolve into the violent and near-violent chaos of Virginia's society.
Massachusetts' society was founded upon a more clearly defined set of
social and political principles than Virginia, and Massachusetts was
maturing in a more diversified, economy than Virginia.

Thus the

northern colony had more resiliency built into its structure than
did her tobacco-oriented s i s t e r . ^
Virginia's social structure had not reached the maturity of Massa
chusetts' by 1675; too much scramble for wealth in the tobacco colony
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prevented the development of a stable social structure and interrupted
the advance of the colony toward a set of social principles helping
bind man to man.-*-^

The absence of any principles of social organiza

tion other than an effort to recreate England's country squire system
prevented significant ties from developing.

This was a lesson that the

Virginia Company was learning in the second decade of the colony's
settlement.

In order to attract new settlers, the company was creating

roles or statuses to provide attractions for those having to come to
the colony either as company or private servants.

What attractions

there were had to be made in land or occupations, a point which char
acterized American history until the end of the frontier period.'*’®
Although Virginia's economy depended upon tobacco for its basic
needs, the trade in that item had been brought close to ruin during the
last decades of the seventeenth century for many reasons.

Included

among those problems were England's enumeration of tobacco, thus pro
hibiting its exportation to any place other than England; the entrance
into large-scale production of the plant by settlers in North Carolina
and Maryland, thus competing with Virginia's already large annual crop;
and the continued exploitation of large numbers of white servants to
provide the labor necessary to growth of the c r o p . ^

Even though

efforts to diversify Virginia's economy were made with some indications
of success in those experiments, Virginia's farmers and planters did
not make a transition to a more broadly-based economy.'*’®

In part, that

failure explains the resort to turbulence and violence in the late
seventeenth century, for those possessing the land and labor exploited
both to the extent that laborers could take no more.

Outbreaks of

servile violence in the 1660s suggest that migration from an essentially
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free society, one with a high regard for personal liberty, to the
Virginia colony emphasizing the constant need for labor and using many
means, including institutionalized violence, to force that labor to
work was a socially unhealthy decision.*"^

Although servants generally

stopped short of large-scale violence until Bacon's Rebellion, they
remained a constant and ever present threat to the masters of Virginia's
society.

Their willingness to remain non-violent was based on the con

dition that some independent place existed for them within society when
their servitude ended.

However, if their only opportunity after their

indentures expired was to remain in the employ of their former masters
or to hire themselves as agricultural laborers or tenants to another
large landowner, they listened to and heeded those who promised them
another alternative, the Baconians.
Thus, in one sense the principal source of tension in the colony
after 1660 was economic.

But the strains of the society were reflected

in the developing social structure, a structure which after seventy
years of existence ought to have been more mature.

The high level of

immigration, the yearly exit of many indentured servants from their
service, and the constant physical expansion of the colony at the ex
pense of frontier Indians suggests that a fluid society existed, one
filled with economic opportunity.
that opportunity.

But many factors militated against

The facts that the powerful landholders continually

engrossed great quantities of acres and that the King muddled landholding even further with his extensive grants to favorites shut off
much of the presumed opportunity.20

Thus, some social fluidity existed,

but only from servitude to freedom.

The movement upward virtually

halted there.

Even though newly-freed servants might acquire small
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plots of land, fifty acres or more, their ability to make a living off
that land was contingent upon some working relationship with a major
planter marketing their surplus tobacco for them.

London merchants

charging high prices for the sale of commodities and products in the
colony took much of the income of those small farmers, taxes much of the
rest.

Thus, those smallholders found themselves in the unenviable

position of having to choose between a return to servitude or a slide
into some form of tenancy, in either of which they were confronted with
a loss of freedom. 2*By the last two decades of that century, even though Virginians
had tried to resist the centralization and integration of the English
Empire, that rationalizing process had already begun and was welladvanced. 22

Virginia's society felt the impact of events in England

much more than it had earlier in the century.

Some impetus to the

violence of the 1680s and to the threats of violence In the 1690s de
rived from English events, events closely tied to religion and notions
of imperial definition.

Whether the Empire was to revert to Catholicism

was an immediate and pressing problem of the 1680s.

If Whigs and Dis

senters permitted such a reversion, then the Empire would be remodelled
on divine right theories and few in the colonies or England wished for
an event of this nature.

The Glorious Revolution in Virginia, known

as Parson Waugh's Tumult, resulted from not only fears of a Catholic
upheaval in England but aversion to the definition of Empire and gov
ernment implicit in such a reversion.2®

Consequently, the violence and

threats of violence of the 1680s and 1690s were generated as much by
discontents over the nature of the Empire as they were over exclusively
local issues.

Those decades provide some clues to the approaching
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stability of Virginia.

The abuse of white labor had to be ended if any

disciplined order was to appear in the colony.2^

Moreover, more order

ly means for recognition of the status and position of those who had
arrived at the top of the society had to be provided.

In addition, the

nature of the Empire and Virginia's role within that entity had to be
more clearly defined.

By 1705 these major problems had been worked

out.2®
The substitution of slavery for indentured servitude was largely
completed by that year and the nature of the Empire and its governance
settled.

The inauguration of slavery is lost in the seventeenth century.

Its formal introduction, that is as a legal institution with the author
ity and sanction of law, occurred in the 1660s, and by the 1670s many
basic laws had been enacted.2®

However, the massive importation of

slaves to replace white labor did not occur until the early eighteenth
century.

By 1705 Virginians signalled through the enactment of a slave

code their intention to use slaves as their basic labor force.

Within

the early laws and the 1705 code were contained acts institutionalizing
violence as a means of black control in the colony.

The colonial gov

ernment had long used violence as a means of controlling the society,
violence aimed not only at individual malefactors, but those who fo
mented mass resistance.

But the legal violence associated with slavery

was of a much more brutal nature, for it permitted masters to kill their
slaves without fear of legal reprisals.

This institutionalization of

slavery was rooted as much in the need to prevent slaves from shirking
their work as racism.2^

However, the continued association of slavery

with labor in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries
encouraged the growth of a view of labor as degrading and of slaves
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as degraded beings.

Defined as chattel in 1705, slaves had to live a

paradoxical existence.2®

On the one hand, their masters expected them

to know Christian definitions of right and wrong and to refrain from
wrongdoing.

On the other hand, the definition of slaves as property

presumed no reasoning faculties; thus, they could not know such differ
ences.

Yet, they were constantly violently corrected for their mis

deeds, real or fancied.

Thus, in one sense, the institutionalization

of slavery increased the level of personal violence in the colony, for
it encouraged violence between black and white.

On the other hand,

however, the growth of slavery and its substitution for indentured
servitude as the principal laboring system in Virginia siphoned off
much of the lower-class white discontent which had marked the late
seventeenth century.
As Virginians completed the transition from dependence upon in
dentured servants to slaves, there appeared a clear decline in unrest
within the society.

Not only did the substitution of slaves siphon off

that discontent, but the opening of opportunity for cheap or free land
acquisition enabled many white lower-class males to acquire land and a
slave or two with which to work that land.

Their newfound status re

lieved many of their anxieties and, at the same time, helped create a
set of common bonds between them and the upper class of the colony.2^
These bonds encompassed attachment to the land and racial fears, for
the important point from considerations of violence is the growth of
those racial fears.

The renewal of a racial threat in Virginia provided

one more bond tying the society together.

During the 1680s and 1690s,

first expressions of those racial threats appeared.

The resistance of

blacks to slavery as well as the resurgent racism of Virginians provoked
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some thirty years of unrest between the two peoples.
Blacks used many means, some violent, to resist the institution
to which they were confined after 1700.

Those violent means of express

ing their discontent aroused fears and apprehensions within white
society.

Several insurrectionary plots, some allegedly involving free

blacks, reinforced those apprehensions.

While the reality of those

plots may be questionable, emphasizing that white paranoia and guilt
read into black meetings motives more sinister than slaves intended,
the evidence of five plots in Virginia between 1687 and 1730 suggests
that white fears were by no means exaggerated.

Blacks recoiled against

slavery and the evidence of individual violent resistance to the institution simply augments and supports the evidence of mass plots.
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White fears of their slaves reinforced the bond in white society
as slavery replaced servitude.

This is not to say that white indentured

servitude disappeared, but that slavery greatly eclipsed it.

Therefore,

in a twofold fashion, slavery encouraged a common bond among whites,
helping forge an orderly society which had not developed by the end of
the seventeenth century.

Moreover, slavery diminished much violence

among whites in the society because whites now had another race to
which they could direct their violent proclivities.

The continuation,

even the entrenchment, of slavery in eighteenth-century Virginia elim
inated much class conflict which had marked seventeenth-century Vir
ginia. 31Even those symptoms of class conflict apparent in the 1720s and
1730s remained just symptoms.

They did not blossom into full-scale

class conflict as they had in the 1670s, for slavery helped alleviate
the tensions within white society.

Certainly Virginia's white society

had reached a level of stability and maturity it had not attained in
the last half of the seventeenth century, but probably without that
institution the stability for which Virginia became so famous in the
eighteenth century would not have developed so far as it had by 1740. ^
The evidence of incipient unrest, tobacco warehouse burnings, outlaw
gangs, and political assaults exemplified by the election riots and
violence done to burgesses' families and servants suggests strongly
that Virginia might have become a society beset by disorder such as New
York or Pennsylvania, were it not for

s l a v e r y . ^3

That institution, even

when mass slave unrest disappeared after 1735, remained a means by which
a rough egalitarianism developed among all whites in the colony.

The

"legitimate" use of violence against blacks not only reduced white un
rest but provided a means by which whites could release their own
violence.

Moreover, the growth of slavery and the use of violence in

its control may have, in a fashion difficult to explain, lessened Vir
ginia's governmental commitment to a system of inhumane punishments for
convicted criminals.

Certainly the evidence from the 1730s and 1740s

indicates a slightly more permissive official attitude to white crim
inals than had appeared even as late as 1700.^

The trend toward a

nonphysical system of punishment, so apparent by 1750, was hardly dis
cernible in 1700.

Yet the transition to slavery and the use of vio

lence by white against black within that institution probably encour
aged more lenient views of punsihment within the white society.
Virginia's black population remained roughly one-third to fourtenths of the colony's total population between 1730 and 1750.
those fractions represented a dramatic increase since 1700.

But

In that

year the black population was perhaps one-tenth of Virginia's total

312
population, and there was not yet apparent to the colony's leaders a
trend of rapid slave increase.

Five years later the leadership suddenly

awoke to growth of the black population.35

As seen above, efforts were

made to limit the importation of slaves, but to little avail until
1732.^®

By then, however, blacks had arrived in sufficient numbers

that their population rise could rely on natural increase rather than
immigration.

By that latter date, mass slave plots had been curtailed

and blacks were resorting increasingly to individual means and methods
of resistance.

Thus, white relaxation of punishment within white crim

inal elements reflects the rise in black individual violence and the
attendant use of harsh physical means of correction against the slaves.
Probably no better example of white concern for preserving a united
front against their slaves may be found in Virginia than the Andrew
Bourne trial of 1729.

In that trial the Governor and Council, sitting

as the General Court, found him guilty of murdering a slave, only to
reverse the conviction sitting as the colony's Council.

This reversal

was based on the impetus his execution would give to the contempt and
arrogance blacks were allegedly expressing for their white rulers and
masters.3?
In consequence of the evidence of the overt and covert racial and
social uses of violence in colonial Virginia, long before nineteenthand twentieth-century whites in America were using violence to separate
themselves from groups of whom they were either suspicious or fearful,
it seems that the apparent paradox of a society, violent by nature yet
with little tradition of political violence, appeared even before
Independence.

White Virginians used many forms of violence to forge

a stable, orderly society, but the bulk of that violence was directed

at groups too weak to fight back on even terms.

What Henry Steele Com-

mager suggested as a focus for examining the history of violence, that
is, that whites directed their violence at those unable to retaliate,
in the United States during its national period had its roots in the
colonial era.^®

While colonial Virginia was probably not a violent

society compared to some of her colonial sisters, the peaks of violence
such as Bacon's Rebellion certainly outstripped any violent event in
other colonies in terms of sheer numbers.

But the bulk of the physical

violence and deaths associated with the history of violence in colonial
Virginia occurred between racial groups, Indians and whites in the
early seventeenth century and blacks and whites in the early eighteenth
century.

Thus, turmoil in Virginia's society between 1607 and 1754

revolved about a major racial pattern and a minor pattern of official
violence used to help create an orderly society.

At times the society

collapsed into disorder and violence, especially during Bacon's Re
bellion, however, the surviving record suggests that Virginia exper
ienced little major violence compared to other English colonial soci
eties of the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries.

But Virginians' use

of violence helped enable them to forge a stable, orderly society.
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NOTES
CONCLUSION

^See Morgan's discussion of Indian living in American Slavery,
American Freedom, 48-58. For specific reference to those "going Indi
an," see above, chap. II, pp. 53, 59. Lurie, "Indian Cultural Adjust
ments," 49-50, makes the argument for Opechancanough1s perceptions of
whites. The notion of calling infused English society, although the
Puritans developed it to its highest degree. See Bridenbaugh, Vexed
and Troubled Englishmen. 315-316.
^Morton, Colonial Virginia. I, 154, points out the rumor that
Berkeley intended to send the old Indian chief to England. For the
story of the guard shooting Opechancanough, see above, chap. Ill, p. 102.
% o m e acts of Assembly subordinating the tribes to the will of the
whites have already been cited. The treatment of the Nansiatticoes is
the most blatant example of the disregard.
See above, chap. IV, 117119, and chap. VI, 206-207. For further evidence of the disregard, see
Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 232-234.
^The problem of frontier Indians remained an important one during
the rest of the colonial era. Virginia's leadership had to deal with
frontier Indian violence and with violence generated by tributary
tribes within the colony. However, these violent events were usually
confined to Indians alone, especially the tributaries.
Indian raiders
seldom penetrated the more settled regions of the colony, confining
their attacks to the isolated settlements of the frontier. *
^Lovejoy, Glorious Revolution in America, 32-70, details the ef
fects of tobacco policy and administrative changes on Virginia as well
as other colonies. Land grants to court favorites and their impact on
Virginia's society may be found in Morgan, American Slavery, American
Freedom, 244-246; and Lovejoy, Glorious Revolution in America, 32-42.
^Hening, ed., Statutes-at-Large, III (1684-1710), 453-462.
^Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, Book III, details the
great discontent engendered by labor exploitation in the last half of
the seventeenth century.
^Ibid.; Craven, White, Red, and Black, 1-39; and Edmund S. Morgan,
"Headrights and Head Counts: A Review Article," VMHB, LXXX (1972),
361-371.
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®An individual angered by a friend or loved one will not resist the
temptation to grab the nearest weapon, a handgun in m o d e m America, in
order to vent his anger.
In a colonial society possessing large numbers
of guns, the same insight would probably apply.
l O t f e r t e n b a k e r ,

Torchbearer of the Revolution. 39-50, for Bacon's

social standing.
■^See above, chaps. IV and VI.
I2sailyn, "Politics and Social Structure," 99-102; Morgan, Ameri
can Slavery, American Freedom, 255, 268-269, 274, 279-280, 304, 305.
13Ibid., 255-256.
l^For an analysis of the problems besetting colonial Massachusetts
in the late seventeenth century, see Lovejoy, Glorious Revolution in
America, 143-150.
■^Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, Book III, emphasizes
this point repeatedly.
l^ciamond, "From Organization to Society," makes this point for the
Company period of Virginia history, but it seems plausible to extend it
throughout the colony's seventeenth century history.
^Attempts at limiting tobacco production by all three colonies
may be found in Morton, Colonial Virginia. I, 170-194.
l^Rainbolt, From Prescription to Persuasion. 161-165, where he con
trasts the seventeenth-century government attempts at forced diversifi
cation with the gradual diversification of the eighteenth century.
l%organ, American Slavery, American Freedom, 235-242; see above,
chap. IV, pp. 128-129, for Birkenhead's Revolt.
^Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom. 244-249; Craven,
White, Red, and Black, 1-39, for land grants.
^Bailyn, "Politics and Social Structure," 99-104; Morton, Colon
ial Virginia, I, 190-194, for the tobacco surplus of the 1660s and
1670s.
22Lovejoy, Glorious Revolution in America. Chap. 9.
23ibid., 220-225.
^Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 308.
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25l,ovejoy, Glorious Revolution in America, 263-264.
26Jordan, White Over Black, 80-82; Hening, ed., Statutes-at-Large,
II (1660-1682), 170, 270-271, 479-480, 490-491.
27Jordan, White Over Black. 103-108.
2%ening, ed., Statutes-at-Large, III (1684-1710), 333-335.
29williams,

"Political Alignments in Colonial Virginia," 351-353.

3®For the plots, see chaps. VII, pp. 217-219, and VIII, pp. 250-252.
One historian who minimizes the importance of the slave plots is
Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 309. For an analysis of
individual resistance, see Mullin, Flight and Rebellion, 38-43.
3^Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 308-309, for the
social results of the choice for slavery.
^Greene, "Changing Interpretations of Early American Politics,"
177, makes the point that Virginia by 1720 had achieved a political and
social stability unmatched in other American colonies.
33see the classic and still viable analyses of New York in Carl L.
Becker, The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York,
1760-1776 (Madison, 1909) and Pennsylvania in Charles H. Lincoln, The
Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania, 1760-1776 (Philadelphia, 1901).
The political disorder of the two colonies resulted from social stresses
derived from a variety of factors.
3^The rise of severe treatment of slaves paralleled the decline of
inhumane punishments of whites. While cross-cultural ties between
Europe and Virginia played a role as suggested in chapter IX, the
racial factor also encouraged the decline. See chaps. VII, p. 222;
VIII, pp. 258-262; and IX, pp. 271-277 , for the trend.
33Greene and Harrington, American Population, 138.
36Chap. VII, pp. 223-224.
37Chap. VIII, pp. 240-241.
38commager, "History of American Violence," 9-10.
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